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ARTICLE
GEOGRAPHY AS A LITIGATION WEAPON:
CONSUMERS, FORUM-SELECTION
CLAUSES, AND THE REHNQUIST
COURT
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Last Term, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the
Supreme Court seemed to continue its recent efforts to confer on
parties the power to establish by contract the procedural rights that
they will have in subsequent disputes relating to their agreement.
In a variety of areas the Court has manifested its desire to expand
the realm of so-called "consensual adjudicatory procedure."
'2 It
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. Rockhurst College, 1962;
M.A., University of Kansas, 1964; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1968; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1979. The author wishes to thank the members of the New York Law
School Faculty Seminar for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this
paper, especially Robert I. Blecker, Jethro K. Lieberman, Steven J. Massey, Park Mc-
Ginty, Stephen A. Newman, and Michael B.W. Sinclair. Rachel Vorspan's critical
reading was particularly helpful. The author would also like to thank Linda Jacobs,
Thomas Leff, Kenneth Shuster, and D. Gregory Valenza for their assistance in prepar-
ing the article.
1. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). Several discussions of the case have already appeared.
See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700 (1992); Richard
A. Gantner, Note, Absent Bad Faith, Fraud, or Overreaching, A Reasonable Forum Se-
lection Clause in a Commercial Cruise Form Contract Is Enforceable, 22 SETON HALL
L. REV. 505 (1992); John M. Kirby, Note, Consumer's Right to Sue at Home Jeopard-
ized Through Forum Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 888 (1992).
2. The Court's efforts have naturally attracted considerable scholarly attention.
See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consen-
sual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988).
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has, for example, repeatedly enforced clauses that require parties to
submit their claims to arbitration rather than bringing them to the
courts.3 Perhaps most striking, at least prior to Carnival Cruise, in
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. ,4 the Court gave effect to a
forum-selection clause in a federal diversity action in spite of the
fact that the substantive law of the forum state denied enforceability
to such clauses.
In Carnival Cruise the Court reviewed and, with two Justices
dissenting,5 reversed a Ninth Circuit decision 6 holding that a fo-
rum-selection clause inserted in a form retail sales contract was in-
valid and unenforceable. The plaintiffs, Ms. Eulala Shute and her
husband, residents of the state of Washington, purchased tickets
from a local travel agent for a seven-day cruise on one of defend-
ant's ships from Los Angeles to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. While at
sea, Ms. Shute "was injured when she slipped on a deck mat during
a guided tour of the ship's galley."' 7 The Shutes subsequently
brought a negligence suit in admiralty in federal district court in
their home state. Defendant Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. moved for
summary judgment on the ground that a clause in the Shutes' form
ticket contracts required them to bring their action in a court in the
state of Florida, defendant's principal place of business.8 Rejecting
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that "a nonnegotiated forum-selection
3. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991); Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974).
4. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). For valuable discussions that differ from the approach
taken in this article, see Allen R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935
(1991); Stephen R. Buckingham, Comment, Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.: Judi-
cial Discretion in Forum Selection, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1379 (1989).
5. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justice Marshall joined. 111 S. Ct. at
1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
1522 (1991).
7. 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
8. Defendant also moved to dismiss on the ground that the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over it. After upholding the district court's jurisdiction, Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit withdrew its
opinion and certified to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington the question
whether the state's long-arm statute applied to the facts of the case. Shute v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 872 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1989). The Washington Supreme Court answered
the question in the affirmative. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 783 P.2d 78 (Wash.
1989). The Ninth Circuit then filed a "modified" opinion again upholding the lower
court's jurisdiction. Shute, 897 F.2d at 377. Although the parties briefed the personal
jurisdiction issue extensively, the United States Supreme Court did not reach it. 111 S.
Ct. at 1525.
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clause in a form ticket contract is never enforceable," 9 the Court
ruled in an opinion by Justice Blackmun that, as a matter of federal
admiralty law, the clause at issue was reasonable and therefore
enforceable. 10
The Court's decision is troublesome for several reasons. First,
its reasoning is weak, arbitrary, and result-oriented. The Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on the Court's 1972 decision in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co. I"'-an admiralty suit holding that forum-selection
clauses in bargained international commercial agreements are en-
forceable if "reasonable"-in ruling that such clauses were not en-
forceable in nonbargained consumer form contracts.1 2 Although
the Court accepts The Bremen as controlling, it stretches the earlier
case to reach nonbargained consumer form contracts, and it does so
without acknowledging or adequately justifying the stretch. Even
more striking, in construing a federal statute on which the Shutes
relied to invalidate the forum-selection clause, the Court resorts lit-
erally to altering the relevant statutory language in order to find the
provision inapplicable.' 3 Second, the Court faults the Ninth Circuit
for "ignoring the crucial differences in the business contexts in
which the respective contracts" in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise
were executed,14 but it then proceeds to ignore the paramount as-
pect of the "business context" that gives forum-selection clauses
their practical significance in consumer form contracts. It fails to
discuss either the fact that forum-selection clauses constitute a pow-
erful litigation weapon for large-scale corporate defendants or the
extent to which such clauses impact materially, adversely, and un-
fairly on the merits of consumers' substantive claims. Finally, the
decision substantially expands the impact that geography-an arbi-
trary, extraneous, and distorting factor-has on the fair and orderly
administration of the laws. In doing so, Carnival Cruise seems to
defeat basic goals of federal forum control policy that Congress and
the Court have recognized and sought to achieve for more than a
century.
This article examines the reasoning of Carnival Cruise and the
decision's broader social, economic, and political significance. Part
I considers the reasons that the Carnival Cruise court advances to
9. 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
10. See id. at 1528.
11. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
12. The Ninth Circuit's decision was consistent with what appeared to be the ma-
jority view in The Bremen. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 706-07.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
14. 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
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support its holding and examines how the opinion shapes the law to
ensure that forum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts will
be widely enforceable. Part II sketches the "business context" that
gives rise to forum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts and
explores the unfair way such clauses operate in the de facto claims-
disputing process. Part III focuses on the efforts of both Congress
and the Court for the past century to ensure the equitable adminis-
tration of the law, and it traces the development of a basic federal
forum control policy aimed at minimizing, rather than maximizing,
the ability of parties to forge the burdens of geography into the
weapons of litigation. Part IV returns to Carnival Cruise and, in
light of the preceding discussion, considers more fully the nature of
the social policies and values that underlie the decision. Part V sug-
gests some of the ways the Court could alter its approach to forum-
selection clauses in order to make the administration of the law
more equitable. Finally, Part VI adds brief concluding remarks.
I. CARNIVAL CRUISE: ESTABLISHING SOCIAL POLICY
The Shutes challenged the forum-selection clause in Carnival
Cruise on two grounds. They argued that The Bremen limited the
enforceability of forum-selection clauses to those in bargained com-
mercial agreements, and they maintained that the clause violated a
federal statute15 that rendered provisions in ship-passenger con-
tracts unlawful if they restricted the right of passengers to sue. The
Court rejected both arguments.
A. The Scope of The Bremen
Both the Shutes and Carnival Cruise Lines accepted The
Bremen as controlling, 16 and the Court agreed that both sides found
"ample support" in the decision's "broad-ranging language."' 17 The
15. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988).
16. 111 S. Ct. at 1526. The parties, of course, disagreed about the nature of The
Bremen's "principles" and the significance of "key factual differences." Carnival Cruise
argued that The Bremen "held that admiralty law establishes a strong presumption in
favor of enforcing a forum selection clause" and that the Shutes' grounds "for distin-
guishing The Bremen are insufficient." Pet'r's Br., at 105, 109, Carnival Cruise, 111 S.
Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). The Shutes main-
tained that The Bremen, which "concerned a commercial towing contract between par-
ties of approximately equal bargaining power, invalidates the forum selection clause in
this case." Resp't's Br., at 145, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). The clause, they insisted, "should not be enforced
because it is contrary to the Court's holding in The Bremen." Id. at 155.
17. 111 S. Ct. at 1526. The Court's characterization here foreshadows its conclu-
sion. Insofar as The Bremen supported Carnival Cruise's position, it was primarily on
[Vol. 40:423
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Court found, however, that "key factual differences" between the
two cases "preclude an automatic and simple application of The
Bremen's general principles to the facts here." 18
Carnival Cruise briefly summarizes The Bremen. The earlier
case addressed the validity of a forum-selection clause "in a con-
tract between two business corporations," one German and one
American.' 9 The German company agreed to tow the American
company's ocean-going drilling rig from Louisiana to a location off
the coast of Italy, and their agreement specified that any dispute
under the contract would be decided by the London Court of Jus-
tice. When the rig was damaged by a storm in the Gulf of Mexico
and towed into Tampa, Florida, the American company brought an
admiralty suit in a Florida federal court seeking damages for negli-
gence and breach of contract. Relying on the contract's forum-se-
lection clause, the German company moved to have the suit
dismissed. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability
the basis of the opinion's "broad-ranging language." Insofar as it supported the Shutes,
it was on the basis of its facts and its specific reasoning. By implying that both sides
relied on "broad-ranging"-and, hence, presumably vague and imprecise-language,
the Court obscured both the reasoning in The Bremen and the differences between the
arguments of the parties.
18. Id. There is certainly broad language in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972), that could be used to stretch its rule to reach all maritime contracts
and even to reach nonmaritime contracts, too, including those that are "adhesive." Id.
at 17. It is also true that some of the lower federal courts have used The Bremen to
expand the areas in which forum-selection clauses are enforceable, including cases in-
volving consumer form contracts. See, e.g., Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 852 (1987); Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722
F.2d 861 (1st Cir. 1983); Carpenter v. Klosters Rederi, A/S, 604 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1979).
As this article argues, however, the specific facts, the detailed analysis, and the
dominant reasoning of The Bremen all seem more consistent with a narrower reading.
Prior to Carnival Cruise most courts and commentators seemed to agree. See
Goldman, supra note 1, at 706-07. More important, however, even assuming that The
Bremen could be reasonably construed to reach consumer form contracts, two conclu-
sions nevertheless remain standing. One is that as far as the controlling authority of
The Bremen is concerned, the Court could have refused to make forum-selection clauses
enforceable as easily as it made the decision it did. Carnival Cruise, in other words,
represents a knowing choice between competing social values, not the result of clearly
dispositive, authoritative precedent. The other conclusion is that the Court failed ade-
quately to explain why it was making the fundamental value choice that it made.
For general discussions of The Bremen and its development, see Anne E. Covey &
Michael S. Morris, The Enforceability ofAgreements Providing for Forum and Choice of
Law Selection, 61 DENV. L.J. 837 (1984); James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in
International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1 (1976-77); Phoebe Kornfeld,
Note, The Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses After Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 175 (1989).
19. 111 S. Ct. at 1526 (discussing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972)).
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of the clause, declaring that "a freely negotiated private interna-
tional agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or over-
weening bargaining power, such as that involved here, should be
given full effect."
'20
Carnival Cruise then considers how the Ninth Circuit con-
strued The Bremen to decide that the forum-selection clause in the
cruise tickets was not enforceable. The appellate court distin-
guished the cases by both the nature of the parties and the nature of
the transactions. The parties in The Bremen were sophisticated
commercial actors who "negotiated with care in selecting a forum
for the resolution of disputes, '21 the Ninth Circuit reasoned, while
the Shutes were "not business persons and did not negotiate the
terms of the clause."'22 Further, the respective transactions in the
two cases were fundamentally different. The Bremen involved a
"far from routine transaction" between companies from two differ-
ent nations and the transportation of "an extremely costly piece of
equipment" nearly halfway around the globe.23 In contrast, the
Shutes' ticket agreement "was purely routine and doubtless nearly
identical" to every other passenger contract the company issued.
24
While a negotiated forum-selection clause was reasonable in the
context of The Bremen, the Supreme Court acknowledges, "it
would be entirely unreasonable" to assume that the Shutes or any
other passengers "would negotiate with [Carnival Cruise] the terms
of a forum-selection clause."'25
20. Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13) (footnote omitted in original).
In its summary, Carnival Cruise calls attention to four specific points about The
Bremen. First, the earlier decision considered the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause "in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international
trade." Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15). Second, it applied a "reasonable-
ness" standard based on "a number of factors." Id. Carnival Cruise stresses in particu-
lar the weight The Bremen placed on the "strong evidence" that the forum selection
clause was "a vital part of the agreement" and that its consequences figured promi-
nently in the parties' negotiations. Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 14). Third, it
notes that The Bremen did not involve "two Americans" who were trying to resolve
"essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum." Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S.
at 17). If such had been the case, Carnival Cruise comments, The Bremen suggests that
"the serious inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties might
carry greater weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause." Id. (quot-
ing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17). Finally, Carnival Cruise declares, even where the
forum selection clause required a remote forum, The Bremen imposes "a heavy burden
of proof" on the party claiming unfairness. Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17).
21. Id. at 1527.
22. Id.
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In spite of the apparent soundness of the Ninth Circuit's analy-
sis, however, the Supreme Court concludes that the lower court
misconstrued The Bremen. "[B]y ignoring the crucial differences in
the business contexts in which the respective contracts were exe-
cuted," the Court explains, "the Court of Appeals' analysis seems to
us to have distorted somewhat this Court's holding in The
Bremen. ' '26 The statement is curious. Had the Ninth Circuit ac-
complished anything, one would have thought that it was to high-
light quite effectively some "crucial differences in the business
contexts" between the two cases. 27
1. Stretching The Bremen
Simply put, the Court chooses to make The Bremen stand for
the broadest possible principle that its language can support and,
thereby, to make "reasonable" forum-selection clauses enforceable
in all contracts, including consumer form contracts. "As an initial
matter," the Court states, "we do not adopt the Court of Appeals'
determination that a nonnegotiated forum-selection clause in a form
ticket contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the sub-
ject of bargaining. '28 Rather, "we must refine the analysis of The
Bremen to account for the realities of form passage contracts."
'29
The "refinement" consists in the straightforward elimination of
any requirement of bargaining, or even of informed consent, and
acceptance of the de facto practice that consumers generally must,
if they wish to make purchases, accept whatever nonnegotiable
terms a seller offers. The Court acknowledges, but renders irrele-
vant, the critical aspects of the "business context" on which The
Bremen relied in finding a forum-selection clause reasonable: that
the clause appeared in a "freely negotiated agreement,"' 30 that it was
"a vital part" of the agreementfor both parties,31 and that the forum





30. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). Two lines after
the quoted phrase the Court repeats that the forum-selection clause was in "a freely
negotiated private international agreement." Id.
31. Id. The full sentence reads: "There is strong evidence that the forum clause
was a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties
did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the conse-
quences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations." Id. (emphasis
added).
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phisticated businessmen. ' 32 By sanctioning the use of forum-selec-
tion clauses in the radically different take-it-or-leave-it context of
consumer form contracts the Court simply dispenses with the fac-
tors that The Bremen considered critical. "Common sense dictates
that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which
are not subject to negotiation," the Court notes, "and that an indi-
vidual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity with the
cruise line."' 33 Thus, Carnival Cruise "refines" The Bremen by un-
coupling the criterion of reasonableness from the nature or even
existence of any bargaining and from the relative sophistication,
knowledge, or power of the respective parties.
2. Watering Down the "Reasonableness" Test
As Carnival Cruise stretches The Bremen to reach forum-selec-
tion clauses in consumer forum contracts, so it reduces the require-
ment of reasonableness to the mere presence of some arguably
"rational" justification. The Court does not require evidence that a
proposed justification is factually applicable to the case at hand,
only that it has some level of surface plausibility. The undemanding
nature of its reasonableness test appears clearly from the three sepa-
rate grounds the opinion advances to show that "a reasonable fo-
rum clause in a form contract of this kind well may be
permissible."
' 34
The first ground for asserting that forum-selection clauses "of
this kind" may be reasonable is that a cruise line has a "special
interest" in restricting the places where suit may be brought against
it because it "typically carries passengers from many locales." 35
This reason fails to distinguish cruise lines from any other type of
transportation company, from any business that regularly deals
with travellers or tourists, or, for that matter, from any other busi-
ness that sells goods or services in interstate or international com-
merce.36 The established rules of personal jurisdiction, the doctrine
32. Id.
33. 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Court refers to no evidence supporting the "special" nature of cruise com-
panies. Id. at 1522. Moreover, to the extent that the companies could make a convinc-
ing showing that they did face special litigation problems, forum-selection clauses that
were far less oppressive could provide them ample protection. Such clauses could pro-
vide, for example, that a claimant must sue either in his or her home state, where the
claim arose, or in the place where the company has its principal place of business. They
could also provide-although the provision would surely be unnecessary-that plain-
tiffs' forum choice could be altered pursuant to federal law if the claim arose out of a
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of forum non conveniens, provisions for consolidating and transfer-
ring cases, and the procedures governing multi-district litigation all
provide the cruise line with sufficient protections against inconve-
nient and multiple litigations, just as they protect everyone else
from those same burdens.37 The Court's first reason is makeweight.
The Court's second ground for concluding that forum-selec-
tion clauses in consumer form contracts may be reasonable is that
they have "the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about
where suits arising from the contract must be brought" and thereby
of "sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions" and
"conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to
deciding those motions."' 38 While those are laudable goals, it is
highly questionable whether the Court's decision will serve them.
39
More important, conserving the resources of litigants and the judi-
ciary should be subordinate to the more fundamental goal of enforc-
ing rights and securing the equitable administration of justice. A
rule contributing to the former is surely not "reasonable" if it im-
pinges adversely and unnecessarily on the latter. 40 By failing to
consider the practical function of forum-selection clauses in con-
mass tort disaster or similar event requiring multi-district consolidation under 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
37. In addition to asserting the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, of course,
the company could move under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) for a change of venue to a
more convenient forum; it could move under FED. R. Civ. P. 42, to consolidate diverse
suits filed in the same district; and it could move under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) to
transfer diverse suits filed in different districts to the same district for consolidated pre-
trial proceedings.
38. 111 S. Ct. at 1527. More recently, the Court has disparaged what it terms the
"wasteful side shows of venue litigation." Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 112 S. Ct.
2184, 2187 (1992) (upholding against an equal protection challenge a Montana venue
rule that allegedly disfavored foreign corporations).
39. For a discussion of the problems that underlie the Court's goal of conserving
litigant and judicial resources, see infra text accompanying notes 241-245.
40. The question of whether and to what extent the federal docket should be re-
stricted is a fundamental and pressing issue. Even more important and more pressing,
of course, is the question where and how the restrictions should be made. Those ques-
tions are subject to intense debate and raise complicated and basic questions of federal
jurisdiction and federal rights enforcement. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 130-66 (1985); Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry
Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67; John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987); Marc Ga-
lanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Thomas J.
Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and
Accident Prevention, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 381 (1991); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and
Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3.
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sumer form contracts, a subject examined in Part 11,41 the Court
arbitrarily limits its assessment of the overall consequences of such
clauses. Unless the Court considers all the likely consequences of
its decision, however, and explains why it chooses to give weight to
some but not to others, it can neither know that generally "salu-
tary" consequences will flow from enforcing forum-selection clauses
nor claim to have shown that to be the case. The Court's second
reason is both speculative and arbitrary.
The Court's third reason why forum-selection clauses in con-
sumer form contracts may be reasonable is that passengers will
"benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the
cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued."'42
Taken at its strongest, the claim seems to be that forum-selection
clauses will increase economic "efficiency," enable the company to
lower prices, and thereby maximize social wealth. For a number of
reasons the Court's third claim appears highly doubtful. Principal
among those reasons, as the article discusses in Part IV,4 3 is that
companies are able to impose forum-selection clauses on consumers
only because of a massive market failure and, further, that sanction-
ing such market failures will lead to widespread inefficiencies, ineq-
uitable redistribution of wealth, and quite likely a reduction in total
social wealth. Moreover, as discussed in Part II,44 whatever "sav-
ings" companies gain from forum-selection clauses will result not
from increased efficiencies but, on the contrary, from increased inef-
ficiencies and higher transaction costs in the litigation process that
serve to redistribute, not maximize, wealth. Thus, the Court's con-
sideration of the economic impact of forum-selection clauses, like
its consideration of their impact on pre-trial motion practice, is ar-
bitrarily limited to one presumed benefit and ignores numerous
other likely and highly undesirable consequences. The Court's
third reason, then, is also speculative and arbitrary.
3. Minimizing the Idea of "Fundamental Fairness"
After bringing consumer form contracts within The Bremen's
rule and then lowering the applicable standard of reasonableness,
Carnival Cruise proceeds to ensure that few forum-selection clauses
will be voided on equitable grounds. Although it acknowledges that
41. See infra text accompanying notes 90-138.
42. 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
43. For a more complete discussion of the problems with the Court's economic
goal and assumptions, see infra text accompanying notes 246-268.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 73-138.
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"forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are
subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness," 45 it adopts a
minimalist idea of what constitutes "fundamental fairness."
Carnival Cruise indirectly contracts the realm of fundamental
fairness scrutiny by emphasizing both that the burden of proof is on
the party claiming unfairness and that the burden is a particularly
"heavy" one.46 It considers and rejects the Ninth Circuit's alternate
holding that the forum-selection clause should not be enforced be-
cause there "is evidence in the record to indicate that the Shutes are
physically and financially incapable of pursuing this litigation in
Florida. ' 47 The Court, instead, concludes that the Shutes "have
not satisfied the 'heavy burden of proof,' [citing The Bremen] re-
quired to set aside the clause on grounds of inconvenience.1
48
The care with which Carnival Cruise draws on and applies The
Bremen's "heavy burden of proof" rule stands in illuminating con-
trast to the alacrity with which it disregards The Bremen's stress on
the need for a bargained agreement between commercial equals.
49
While the decision adheres religiously to The Bremen's language
and supports the enforceability of forum-selection clauses, it jetti-
sons that language easily when the language limits enforceability.
The disjunction is arresting, and it suggests strongly that in Carni-
val Cruise the Court was simply determined to uphold forum-selec-
tion clauses in consumer form contracts.
The disjunction is also revealing because The Bremen's heavy
burden of proof rule seems tailored to the specific context of com-
mercial agreements between relatively equal and sophisticated par-
ties, not to the context of consumer form contracts. The Bremen
justifies placing a heavy burden of proof on the party challenging
the contractual forum, for example, by citing a comment in the
Model Choice of Forum Act to the effect that suit in the contractual
45. 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
46. Id. at 1526 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17
(1972)).
47. Id. at 1527 (quoting Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 389
(9th Cir. 1990)).
48. Id. at 1528 (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17). The Court also rejects the
Ninth Circuit's alternate holding on the ground that it need not defer to the appellate
court's findings since they are "conclusory" and since the trial court had not made any
findings about the Shutes' physical and financial inabilities. Id. at 1527-28.
49. The Court's application of a heavy burden of proof also stands in sharp con-
trast to the way it treats the "reasons" that make forum-selection clauses in consumer
form contracts permissible. Id. at 1527. In accepting those reasons, the Court does not
demand proof or even any relevant evidence in the record. Rather, it simply assumes
both the validity of the reasons as well as their applicability to the Shutes' case.
UCLA LAW REVIEW
forum-however inconvenient it might ultimately prove to be-is
nevertheless appropriate because "[t]his result will presumably be in
accord with the desires of the parties."' 50 That statement assumes
the existence of meaningful negotiation and knowing consent on the
part of both of the parties, conditions that Carnival Cruise expressly
eliminates. 51 Moreover, a "heavy burden of proof" on the issue of
fairness seems warranted when the party carrying the burden is a
large national or international business, as was the case in The
Bremen. Such parties have relatively substantial resources to use in
attempting to carry such a burden, and the fact that they possess
such resources suggests that litigating in a distant forum would
likely not impose an excessive burden on them. In contrast, the
same burden would generally be oppressive, and in some cases un-
bearable, when applied to ordinary individuals like the Shutes. 52
In addition to shaping the burden of proof to strengthen the
enforceability of forum-selection clauses, Carnival Cruise achieves
the same result directly by shrinking to a minimum the idea of fun-
damental fairness itself. It seems to hold that forum-selection
clauses do not violate fundamental fairness as long as they designate
a forum that bears some rational relationship to the company's
business. The critical reasoning appears in the way that Carnival
Cruise dismisses the Shutes' contention that the company uses fo-
rum-selection clauses to discourage suits against it. "Any suggestion
of such a bad-faith motive," the Court declares, "is belied by two
facts: [the cruise line] has its principal place of business in Florida,
and many of its cruises depart from and return to Florida ports. 53
50. 407 U.S. at 17-18. Similarly, The Bremen justifies the "heavy burden" it im-
poses on the ground that litigation in the contractual forum was "clearly foreseeable at
the time of contracting." Id. Again, it declares that a claim of inconvenience is insuffi-
cient unless the challenging party can show that the contractual forum "will be so mani-
festly and gravely inconvenient" that the party "will be effectively deprived of a
meaningful day in court." Id. at 19. This, too, is a standard appropriate for a large
commercial party which would in all but the most unusual situations be able to shoul-
der the burdens of conducting a distant litigation. It is an exceptionally harsh standard
if applied to ordinary individuals who could in theory often conduct distant litigation,
but who would be prevented from doing so in fact because the costs and burdens were
simply too heavy for them to do so.
51. See 111 S. Ct. at 1527; infra text accompanying notes 255-257.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 90-105.
53. 111 S. Ct. at 1528 (emphasis added). It is worth recalling that the Shutes'
cruise left from and returned to Los Angeles, California. Id. at 1524.
On the contention that the company uses forum-selection clauses to discourage suit
against it, Carnival Cruise appears to accept the company's response.
Respondents do not refer to any record evidence for their assertion that
the clause was intended to deprive passengers of the ability to pursue
meritorious claims, nor could they do so. The forum selection clause in
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This seems to mean that as long as there is some legitimate connec-
tion between a company and its chosen forum the clause does not
violate fundamental fairness.54 It seems to mean, further, that as
long as some such connection exists it is irrelevant whether the indi-
vidual consumer has any connection with the forum. Indeed, here
the Shutes-residents of the state of Washington whose cruise de-
parted from and returned to Los Angeles-had no connection
whatever with the contractual forum state. Those considerations
mean, in turn, that the immense practical litigation advantages that
a company may reap by methodically forcing the burdens of geogra-
this case, like the limitation procedure established by 46 U.S.C. § 185
serves the legitimate purpose of setting forth a single forum where poten-
tially numerous claims can be litigated.
Pet'r's Reply Br., at 166, Carnival Cruise, Ill S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) (citations omitted). If spokespersons can come up
with some ostensibly "reasonable" justification for a forum-selection provision, in other
words, then all merely "accidental" advantages that somehow just happen to result
from it-no matter how important-are irrelevant to the issue of fairness.
The company identified the rational basis of its selection of Florida as the forum
state as follows:
Moreover, the state selected-Florida-is where Carnival has its
principal place of business and where many of its cruises arrive and de-
part. Such a forum bears a logical relationship to the likely location of
documents and witnesses; there is no indication that it was chosen to
prevent meritorious litigation from being conducted efficiently or fairly.
Pet'r's Br., at 11, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Briefs file).
54. In its amicus brief the International Committee of Passenger Lines provides a
particularly revealing illustration of its views as to the standard that the courts should
apply in scrutinizing the fairness of forum-selection clauses. The rule it contends for,
the brief explains, "is not so mechanical or rigid that a party cannot avoid enforcement
of the clause where it would truly deprive that party of the opportunity to present its case."
Br. of the Int'l Comm. of Passenger Lines, at 123, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522
(1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) (emphasis added). The brief
then cites McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), as an example of a case where its proposed
standard was applied and satisfied. The forum-selection clause at issue required suit to
be brought in Iran, and the Passenger Lines' brief agreed that "post-revolutionary con-
ditions in Iran, including the cessation of diplomatic relations between the United States
and Iran, the state of war between Iran and its neighbor Iraq and the suspension of all
commercial air flights to Iran" were sufficient to justify the court's refusal to enforce the
clause. Br. of Int'l Comm. of Passenger Lines, at 123, Carnival Cruise, I I 1 S. Ct. 1522
(1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
Needless to say, the discussion seems to indicate that the industry group believes
that only the most extreme and extraordinary situations should warrant a court's re-
fusal to enforce a forum-selection clause. An international shooting war in the contrac-
tual forum may be a sine qua non.
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phy onto its customers are irrelevant to the question of fundamental
fairness.55
While Carnival Cruise retains "fraud or overreaching" as
grounds on which a consumer could block enforcement of a forum-
selection clause, 56 in practical terms those grounds seem of little
significance. The reason is apparent. The major and systemic prob-
lem with forum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts does
not involve legal fraud or undue influence operating in individual
cases. Rather, it involves the open, planned, and universal exploita-
tion of the burdens of distance in a methodical manner against con-
sumers as a class. That tactic is precisely what Carnival Cruise
finds consistent with fundamental fairness.
B. The Statutory Restriction
Carnival Cruise disposes handily of the Shutes' second argu-
ment against enforcing the forum-selection clause: that it is unlaw-
ful under 46 U.S.C. § 183c. The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for the.., owner of any vessel transporting
passengers between ports of the United States or between any
such port and a foreign port to insert in any rule, regulation,
contract, or agreement any provision or limitation . . . (2) pur-
porting in such event to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any
claimant to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction on the ques-
tion of liability for such loss or injury . . .57
Since the de facto function of the forum selection clause at issue is
precisely to "lessen" and "weaken" the Shutes' right to seek redress
55. It is important to note that use of forum-selection clauses certainly does not
reflect any "bad faith" on the part of the company. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. is quite
open about using the clause in its passenger contracts and quite open about the fact that
the clause serves its business and economic interests. See, e.g., Pet'r's Reply Br., at
164-65, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Briefs file) (Florida as forum serves Carnival's convenience). The problem that Carnival
Cruise illustrates is surely not one of "bad faith" on the part of the company. The
problem is that the United States Supreme Court has come to regard the methodical use
of such defacto inequitable tactics as consistent with its idea of what constitutes "fun-
damental fairness."
56. Dismissing any possibility that the clause at issue conflicted with fundamental
fairness, the Court noted that "there is no evidence that [the company] obtained [the
Shutes'] accession to the forum clause by fraud or overreaching." 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
Hence, proof of some extreme facts evidencing deceit or undue influence would be suffi-
cient to bar enforcement of a forum-selection clause. The facts, however, would have to
be quite extreme. See infra text accompanying notes 63-72.
Here, as elsewhere in its opinion, the Court seems to adopt assumptions and con-
clusions similar to those advanced by Judge Posner in his writings off the bench. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 80-88 (2d ed. 1977).
57. 111 S. Ct. at 1528 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c) (emphasis added)).
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in a court of competent jurisdiction, the statutory language seems
quite directly to void the clause. To elude that result, Carnival
Cruise resorts to a transforming paraphrase. "By its plain lan-
guage," it asserts, "the forum-selection clause before us does not
take away [the Shutes'] right to 'a trial by [a] court of competent
jurisdiction' and thereby contravene the explicit proscription of
§ 183c."5 8 The paraphrase literally erases "lessen" and "weaken"
from the statute's express terms, substituting in their place the non-
equivalent term "take away." Even more striking, it does so in the
name of construing the provision's "plain language."
Understandably seeking to bolster its conclusion, Carnival
Cruise adds that the Shutes failed to produce any evidence that
Congress had intended in passing the statute "to avoid having a
plaintiff travel to a distant forum in order to litigate."' 59 While the
Shutes may have failed to present such evidence, Justice Stevens'
dissent does not. Focusing on two critical facts, it shows that the
Court could easily have found that Congress intended to reach fo-
rum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts. First, the legis-
lative history shows that the statute's purpose was to prevent
carriers from restricting the ability of claimants to obtain effective
judicial relief. While Congress sought specifically to eliminate
clauses that compelled arbitration or limited claimants to stipulated
amounts of damages, the House Report states that the statute was
intended to "put a stop to all such practices and practices of a like
character."6 Second, Justice Stevens points to a convincing reason
why Congress did not specifically proscribe forum-selection clauses
in the statute. "The absence of a specific reference is adequately
explained by the fact that such clauses were already unenforceable
under common law."'61 The Court itself has long been on record
acknowledging that pivotal point. "Forum-selection clauses," The
Bremen itself declared some thirty-five years after Congress enacted
Section 183c, "have historically not been favored by American
courts."
' 6 2
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1529.
60. Id. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis on entire quoted phrase in dis-
sent; no emphasis in original report); see S. REP. No. 2061, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7
(1936); H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936).
61. 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); see Michael
Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agree-
ments, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 138-47.
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C. Ignoring Easily Dispositive Facts
Considering the way Carnival Cruise treats both of the Shutes'
arguments, the court's determination to make forum-selection
clauses in consumer form contracts enforceable seems apparent. In-
deed, the opinion announces at its very beginning that "this is a case
in admiralty, and federal law governs."' 63 Thus, it is clear that no
state law constrains the Court in laying down whatever rule it re-
gards as most fair and reasonable.
The Court's result-oriented approach is further illuminated by
its treatment of two key facts involved in the case. First, the Court
ignores the fact-highlighted by the dissent-that the Shutes did
not receive notice of the forum-selection clause until after they paid
for their tickets and made plans for the cruise. Thus, Carnival
Cruise found it irrelevant that the company imposed the forum-se-
lection clause on the Shutes only after the transaction was
completed.
Second, Carnival Cruise also ignores the fact that the tickets
contained another clause that provided that the "Carrier shall not
be liable to make any refund to passengers" if they failed to use
their tickets. 64 The Court dismisses the nonrefund clause and ig-
nores the possibility that consumers could reasonably fear that the
clause meant that they either had to use the tickets that contained
the previously unknown forum-selection clause or forfeit both their
tickets and their right to obtain a refund. The opinion merely as-
serts that the Shutes "presumably retained the option of rejecting
the contract with impunity. ' 65 Content to rely on a mere presump-
tion, the opinion shows no concern that an effort to obtain a refund
might well have required a substantial amount of inconvenience,
frustration, time, and cost. More particularly, the opinion also ig-
nores the fact that the tickets contained provisions that imposed on
purchasers who canceled penalties ranging from $100 to $200.66
63. 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
64. Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Not knowing whether or not that provision is legally enforceable, I as-
sume that the average passenger would accept the risk of having to file
suit in Florida in the event of an injury, rather than canceling-without a
refund-a planned vacation at the last minute. The fact that the cruise
line can reduce its litigation costs, and therefore its liability insurance
premiums, by forcing this choice on its passengers does not, in my opin-
ion, suffice to render the provision more reasonable.
Id.
65. Id. at 1528.
66. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. described the ticket contract as containing the fol-
lowing provisions: "The final page of the brochure, captioned 'General Information,'
[Vol. 40:423
1992] GEOGRAPHY AS A LITIGATION WEAPON 439
The Court was apparently determined not only to ignore the
Shutes' arguments but also to use the extreme facts that the case
presented to produce a decision that would make forum-selection
clauses in consumer form contracts broadly and generally enforcea-
ble. Its orientation appears with particular clarity when its treat-
ment of the facts is contrasted with Judge Richard A. Posner's view
of the facts in Carnival Cruise. Judge Posner's attitude is particu-
larly revealing in this instance because, in his nearly contemporane-
ous decision in Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Donovan,67
he seems fully sympathetic with both the goals and doctrine that the
Court adopts in Carnival Cruise.68 The Court, moreover, seems
equally to approve of Judge Posner's views about the economics of
forum-selection clauses. 69 Despite that deep mutual sympathy,
however, when Judge Posner considered the facts of Carnival
Cruise in his Donovan opinion-after the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari but before its decision-he easily found them
"special." ' 70 He was struck in particular by the fact that the Shutes
had no knowledge of the existence of the forum-selection clause un-
til after they had bought their tickets and the transaction was com-
plete. In Carnival Cruise, Judge Posner concluded, the forum-
selection clause "plainly is neither intended nor likely to be read"
by the consumer. 71 "If ever there was a case for stretching the con-
cept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was Shute," he
declared, "and perhaps no stretch was necessary." ' 72
states that a seven-day cruise (such as the one taken by Respondents) can be cancelled
between 16 and 45 days before sailing with a $100 penalty, and between 3 and 15 days
before sailing with a $200 penalty." Pet'r's Br., at 164, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522
(1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
67. 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990).
68. Addressing the question of the validity of forum-selection clauses in several
limited partnership agreements between an insurance company and individual defend-
ants, Donovan applies The Bremen to uphold their enforceability. The facts in Donovan
make it easily distinguishable from Carnival Cruise and far closer to The Bremen.
Judge Posner, for example, describes the individual defendants as "millionaires" who
"are wealthy tax-shelter investors." Id. at 378. Donovan nevertheless makes clear its
view that forum-selection clauses should be widely and generally enforceable. The
proper approach, it states, "is to treat a forum selection [sic] clause basically like any
other contractual provision." Id. at 375.
69. Carnival Cruise cites Judge Posner's Donovan opinion as its sole authority in
support of its economic argument for the reasonableness of forum-selection clauses. 111
S. Ct. at 1527.
70. 916 F.2d at 376.
71. Id. at 377.
72. Id. at 376. Judge Posner's statement is also noteworthy because, in his theoret-
ical writings at least, he rejects "unconscionability" (as well as "inequality of bargaining
power") as a basis for invalidating contracts. To warrant refusal to enforce agreements
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In Carnival Cruise the Court decided to make a major policy
choice. Doctrinally, the decision means that forum-selection
clauses in consumer form contracts are now highly-favored contrac-
tual provisions. In social, economic, and political terms, the deci-
sion has even broader significance. An examination of the burdens
that geography imposes on litigation and claim-disputing practices,
and a consideration of the ways that Congress and the Supreme
Court have attempted over the years to lighten those burdens, help
illuminate that broader significance.
II. GEOGRAPHY AS A LITIGATION WEAPON
The current Court harbors a noticeable fondness for the apho-
risms of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Dissenting in a deci-
sion handed down only a month before Carnival Cruise, for
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist countered the majority's Holme-
sian invocation with one of his own, assuming arguendo that "we
must choose among Justice Holmes' aphorisms to help decide this
case."' 73 It seems appropriate, then, to begin consideration of the
practical significance of forum-selection clauses in consumer form
contracts by plucking another plum from the rich Holmesian store-
house. Judges are apt to be somewhat "naif," the Yankee from
Olympus once declared, and to counter that tendency they "need
something of Mephistopheles. ' 74 In dealing with legal rules, his
image suggests, judges-and anyone else who would understand
"the operations of the law"-need to include in their thinking a
shrewd and realistic appraisal of the purposes and tactics of parties
and of the non-ideal aspects of legal practice.
Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, for example, persistently
repeat the refrain that "parties seek predictability and certainty in
their contractual relations." The statement is, in a general sense,
true enough. At the same time, however, it is both misleading and
he believes that a specific showing of actual fraud or duress should be required. "Of
course," Judge Posner writes, "if the purchaser does not understand the effect of such
[contractual] provisions, he does not have a meaningful choice. This may be a problem
but again it is one of fraud rather than of inequality of bargaining power." POSNER,
supra note 56, at 86. Thus, when he suggests in Donovan that the Shutes may have been
the subject of "fraud," he seems to be suggesting that their treatment by Carnival Cruise
Lines may have gone well beyond what most courts would likely call
"unconscionability."
73. Salve Regina College v. Russell, Ill S. Ct. 1217, 1226 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The six Justice majority, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, also
invoked Holmes. Id. at 1218.
74. OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295 (1920).
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incomplete. The mere fact that forum-selection clauses may in-
crease, or at least appear to increase, predictability is no reason to
think that they do not serve other and far more important ends as
well. 75 Nor, of course, is it any reason to think that predictability is
the result that the parties actually value most highly or seek most
intently to achieve.
A. Forum-Selection Clauses: The Relevant Business Context
Although Carnival Cruise emphasizes the importance of "busi-
ness context" in evaluating forum-selection clauses, it fails to con-
sider the importance of the claims-disputing context where forum-
selection clauses actually affect human behavior.76 In particular, it
ignores three salient and quite obvious characteristics of that con-
text. One is that most disputes are resolved by out-of-court settle-
75. See infra text accompanying notes 124-129. The extent to which courts will
inquire into issues of "pretextuality" generally reflects commitments to basic policy
choices. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law:
Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19
PSYCHOL. L. BULL. 131 (1991).
76. Some lawyers and economists argue that the "efficiency" of legal arrangements
should be judged "ex ante," that is, before anyone suffers injury and needs to invoke the
law. The ex ante approach allows a theoretical evaluation of efficiency free from the
need to consider ex post fairness problems. Whatever its virtues, however, the ex ante
approach is not appropriate here.
First, the approach does not in its own terms purport to justify a legal arrangement
unless that arrangement is wealth maximizing. Since forum-selection clauses in con-
sumer form contracts seem likely to reduce aggregate wealth, as this article discusses in
Part IV, ex ante analysis provides no basis either for defending such clauses or for
ignoring their unfair ex post consequences.
Second, ex ante analysis is inappropriate here because the operation of forum-selec-
tion clauses in consumer form contracts is not ex ante random and unpredictable. With
respect to the relationship between the company and its consumers, it is certain that the
former will derive a substantial and regular benefit from the clauses and that the latter
will, as a group, bear added risks and burdens. It is highly doubtful that the consumers
will, as a group, receive the full amount of any company savings in the form of cheaper
tickets, and it is equally doubtful that any savings that consumers as a class might
obtain would equal the detriment incurred by those who suffer injury. With respect to
the consumers considered among themselves, the social significance of forum-selection
clauses is that they allow companies to use geography as a systematic claims-disputing
weapon and thereby bring a variety of extraneous social factors to bear on the consum-
ers' ability and willingness to litigate. The de facto result is that consumers are pres-
sured more forcefully to discount their claims and settle them relatively cheaply. Those
various social factors, however, do not affect all consumers or affect them randomly.
Rather, they affect them in predictable and patterned ways, and consequently the provi-
sions are not ex ante equally fair to all. Identifiable classes of consumers-those who
live at greater distances from the chosen forum, those who lack interstate contacts and
legal sophistication, and those who lack substantial personal and financial resources-
will all be affected relatively more directly, adversely, and seriously. Because that une-
qual impact of forum-selection clauses is predictable ex ante-both between the com-
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ments with little or no judicial involvement; the second is that
geographical burdens place individual parties at a severe disadvan-
tage when they have disputes with large national and international
corporations; and the third is that corporate attorneys structure
their clients' contracts and shape their litigation posture to maxi-
mize their clients' total leverage in the claim-disputing process.
77
Together, those three characteristics largely determine the de facto
social function of forum-selection clauses in consumer form
contracts.
1. The Nature of the Claims-Disputing Process
A simple and familiar fact is that the overwhelming majority of
claims are never brought to court78 and that an equally overwhelm-
ing majority of the claims that are brought to court are never
brought to trial. The percentage of cases that are tried to judgment
seems, in fact, to have declined significantly over the years.79 A
pany and its customers on one hand and among the customers considered by themselves
on the other hand-an essential presupposition of ex ante analysis is lacking.
Beyond those intrinsic reasons why an ex ante analysis of forum-selection clauses
in consumer form contracts is inappropriate, the approach is also unsatisfactory for a
more general reason: Ex ante analysis ignores questions of wealth redistribution, and
this characteristic is particularly troublesome and unrealistic here because a principal de
facto function of such clauses is precisely to externalize costs and thereby to redistribute
wealth. Ex ante analysis embraces the distributively ambiguous concept of "Kaldor-
Hicks" or "potential Pareto" efficiency (that is, efficiency that would allow the benefit-
ted parties to compensate the injured and still be better off, regardless of whether any
such compensation occurs). See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 16-17 (1987). That standard disregards
the distributive impact of legal rules and, as a practical matter, accepts the fact that
those who are benefitted by a legal rule will not fully (or perhaps even partially) com-
pensate those who are harmed by it. As Landes and Posner state candidly, under a
Kaldor-Hicks or potential Pareto standard of efficiency it remains true that "the result
is not efficient in the [actual] Pareto sense, because the victim is worse off." Id. at 17.
The Kaldor-Hicks standard, in fact, is highly subjective. See infra note 251; see also
Gregory S. Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Con-
fronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
231 (1991). Since the de facto function of forum-selection clauses in consumer form
contracts is to externalize costs and redistribute wealth, it seems pointless to ignore that
fact.
77. Some of the material in this section and in Section III(B) is drawn from ED-
WARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURIS-
DICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 28-58, 177-99 (1992).
78. E.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 443, 448-52 (1987); Galanter, supra note 40; Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System--and Why Not?, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1147, 1183-85 (1992).
79. A study of litigation in a state court over the 150 years from 1820 to 1970
reached typical conclusions: "The proportion of cases resulting in contested judgments
declined, voluntary dismissal and uncontested judgments increased." Wayne McIntosh,
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study that examined two different state courts over the eighty-year
period from 1890 to 1970, for example, found a marked decline in
trials and final judgments and a corresponding rise in out-of-court
settlements. While different factors may explain the trend for di-
verse types of litigants, the study noted that "ordinary people are
deterred by the cost, the torpor, the technicality of court proceed-
ings." 80 In the late twentieth century only a relatively small
number of filed actions-generally less than ten percent--end in a
final legal judgment after trial.81 Of a sample of 1,649 recent state
and federal cases, for example, only eight percent went to trial, and
some of that number settled before trial was completed. 82 "One of
the most striking aspects of our study of litigation," announced an-
other analysis, "was that bargaining and settlement are the preva-
lent and, for plaintiffs, perhaps the most cost-effective activity that
occurs when cases are filed."
'8 3
If one considers the universe of all legal claims asserted, in-
cluding those presented informally as well as those filed in court,
final legal judgments probably account for the resolution of no more
than one or two percent of the total.84 Of approximately thirty-one
million automobile accidents that occurred in 1984, for example,
only 500,000-less than two percent-wound up in the courts. Of
362,000 automobile-related bodily injury claims submitted to one
major insurance company in 1985 eighty-eight percent were settled
without the initiation of a lawsuit. Even more striking, only one
150 Years of Litigation and Dispute Settlement: A Court Tale, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV.
823, 847 (1980-81).
80. Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation
in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'y REV. 267, 300 (1976).
81. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels, Continuity and Change in Patterns of Case Han-
dling: A Case Study of Two Rural Counties, 19 LAW & Soc'y REV: 381 (1985); Patricia
M. Danzon, The Medical Malpractice System: Facts and Reforms, in THE EFFECTS OF
LITIGATION ON HEALTH CARE COSTS, 28, 30 (Mary Ann Baily & Warren I. Cikins
eds., 1985); Richard Lempert, More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the
"Dispute Settlement Function" of Trial Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 91 (1978);
Wayne V. McIntosh, A State Court's Clientele: Exploring the Strategy of Trial Litiga-
tion, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 421 (1985).
82. Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDI-
CATURE 161, 162 (1986).
83. David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV.
72, 122 (1983).
84. H. LAWRENCE Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT 216 (1970); see also Richard
E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525 (1980-81); Saks, supra note 78, at 1171-89.
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percent of the claims reached trial and only half of one percent were
actually tried to a verdict. 85
The business of resolving disputes, even those that become for-
mal legal actions, is thus carried on outside of the courts. Although
traditional legal theory conceives of litigation as a preparation for
trial on the merits, its predominant de facto function in contempo-
rary American society is to prepare the parties to settle. Litigation
accomplishes this result by imposing various costs and burdens on
the parties, by both creating and resolving various kinds of per-
ceived risks and uncertainties, by gradually establishing certain mu-
tually (if often covertly) accepted assessments of the relevant
evidence and controlling law, and in some cases by obtaining judi-
cial decisions that resolve critical "preliminary" issues and thereby
narrow the range of disagreement between the parties. The term
"litigation" is, of course, an abstraction. As a matter of actual
human behavior, litigation comprises the sum total of actions that
parties and their attorneys take to increase their convenience and
strengthen their positions while forcing costs and burdens on their
adversaries, generating risks and uncertainties that undermine their
adversaries' determination to continue, and weakening and destroy-
ing as many as possible of the legal and factual foundations on
which their adversaries' positions rest. As a matter of descriptive
human dynamics, litigation is a socio-legal process in which parties
and their attorneys labor to pry settlement values up or down and,
in their efforts, research and sometimes ransack "the law"-but one
of the possible sources of useful pressure-in a methodical search
for potential fulcra of effective leverage.86
The role that out-of-court settlements play in the litigation pro-
cess is well known to lawyers and judges alike. In a recent survey of
lawyers' forum preferences, for example, fifty-five percent of the de-
fense attorneys who preferred a federal to a state forum did so be-
cause, among other reasons, they thought that the federal forum
would lead to "faster settlement. '8 7 Recent amendments to the
85. Leo J. Jordan, The Insurance Industry's Effect on Civil Litigation, 29 JUDGES'
J. 37, 37-38 (1990).
86. See, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 82, at 161; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law. The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979). Legal scholars have also begun increasingly to emphasize the practical, "non-
ideal," and strategic nature of litigation practice. For a description of some of the types
of tactics that parties use, see Phillip G. Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Con-
sumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (1969).
87. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 406 (1992).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to encourage settle-
ments,88 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly manifested its de-
sire to facilitate and encourage settlements. 89 The paramount
consideration in understanding the significance of forum-selection
clauses, then, is the role they play in the de facto process of disput-
ing and settling claims out of court.
2. The Impact of Geography on Claim Disputes
Forcing an adversary to litigate in a distant forum can impose
substantial and sometimes unacceptable costs, risks, delays, and un-
certainties. In a recent case, Justice Scalia noted that "[v]enue is
often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency with
which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue." 90
The reasons he gave were forceful and (in the Holmesian sense) em-
inently Mephistophelean. "Suit might well not be pursued, or
might not be as successful, in a significantly less convenient fo-
rum."91 In 1990, the Court emphasized the impact of geographical
burdens when it noted that "some plaintiffs would not sue these
defendants for fear that they would have no choice but to litigate in
an inconvenient forum."' 92 A recent study found that, in one of the
four federal judicial districts examined, "the burden and expense of
travel" within the single district was sufficiently heavy that local at-
torneys considered geographic factors "the most significant variable
in forum choice" between the local state and federal courts.93
If geography can be burdensome to corporations, it can weigh
even more heavily on individuals. The fewer the resources a litigant
has or the greater the disparity between her resources and those of
88. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16; see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
89. E.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985).
90. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39-40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Professor Charles Alan Wright noted the importance of venue in litigation when he
discussed the federal change-of-venue statute: "Section 1404(a) has given rise to a veri-
table flood of litigation. Probably no issue of civil procedure gives rise to so many
reported decisions, year after year, as does this seemingly simple statute." CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 260 (4th ed. 1983).
91. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. at 39-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated: "It
is difficult to imagine an issue of more importance, other than one that goes to the very
merits of the lawsuit, than the validity of a contractual forum-selection provision." Id.
at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990).
93. Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and
Implications for Reform, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 749, 771 (1980-81) (emphasis in origi-
nal deleted).
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her adversary, the heavier the burdens of geography. As a general
matter, the burdens are at their most oppressive when an individual
plaintiff is forced to seek redress against a large national corpora-
tion in the latter's distant home state.94 As the district court ex-
plained in Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,95 "where the
[forum-selection] clause requires the filing of a suit in a distant state
it can serve as a large deterrent to the filing of suits by consumers
against large corporations."
'9 6
The deterrent effects of geography are numerous and
weighty. 97 The threshold task of merely retaining counsel in a dis-
tant location, which may seem routine to attorneys and judges, is
profoundly daunting to ordinary people. The very decision to re-
tain an attorney is so troublesome, in fact, that most claimants are
content to accept a settlement without one. The result of that com-
monplace decision, as numerous studies have repeatedly shown, is
that such claimants almost invariably obtain much less from their
adversaries than they otherwise would. 98 If claimants learn, per-
94. Geography is only one of the extra-legal factors that can help dissuade a claim-
ant from bringing suit. A great many other social factors-delay, distrust of lawyers
and legal system, cultural attitudes of a sub-group or location that disfavor personal
injury claims, lack of understanding of or access to legal institutions, and even simple
fear-may prevent individuals from effectively seeking legal relief. See, e.g., Elvia R.
Arriola, "What's the Big Deal?" Women in the New York City Construction Industry
and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 21 (1990);
David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'y REV. 551 (1984).
95. 630 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1986).
96. Id. at 759.
97. The burdens can be so heavy that often even relatively small distances are suffi-
cient to discourage or disable individual litigants, especially those who lack either re-
sources or sophistication. See, e.g., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976);
Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. 1978); Barquis v. Merchants
Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972); John J. Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in
Consumer Transactions: A Proposed Solution, 51 TEX. L. REV. 269 (1973); Craig
Karpel, Ghetto Fraud on the Installment Plan, N.Y. MAG., May 2, 1969, at 41.
98. Cf Ross, supra note 84, at 69-70 (summarizing several studies that show that
only between 15 and 30% of claimants obtain legal representation and that only ap-
proximately half of those who are "seriously injured" do so); Jordan, supra note 85, at
38 (noting that 62% of 362,000 automobile personal injury claimants were unrepre-
sented in their negotiations with the insurance company the author represented); Linda
Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can't Always Get What They Want
and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 284-85
(1992) (summarizing results of American Bar Association and American Bar Founda-
tion surveys suggesting that slightly more than 80% of Americans agree that it is diffi-
cult for many people to find a competent lawyer when they need one).
For the economic consequences of a claimant's failure to obtain legal representa-
tion, see, e.g., Ross, supra note 84, at 69-70, 116-21, 142-43, 167, 193-98; JOEL SEID-
MAN, THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN 157 (1962); 1 U.S. RAILROAD
[Vol. 40:423446
1992] GEOGRAPHY AS A LITIGATION WEAPON 447
haps from company representatives they contact, that they must re-
tain an attorney in a distant contractual forum in order to initiate a
legal action on their claims, that information alone may dissuade a
significant number from proceeding and lead them to accept
whatever offer, if any, the company might make.
If a claimant does eventually retain an attorney, he may likely
begin by securing counsel who resides near his home and outside of
the contractual forum state. In such a case, his hopes are immedi-
ately subject to two related risks that geography creates. First, the
claimant's leverage in negotiating a settlement is minimized because
he has not yet established his willingness or capacity to bring suit in
the contractual forum, or even to hire an attorney in the forum
state. Second, his local attorney has a strong incentive to arrange
an out-of-court settlement---especially if she is acting, as she most
probably is, under a contingent fee agreement-in order to maxi-
mize her return and prevent the great bulk of the fee from eventu-
ally going to an attorney in the contractual forum state.99 Those
facts by themselves increase the likelihood that the claimant will
wind up with a relatively low and unfavorable out-of-court
settlement.
If the claimant does secure representation in the distant con-
tractual forum, he begins to shoulder other and more palpable bur-
dens. He may, for example, wind up with two attorneys, one local
and one in the contractual forum, an arrangement that can compli-
cate the representation and drive up his costs. Further, his need to
rely on a distant attorney compounds his anxieties and uncertain-
ties. The distant attorney is an unknown quantity. The claimant
has fewer reasons to trust her, and the possibility that some subtle
conflict of interest might emerge between the client and his distant
RETIREMENT BD., WORK INJURIES IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY, 1938-40, passim
(1947); Engel, supra note 94; Marc A. Franklin et al. Accidents, Money, and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, in DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE
AUTOMOBILE VICTIM 27, 42-44, 46-47 (1968).
99. Scholars are increasingly recognizing and exploring the extent to which the
economic and other interests of lawyers may diverge from those of their clients and lead
the attorney to accept settlements less favorable to the client than might have been
obtained. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 84, at 82-83; PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT OR-
ANGE ON TRIAL 192-223 (1986); Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); George W.
Shadoan, Pressure Points in Settlement Negotiations, TRIAL, Aug. 1991, at 36; Terry
Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What They're Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement
Process, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1991); Trubek, supra note 83, at 123; see also Earl
Johnson, Jr., Lawyer's Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Deci-
sions, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 567 (1980-81).
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attorney increases.1°° The claimant can scarcely monitor the dis-
tant attorney's performance closely, and any attempt to do so would
drive up his costs yet again.' 0 ' For her part, the attorney in the
contractual forum is not particularly concerned with her reputation
in the relatively remote town where her client lives, and she most
likely does not represent or hope to represent other individuals or
organizations from her client's distant home town.
0 2
Once litigation begins, the process quickly piles on additional
burdens. One is the obvious need to travel and communicate over
long distances, which makes the suit more costly as well as more
inconvenient in terms of both litigation planning and client-attorney
consultation. Another is the compounded costs and risks created
by the attorney's need to communicate with the client's witnesses
and to prepare them for depositions and trial testimony. The party
may either have to pay additional travel costs for in-person meet-
ings or risk the creation of potentially discoverable documents that
could spur additional and costly motion practice and, if disclosed,
weaken the party's position in negotiations and at trial. 0 3 A third
burden is the likely additional delays involved in prosecuting the
case, as distance and inconvenience combine to complicate various
pretrial events and to remove from the attorney the spur of a human
client who can or does present himself in person at his attorney's
office. A fourth burden is the added cost of participating in a dis-
tant trial, including the costs and risks involved in securing the at-
tendance of witnesses at such a location. All of these burdens will
be especially heavy if the plaintiff's claim arises from events in his
home state and many or all of his witnesses reside there.
Yet another burden is the fact that, whatever else happens,
psychologically the claimant feels more cut off, more vulnerable,
100. See supra note 99.
101. To the extent that plaintiff has his local counsel monitor the work of the out-of-
state attorney, for example, he will almost certainly incur added legal costs.
102. Numerous pressures may induce an attorney to press a client's claim with less
than his or her greatest effort or determination. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Personal
Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 149 (1986).
103. Documents used to prepare witnesses for trial might be discoverable, for exam-
ple, under FED. R. EvID. 612 (allowing discovery of "a writing" used to refresh the
memory of a witness prior to testifying), or, in the case of an expert witness such as a
physician, under FED. R. EVID. 705 (allowing discovery of material on which expert
witness relies in forming his opinion). Another great danger is that any document
shown to a nonparty witness might be found to have lost whatever privilege protection
it could otherwise claim.
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and even more anxious than he otherwise would. 104 That burden is
magnified by the fact that the attorneys representing his corporate
adversary feel relatively comfortable and secure litigating in their
home court. Those attorneys are, moreover, fully aware of the ex-
tra-legal burdens the plaintiff is facing. Consciously or uncon-
sciously, they will tend to drive a harder bargain, hold off settling
for a longer period in the hope of obtaining increasingly more
favorable terms, and drag their feet while forcing the out-of-state
litigant continually to press for action at each stage of the
litigation. 10
5
A final burden is the risk that the cumulative effect of some or
all of the preceding complications may combine to so hamper the
party's trial preparations that he will ultimately feel compelled to
"cave" on the courthouse steps or end up putting on a materially
weaker case than he otherwise would have. If settlement comes af-
ter full pretrial discovery and motion practice, costs will consume a
larger proportion of any settlement payment. If trial presentation is
weak, the party may win little or nothing. The risks of geography
increase the likelihood of such unfavorable outcomes, and that ulti-
mate concern further compounds the pressures that push nonresi-
dent claimants toward earlier and less favorable settlements.
The burdens of geography are thus numerous and heavy. They
are emotional as well as financial. Some are readily apparent, while
others are subtle and surely unmeasurable. When placed on indi-
viduals who lack relevant interstate connections and experience or
who lack extraordinary personal or financial resources, however,
their defacto impact as a general matter is severe and certain. They
impose sharp discounts on the value of the claims involved and dis-
courage large numbers of plaintiffs from attempting to enforce their
legal rights.
3. The Role and Duty of the Corporate Attorney
With respect to the claims-disputing process, the role of corpo-
rate attorneys, is apparent. They seek to gain the most satisfactory
results possible for their clients. The testimony that an attorney for
104. In some contexts, of course, the Court takes note of the importance of such
personal and psychological impediments to litigation. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 n.22 (1984) (noting that the fear of "unwanted publicity"
could discourage plaintiffs from bringing actions for defamation).
105. Although sometimes ignored or downplayed by professional spokespersons,
and clearly raising ethical questions, delay as a litigation tactic is commonly used. See,
e.g., Lois G. FORER, MONEY AND JUSTICE: WHO OWNS THE COURTS? 96-99 (1984).
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the New York Central System gave to Congress some eighty years
ago seems as straightforward and unexceptional today as it did
then: "The lawyer for the railroad company is trying to [settle
cases] from an economical standpoint," he explained. i06 The goal is
"to bring about the end of the year with the smallest amount possi-
ble to be paid in the aggregate so far as his company is con-
cerned." 0 7 Indeed, the unquestioned ethical duty of lawyers who
represent corporations is to search out every possible way in which
they can legitimately strengthen their clients' legal positions. 10 8 "In
the realm of practice," a recent study of attorneys in large firms
concluded, "these lawyers enthusiastically attempt to maximize the
interests of clients."109
In the context of litigation planning, moreover, corporate at-
torneys plan to win the actions they must defend. Justice Robert H.
Jackson, one of the legal profession's more outspoken members,
both before and after he ascended to the bench of the United States
Supreme Court, vouched for the power of the litigator's individual
competitive drive in intensifying the desire for forensic victory re-
gardless of the merits of the dispute at issue. "[W]e abhor," Justice
106. S. Doc. No. 338, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. II, at 756-57 (1912) (statement of
Robert J. Cary, Attorney, New York Central System).
107. Id. The point is not that lawyers are cruel or do not seek "fair" settlements. It
is, rather, that ideas of "fairness" diverge drastically and that the lawyer's job is gener-
ally to get the most, or give up the least, possible in the circumstances. Compare the
complexities of settlement negotiating practices described in Ross, supra note 84.
108. In protecting their clients interests to the fullest extent possible, of course, cor-
porate attorneys are fulfilling their highest professional obligations. See infra text ac-
companying note 137; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.
109. The dominance of client interests in the practical activities of lawyers
contradicts the view that large-firm lawyers serve a mediating function in
the legal system.... Both the direction of their law reform activities and
their approach to the issues that arise in ordinary practice ultimately are
determined by the positions of their clients.
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER 232 (1988); see, e.g., Robert A. Kagan,
The Routinization of Debt Collection: An Essay on Social Change and Conflict in the
Courts, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 323 (1984).
For studies of the development of the bar and of corporate legal practice, see Rich-
ard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY 80,
121-35 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE
LAWYER AND His COMMUNITY (1967); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN,
CHICAGO LAWYERS 365-73 (1982); JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW (1950); ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 1-14 (1964); JAMES B.
STEWART, THE PARTNERS 13-17 (1983); Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and
Legal Practice in the Age ofAmerican Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PRO-
FESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 70-110 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); Stewart
Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 115 (1979).
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Jackson declared while still in practice, "a proceeding where two
and two must always make four-we want a chance by forensic skill
to build two and two up to six or hold them down to three, and now
and then to get two and two returned by a jury as a cipher."' 10
Judge Marvin Frankel, one of the leaders of the federal bench prior
to his return to private practice, acknowledged that "[t]he business
of the advocate, simply stated, is to win."'I  To understand modern
lititgation, he explained, "[w]e should face the fact that the quality
of 'hired gun' is close to the heart and substance of the litigating
lawyer's role."" 2 Often glorying in such descriptions, litigators
plan their efforts strategically and attempt to exploit whatever tacti-
cal opportunities appear in order to ensure their clients the greatest
possible leverage in litigating and settling disputes. Always eager to
exploit an opening, they share the attitude of the partner at a promi-
nent New York firm who "delights in thinking up new wrinkles to
throw into a situation."1
3
Among the tactics that such practitioners value and use, of
course, are those that allow them to control forum choice and to
secure the most favorable court possible in which to confront their
adversaries. 14 In any particular case or type of case the rewards of
forum control might include helpful procedural rules, favorable
statutes of limitations, or less formal but nevertheless acutely felt
leverage stemming from the structure, personnel, or docket of the
chosen forum. The ability to control forum choice may also enable
a party to control the substantive law that will govern the case." 5
110. Robert H. Jackson, Trial Practice in Accident Litigation, 15 CORNELL L.Q.
194, 197 (1930).
111. The entire quote is as follows: "The business of the advocate, simply stated, is
to win if possible without violating the law. (The phrase 'if possible' is meant to modify
what precedes it, but the danger of slippage is well known.)." Marvin E. Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1975).
Naturally, "winning" can mean a variety of different things and have a range of
different forms in any given context. In the overwhelming majority of disputes, in fact,
it would have no connection with any final legal judgment on the merits. Ordinarily,
"winning" would refer to the conclusion of a favorable out-of-court settlement in which,
for example, a party either paid substantially less than the amount of its estimated liabil-
ity on the merits or obtained significant collateral concessions (waiver of other claims,
agreement not to disclose information developed during discovery, etc.) from the other
party.
112. Id. at 1055 (footnote omitted).
113. NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK Lipsius, A LAW UNTO ITSELF 252 (1988).
114. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991
Wis. L. REV. 11.
115. Control of the forum will in many cases determine which state's substantive
law will be applied. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985);
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Perhaps most important from the practitioner's point of view, the
choice of forum may make a drastic difference in the amount of
damages likely to be recovered at trial and, consequently, a drastic
difference in the settlement value that attorneys place on a case. To
whatever extent the size of jury verdicts may have changed over
time, studies show that they vary markedly and relatively consist-
ently by location, differing both from state to state and among coun-
ties within the same state. A study of forty-three counties in ten
states, for example, found that the median jury verdict was more
than $50,000 in fourteen counties and more than $100,000 in four,
while it was less than $25,000 in twenty-three other counties and
less than $15,000 in ten. In California the highest and lowest coun-
ties studied had median jury verdicts of $122,580 and $51,800 re-
spectively; in Washington the numbers were $64,800 and $17,719;
in Illinois they were $24,920 and $10,382.116 "These large differ-
ences," concluded another scholar, "suggest that differences in the
milieu externe or the local legal culture may have an equal or
greater impact in determining awards than differences in the sub-
stantive law."' 117 Whatever the explanations, the ability to control
forum choice is a pivotal and distinctly bottom-line power.
While litigation planners might seek a variety of possible ad-
vantages from the ability to control forum choice, they would inva-
riably recognize the significance of geography and readily
appreciate the benefits of being able to force heavy and dispropor-
tionate practical burdens on their adversaries. A recent survey of
attorneys in a sample of 600 cases removed to federal court, for
example, found that 14.9 percent of plaintiffs' counsel and 17.9 per-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Goldman, supra note 1, at 712. In
some instances, of course, a party may control substantive law directly by means of an
express choice-of-law provision.
116. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Jus-
tice, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 321, 336-38 (1986). The numbers for the states cited represent
neither the highest nor the lowest numbers found in the 10 states.
A recent study by the General Accounting Office has found evidence suggesting
that arbitration may provide a more favorable forum than courts for securities firms
defending against claims filed by investors. The study found, for example, that the ap-
proximately 60% of claimants who were victorious recovered only 60% of their claimed
losses and that claimants were more likely to obtain above-average awards if they re-
tained attorneys and were able to have formal hearings rather than being confined to
written submissions. The findings suggest, of course, that those firms that are increas-
ingly forcing arbitration clauses on their customers are making a decisions that is, for
them, economically rational. See Henriques, Wall St. Arbitration Programs Criticized,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at DI. The Supreme Court has made such arbitration
clauses enforceable on a "consent" theory. See supra text accompanying note 3.
117. Saks, supra note 78, at 1252.
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cent of defendants' counsel were willing to admit that they consid-
ered the extent to which a forum would impose geographical and
financial inconveniences on their opponents as a factor in determin-
ing their forum preference. 18 Since most attorneys would likely be
unwilling to acknowledge publicly that they used such "hardball"
tactics, 119 the study's findings almost certainly underrepresent the
number of those who in practice attempt to exploit the burdens of
cost and convenience.
Evidence has repeatedly shown that some companies use in-
convenient venues methodically to discourage individuals from ap-
pearing in debt collection and other similar types of actions.' 20 In
New York, for example, merchants and finance companies have
used the state's liberal venue rules to bring collection suits in coun-
ties distant from the debtor's home-a practice that frequently re-
warded them with quick default judgments. 12' A study of
consumer collection practices in Texas found that several large re-
118. Miller, supra note 87, at 403. The results of the survey also illustrate some of
the ways that defense attorneys attempt to use procedural devices-plaintiffs' attorneys,
of course, have their own special tactics-to gain advantages over their adversaries.
[T]hree defense attorneys reported removing in the hope that their less-
experienced opposing counsel would be unfamiliar with the federal rule
requiring a written demand for jury trial. Four other defense attorneys
reported that they removed simply to annoy opposing counsel or because
filing in federal court would remove whatever advantage plaintiff counsel
thought would come from filing in state court. Finally, one plaintiff at-
torney reported that the defendant used removal to gain time to become
judgment proof.
Id. at 404. Such admissions by defense attorneys are especially noteworthy because, as
the author points out, some of the tactics described "may, of course, violate professional
ethics." Id. at 404 n.136.
119. In private, of course, the situation is quite different. In the right circumstances,
few attorneys can resist the opportunity to recount a colorful "war story." Auditors
often note some discrepancy between the tactics described in such tales and the highest
ethical standards of the organized bar.
120. See, e.g., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976); Schubach v.
Household Fin. Corpl, 376 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. 1978); Barquis v. Merchants Collection
Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972).
121. Karpel, supra note 97. The article, focusing on practices in New York City,
reported the following:
Of the 53 per cent who are warned they're being sued [i.e., who received
actual notice], most of them are done in by improper venue. Under New
York's rules of civil practice, any county civil court has jurisdiction on a
case that arose anywhere in the state. So merchants and finance compa-
nies often sue, not in the county where they reside or in the county where
the defendant resides, but in some other county which is likely to be in-
convenient for ghetto consumers to get to. Under the rules, the consumer
can have venue changed to the county where he resides. If he is being
sued in a court that is inconvenient for him to get to, all he has to do is go
to the court that is inconvenient for him to get to and ask for a change of
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tail and finance companies used form contracts to obtain the same
results. Their agreement forms allow creditors to bring collection
suits in counties , distant from the borrowers' places of residence.
The study found that "those creditors act upon the venue advantage
gained and file a significant number of lawsuits in the distant forum
against out-of-county residents."1 22 Equally important, the study
found that the practice paid off. "[D]efendants sued in a distant
forum are more likely to have default judgments entered against
them than are county resident defendants."1 23 Such venue provi-
sions, of course, are the functional equivalent of forum-selection
clauses in consumer form contracts, and both bring the same result
to companies able to use them-the ability to force their adversaries
to abandon their suits or to accept relatively unfavorable out-of-
court settlements.
While corporate lawyers may defend forum-selection clauses
on the ostensibly "neutral" ground that they increase "predictabil-
ity" in the legal process, the significance of predictability as such is
trivial compared to the importance of the powerful litigation lever-
age that companies can obtain by controlling forum choice. If fo-
rum-selection clauses merely increased predictability, that benefit
would accrue to all parties equally; however, in litigation planning
and claims disputing a benefit that accrues equally to all parties are
seldom an advantage to anyone. 24 In sharp contrast, however, the
burdens of geography-which forum-selection clauses impose re-
gardless of the formal purposes that purportedly explain their use-
often fall heavily, and usually either disproportionately or exclu-
sively, on one side only. That, of course, is a substantial litigation
advantage for the nonburdened party.
How would Mephistopheles evaluate the utility of forum-selec-
tion clauses?
venue. He would also be well advised to bring his lawyer with him, be-
cause getting a venue shifted is a rather tricky procedural maneuver.
The result was unsurprising.
The poor defendant gets either no summons, or one telling him he
must report to another county. The result is almost invariably the same
in either case: He doesn't show up. So a "judgment in default" is entered
against him by the clerk of the court.
Id. (emphasis in original).
122. Sampson, supra note 97, at 281-82.
123. Id.
124. The practical significance of predictability as such, as well as the more partisan
advantages to be gained through forum control, suggest some of the reasons why forum-
selection clauses may be reasonable when they are freely negotiated between knowledge-
able and sophisticated parties.
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B. Forum-Selection Clauses: The Function and the Future
While the role of forum-selection clauses may differ dramati-
cally depending on the nature of the parties and issues, in disputes
involving consumer form contracts their real-world function is
clear: they have little to do with choosing a convenient litigation
forum and less to do with limiting pretrial venue motions; they have
almost nothing to do with choosing a forum that will actually adju-
dicate a claim. Conversely, they have everything to do with the out-
of-court process of negotiating, litigating, and settling claims.125
Forum-selection clauses are tactical devices that enable companies
to cast heavy burdens and costs on consumers while conserving
their own resources and guaranteeing themselves an unrelenting
leverage against their adversaries. Because approximately ninety
percent of all claimants refrain from bringing suit and approxi-
mately ninety-eight percent settle out of court with or without
bringing suit, the paramount and unrivalled de facto function of fo-
rum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts is to compound
disincentives to suit and to press consumers to reduce their claims
steeply and settle them quietly and quickly. In economic terms, fo-
rum-selection clauses may be understood as a rational method
whereby companies multiply the transaction costs that litigation
imposes on those with claims against them in order to force such
claimants to discount or abandon their claims, thereby enabling the
companies to externalize a higher percentage of their overall costs
of operation. 126
125. Forum-selection clauses are facially neutral devices that serve in practice as a
partisan weapon. They are analogous, for example, to the clauses that cruise lines use
to impose time limitations or notice provisions on passengers who wish to bring suits.
The companies tend to require that notice of claims be given within six months and that
suits be brought within one year, the bare minimum amount of time that Congress has
mandated they allow. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b (1988). The time limitations and no-
tice provisions are defended on ostensibly neutral and "reasonable" grounds, such as
allowing defendants to secure relevant evidence while it remains available. Regardless
of theory, the fact remains that such provisions function to give the companies signifi-
cant advantage over individual claimants, especially those individual claimants who
lack resources and sophistication. Moreover, such provisions serve to bar claims that
would otherwise have been maintainable. Several circuits have upheld such clauses:
e.g., Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861 (1st Cir. 1983); Carpenter v.
Klosters Rederi, A/S, 604 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1979); Geller v. Holland-America Line, 298
F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 909 (1962).
126. Forum-selection clauses cannot properly be understood simply as devices that
reduce a company's overall costs. Such an approach begs a critical social question by
assuming implicitly a particularly narrow definition of "cost" (and perhaps even a tau-
tological one as the amount of money that a company pays to claimants). Considered
fairly and fully, the total "costs" of a company's operations includes all of the injuries,
losses, and deprivations that the company's operations cause. Given a definition that
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Given the social function of forum-selection clauses in con-
sumer form contracts, the "predictability" they create takes on a
new significance that is neither trivial nor neutral. The fact that the
forum is predictable means, as a practical matter, two things: First,
that nonresidents and their attorneys will quickly learn that they
have been placed at a substantial disadvantage, and second, that the
company's lawyers know that they will be able successfully to
stonewall large numbers of nonresident claimants. Predictability, in
short, means that before any litigation begins both sides will know
that the settlement value of the claim has already been pushed be-
low what it otherwise would have been. In this context, then, pre-
dictability is anything but a neutral and even-handed simplifying
factor.
Such predictability may, in some cases, even defeat a meritori-
ous claim if it dissuades plaintiffs' attorneys from accepting a poten-
tial client's case. Numerous studies have shown that personal
injury lawyers tend to be highly selective in choosing which plain-
tiffs they will represent.127 Operating for the most part on a contin-
gent fee basis, they carefully evaluate the relative strengths and
weaknesses of a case, the time and costs involved in pursuing it, and
the likelihood of obtaining a settlement or judgment sufficient to
repay their efforts. "Cases that are more expensive to litigate," con-
cluded one scholar after an extensive review of the available empiri-
cal evidence, "will be accepted less readily and will require a higher
expected return before they will be litigated."' 128 Even without fo-
rum-selection clauses, the evidence suggests that attorneys screen
out a large number of meritorious claims from the claims-asserting
process and that the tort system as a whole undercompensates in-
jured persons by many billions of dollars.' 29 When forum-selection
clauses make it clear to plaintiffs' attorneys that additional costs
encompasses all costs, it is apparent why and how forum-selection clauses contribute to
a process by which a substantial part of a company's total costs of doing business are
externalized-that is, displaced without adequate compensation onto those who suffer
the injuries, losses, and deprivations. From its inception, the economic analysis of tort
law has urged the elimination or minimization of externalities as a principal goal of tort
reform. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 144-50 (1970).
127. Saks, supra note 78, at 1190-91 and works cited therein.
128. Id. at 1192. "Well," explained one personal injury attorney, acknowledging
that his firm refused to accept cases that did not promise substantial payoffs, "its a very
imperfect world." JOHN A. JENKINS, THE LITIGATORS: INSIDE THE POWERFUL
WORLD OF AMERICA'S HIGH-STAKES TRIAL LAWYERS 302 (1989).
129. Keith W. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 111, 112-13 (1991); Saks, supra note 78, at 1196, 1226.
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and risks will burden a potential client's case, the predictability the
provisions offer will likely lead the attorneys to screen out a larger
number of such cases.
The cruise industry has already taken full advantage of forum-
selection clauses. The International Committee of Passenger Lines,
an industry group representing sixteen passenger lines operating
eighty-one vessels in and around North America, submitted an ami-
cus brief in Carnival Cruise arguing that the clause should be en-
forced. "The use of forum selection clauses in passenger ticket
contracts, designating a single venue for resolution of legal actions,"
it stated, "is a universal practice.' 3 0 In fact, it continued, "each
member cruise line relies on a forum selection clause in its ticket
contract."' 31 The numbers affected by the clauses are large. Sales
of passenger cruise tickets had grown "to over 3.3 million in 1989,"
the group stated, while the industry expected sales to reach 10 mil-
lion tickets within the decade.
132
The impact of forum-selection clauses in consumer form con-
tracts will be far broader, and the numbers affected multiplied geo-
metrically, if other companies begin generally to adopt the same
tactic with a similar degree of industry-wide uniformity.
133
Although Carnival Cruise construes federal admiralty law, its ap-
proach seems applicable to all forum-selection clauses. Some of the
lower federal courts have already taken the position that the valid-
ity of such clauses is a matter of federal common law. 134 They rely
in particular on the Court's recent decision in Stewart Organization,
130. Br. of the Int'l Comm. of Passenger Lines as Amicus Curiae, in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 61, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-
1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Forum-selection clauses have come into increasing use during the past two de-
cades. The reported cases suggest that such clauses are used most commonly--or at
least that they are contested most commonly-in general commercial contexts and to a
lesser extent in franchise and employment contexts. They are, however, beginning to
appear more frequently in consumer form contract cases, and the courts seem increas-
ingly willing to enforce them in such consumer cases. See, e.g., American Performance,
Inc. v. Sanford, 749 F. Supp. 1094 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (clause enforced); Hollander v. K-
Lines Hellenic Cruises, S.A., 670 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (clause enforced); Cold-
well Banker & Co. v. Eyde, 661 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (clause enforced); Fried-
man v. World Transp., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (clause enforced); Yoder
v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1986) (clause not enforced);
Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (clause not
enforced); Sall v. G.H. Miller Co., 612 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1985) (clause not en-
forced); cf. Goldman, supra note 1, at 706-07.
134. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir.
1988).
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Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. ,135 which has the effect of making forum-selec-
tion clauses generally enforceable in federal diversity actions even
when the suit is heard in a state whose law refuses to enforce such
clauses. 136 Together, Carnival Cruise and Ricoh threaten to extend
the use of forum-selection clauses far beyond admiralty jurisdiction,
to multiply the situations where corporate parties can exploit geog-
raphy as a litigation weapon, and to transform various federal pro-
cedural devices-removal, declaratory judgment, and transfer
under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a)-into tactical devices that would
enable companies methodically and regularly to impose the burdens
of geography on their unsuspecting customers.
It is essential to note, too, that in using forum-selection clauses
in consumer form contracts corporate attorneys are performing
skillfully and properly. They have every right to utilize whatever
tactics the law sanctions. 137 For the law to allow corporations to
135. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). In Carnival Cruise the company cited Ricoh in support of
its position. "With respect to non-admiralty cases, this Court indicated a policy in favor
of forum selection [sic] clauses in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp." Pet'r's Br.,
at 106, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 59-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Briefs file).
It is important to note that Carnival Cruise goes well beyond Ricoh. The latter
case presented a commercial dispute that grew out of a dealership arrangement between
two corporations. Throughout its analysis, moreover, Ricoh assumes that the forum-
selection clause at issue represented a known and understood part of the agreement
between the two knowledgeable commercial parties. Finally, unlike Carnival Cruise,
Ricoh expressly states that in evaluating the significance of a forum-selection clause a
court deciding a motion to transfer should consider "the parties' relative bargaining
power." 487 U.S. at 29. While Ricoh is essentially compatible with The Bremen, Car-
nival Cruise represents a leap beyond both.
For discussions of Ricoh, see Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses
in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh
Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1090 (1988); Eric Fahlman, Note, Forum-Selection
Clauses: Should State or Federal Law Determine Validity in Diversity Actions?, 64
WASH. L. REV. 439 (1989).
136. Ricoh held that in diversity cases a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) is "procedural" and hence governed by federal law and that as a matter of
federal procedural law forum-selection clauses, constituting "the parties' private expres-
sion of their venue preferences," 487 U.S. at 30, may properly be given weight in evalu-
ating the "convenience" and "fairness" of a proposed transfer. Id. at 29.
In Ricoh the law of the forum state declined to enforce such forum-selection
clauses. Id. at 24, 30.
137. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613.
While the rules of professional responsibility make certain tactics unethical, the
realities of litigation practice as well as the lawyer's inventiveness mean that one can
usually, if not always, come up with some "legitimate" cover explanation for a tactical
choice, regardless of the true motives for adopting it. To take any action for the sole
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maximize their own "convenience" while at the same time imposing
severe practical hardships on individual consumers seems, it is true,
inconsistent with notions of fairness and with the basic ideal of the
equitable administration of the law. As long as the Supreme
Court's decision in Carnival Cruise stands, however, corporate at-
torneys certainly have the right, and probably the professional ethi-
cal duty, to inform their clients of the advantages such clauses offer
and to urge them to seize the opportunity presented.
A recent article directed to insurance counsel seems to illus-
trate both the lawyering process and the likely trend in drafting
consumer form contracts. In the policies they write, the article rec-
ommends, "insurers hopefully will make strides toward greater cer-
tainty and predictability by incorporating more explicit and clear
forum selection clauses."'
38
III. GEOGRAPHY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL
FORUM CONTROL POLICY
Throughout the nation's history, enterprising and resourceful
litigants have sought advantages from the opportunities that geog-
raphy and federalism created, 39 and Congress and the Supreme
Court have repeatedly sought to counter their efforts in the service
of two compelling and compatible goals: Minimizing the unfairness
in the litigation process that results from the burdens of geography,
and countering systematic efforts by organized groups of litigants to
exploit those burdens. Carnival Cruise conflicts with both of those
fundamental policies.
A. Constitutional Control over Forum Choice
Since the late nineteenth century, when the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment coincided with the rise of the modern busi-
purpose of causing delay, for example, is unethical. Most litigators, however, can imag-
ine some other purpose that can plausibly explain a delaying tactic (obtaining more
complete discovery, ensuring that all of the client's legal contentions receive a hearing,
etc.). Hence, litigators can justify the tactic on one of those other grounds and receive
the advantage of the delay merely as a kind of accidental and unintended result.
138. W. Michael Jacobs, Rules and Procedures: Annual Survey of the Law of Civil
Procedure, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 437, 443-44 (1992). The article does not discuss Car-
nival Cruise and may have been written before it came down. The author, fully aware
of the bar's ethical requirements, explicitly notes that "the ancient concept of fair play
and substantial justice must be the touchstone for extensions of the law of jurisdiction
and venue beyond their current limits." Id. at 444.
139. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order,
1789-1910, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 57 (1975).
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ness corporation, the Due Process Clause has served as the funda-
mental constitutional basis for controlling interstate forum use.' 40
On the one hand, the Court has construed the clause to impose re-
strictions on the ability of states to assert personal jurisdiction over
nonresident parties. This application of the Due Process Clause
prevents plaintiffs from forcing their adversaries to defend in un-
fairly burdensome forums. On the other hand, the Court has con-
strued the clause flexibly, to allow the states to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresident parties who transact business or perform injurious
acts within their borders. This application of the Due Process
Clause ensures that states are able to protect their citizens by pro-
viding them with convenient local forums in which to seek
remedies. 141
140. The classic case, of course, is Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Though it
relied on "principles of public law," id. at 722, and because the events that it addressed
arose prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pennoyer noted the rele-
vance of the Due Process Clause, id. at 733, and quickly became the fountainhead of
due process analysis concerning the limits of state power in asserting personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents.
Subsequently, the Court has made it clear that the Due Process Clause imposes
much sharper restrictions on the ability of states to assert personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants than it does on another important aspect of interstate forum
choice, the determination of applicable substantive law in actions with multi-state con-
tacts. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); cf. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
141. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), the Court up-
held jurisdiction by the state of California over an out-of-state insurance company, not-
ing the importance of the state's "manifest interest in providing effective means of
redress for its residents." Id. at 223. Were jurisdiction not available in California, indi-
vidual California residents
would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insur-
ance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.
When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently
could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in
effect making the company judgment proof.
Id.; see Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied. Overhauling Consti-
tutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67 (1988).
Even in Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the Court recognized the counterbalancing
right of the states to protect their own citizens in their dealings with nonresidents. The
appropriate method open to the states was to assert jurisdiction over any of the defend-
ant's property located within their borders, regardless of whether the property was in
any way related to the dispute at issue.
Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents
deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and
appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the
claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the
property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals
can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and
1992] GEOGRAPHY AS A LITIGATION WEAPON 461
While the Due Process Clause applies to all litigants,' 42 the
Court developed its jurisprudence for the most part in addressing
the problems that arose from a centralizing national economy and
the emergence of the modern business corporation. 143 In the last
third of the nineteenth century the states began to enact statutes
designed to subject out-of-state residents, particularly foreign cor-
porations, to local jurisdiction. 144 Recognizing the powerful new
demands for expanded jurisdiction, 145 the Court found a variety of
ways to uphold the use of such statutes and allowed the states broad
leeway in providing local forums for their residents. 146 Then, facing
mounting doctrinal complexities and the challenge of ever more so-
phisticated corporate operations, the Court in 1945 reconceived the
due process law of personal jurisdiction. In International Shoe Co.
v. Washington 147 it placed the law on a coherent theoretical basis
and dealt directly with the artificial and complex nature of the mod-
ern corporation. Focusing on "the quality and nature" of defend-
ant's in-state activity, 148 International Shoe held that parties are
constitutionally subject to suit in any forum where they or their
activities "establish sufficient contacts" with a state to make the as-
sertion of jurisdiction "reasonable and just, according to our tradi-
tional conception of fair play and substantial justice."' 149 Clever
lawyering, the Court in effect decided, should not enable corpora-
the inquiry can then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the
disposition of the property.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. The Court has subsequently modified the law on this point.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
142. Eg., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811.
143. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25
U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
144. William L. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C. L.
REV. 1 (1968).
145. As the Court explained in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-93:
The limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause,
in its role as a guarantor against inconvenient litigation, have been sub-
stantially relaxed over the years. As we noted in McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., this trend is largely attributable to a fundamental transfor-
mation in the American economy.
The Court noted further that the "historical developments noted in McGee, of course,
have only accelerated in the generation since that case was decided [in 1957]." Id. at
293.
146. Classic examples include Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243
U.S. 264 (1917) ("doing business") and Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining
& Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) ("consent").
147. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
148. Id. at 319.
149. Id. at 320.
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tions to structure their businesses in ways that allowed them sys-
tematically to profit from activities within a state while at the same
time avoiding jurisdiction in that state.150
In construing the Due Process Clause, the Court has consist-
ently recognized both the practical difficulties that ordinary individ-
uals would face if they were denied the opportunity to bring suit in
their home states and the relative ease with which corporations con-
ducting interstate operations could generally shoulder the burdens
of out-of-state litigation. That basic social calculus means, of
course, that the rights of all parties are generally best protected, and
the legal system most likely to address the substantive merits of dis-
putes, if ordinary individuals are able to sue interstate corporations
in forums near their homes. The basic constitutional policy is com-
pelling: The very "purpose of the due process clause," International
Shoe declared, is to ensure "the fair and orderly administration of
the laws." 151 As the states universally enacted long-arm statutes
and began extending them to the outer constitutional limits,152 the
Court has without exception upheld their use whenever the non-
resident performed some relevant and sufficient action directed to-
ward the forum state.1 53
More important, when the Court has found that the nonresi-
dent's alleged contacts with the distant forum were insufficient to
150. In International Shoe the company had very carefully structured its business
operations to avoid suit in Washington, the forum state. It had succeeded in marketing
its products within the state on a regular and continuous basis, but it had also tailored
its activities in a way that seemed to prevent it from being "present" in the state and
therefore subject to personal jurisdiction there. For example, the company maintained
no office and no inventory in the state. It operated through approximately a dozen local
salesmen who were paid on a commission basis and who carried only single shoe sam-
ples of the company's products. The company finalized all sales contracts in its home
state (Missouri), and it sent all of its products into the forum state f.o.b. from points
outside of the state (i.e., in interstate commerce). In International Shoe the Court es-
sentially ruled that if a company intentionally carried on meaningful business activities
within a state it should be subject to suit in that state regardless of the technical way it
structured those business activities.
151. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
152. See, e.g., Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870
(Tex. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
153. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). When the Court has enforced the
limits imposed by the due process clause, it has made it clear that purposeful acts by a
defendant directed toward the forum state continue to be sufficient to subject the de-
fendant to personal jurisdiction in that state. Conversely, jurisdiction is improper when
the defendant's alleged "contact" with the forum state arises only from another party's
activities, when, that is, defendant's alleged contact with the forum state arises from the
other party's "unilateral activities" directed toward the forum state. See, e.g., Asahi
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allow jurisdiction, it has done so because the contacts were largely
or exclusively the result of actions taken by other parties and be-
cause the nonresident derived no benefit from its alleged contacts
with the forum state.' 5 4 The Court has, in fact, recently demon-
strated a special sensitivity to the unfair burdens that state long-arm
statutes can impose on relatively small and local commercial actors
when their products move between states and threaten to subject
them to personal jurisdiction in distant forums. In World- Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'55 for example, plaintiffs purchased
an automobile from a local New York retail dealer and shortly
thereafter drove westward toward Arizona. Plaintiff's car caught
fire, badly burning three family members, when it was struck in the
rear while passing through Oklahoma. Plaintiffs brought a prod-
ucts liability action in an Oklahoma state court and named four
defendants: the automobile's German manufacturer, its American
importer, its New York area regional distributor, and the local New
York dealer from which they had purchased the car. The Court
held that Oklahoma could not assert personal jurisdiction over the
latter two, the regional distributor and the local retailer. Both were
incorporated in New York, had their business offices there, and op-
erated only in that local area.' 56  The fact that one of their
automobiles was involved in an accident in Oklahoma, the Court
pointed out, was merely a "fortuitous" and "isolated occur-
rence."' 57 There was "a total absence of those affiliating circum-
stances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court
jurisdiction."'' 58 Whatever relationship the accident created be-
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Recently the Court has given somewhat greater emphasis to the "rights of defend-
ants" half of the balance. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102 (1987); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982). The earlier law, and the earlier balance described in the text, however, still
remains firmly in place. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985) ("So long as a commercial actor's efforts are 'purposely directed' toward resi-
dents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physi-
cal contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.").
154. E.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958).
155. 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980).
156. The local retailer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., was located in Massena, New
York. The regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., operated only in the
states of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Id. at 288-89. Defendants did not
challenge jurisdiction in Oklahoma against two other defendants who operated on a
national scale.
157. Id. at 295.
158. Id.
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tween the two local New York businesses and Oklahoma was due
solely to "the mere 'unilateral activity'" of the purchasers and, in
any event, neither of the two New York businesses derived any
profit from Oklahoma.159
In World-Wide Volkswagen the Court declared emphatically
that the mere foreseeable possibility that products would find their
way into distant states is not sufficient to allow those states to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state businesses. The court
explained:
If foreseeability were the criterion a local California tire retailer
could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs
there ... a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack could
be haled before a distant court for damage caused in New Jersey
... or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire could be summoned to
Alaska to account for injuries happening there .... 160
World- Wide Volkswagen thus demonstrated that the Due Process
Clause protects relatively small-scale and local commercial actors
who are swept up in the broader currents of modem-day transpor-
tation and commerce. Such local actors will not be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in distant states, absent their consent, if they
derive no direct financial benefit from those states and if they are
brought into contact with them through the activities of others.
Because plaintiffs normally enjoy the initial choice of forum,
the constitutional law of personal jurisdiction has focused on the
rights of defendants.' 6' The Due Process Clause, however, safe-
guards nonresident plaintiffs as well as nonresident defendants.
"The Fourteenth Amendment does protect 'persons,' not 'defend-
ants,'" Justice Rehnquist explained for the Court in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts.162 Consequently, "absent plaintiffs as well as
absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the jurisdic-
159. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253).
160. Id. at 296 (citations omitted). Four Justices, including three members of the
current Court, would expand the limitations imposed by the due process clause even
further. In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), Justice
O'Connor-joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia-main-
tained that the Due Process Clause prevented states from exercising jurisdiction over
producers whose goods were swept into a distant state by the "stream of commerce," if
the producers had not in any way "purposely directed" their activities toward that dis-
tant forum state. Mere "awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum State," the four Justices declared, should not be sufficient to
subject the producer to jurisdiction in that distant forum. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
161. E.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982).
162. 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
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tion of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims."'1 63 In
cases like Carnival Cruise consumer-plaintiffs should receive the full
protection that the Due Process Clause guarantees for a simple but
compelling reason: the function of forum-selection clauses in con-
sumer form contracts is precisely to reverse the standard position of
the parties with respect to forum selection. Such clauses preempt
the right of unknowing or uncomprehending consumer-plaintiffs to
select the forum, and they confer that right on company-defendants.
Although the consumers appear in the posture of plaintiffs, with
respect to the critical issue of forum choice, they are in the de facto
position of defendants.
Indeed, with respect to the substantive rights and policies that
underlie the Court's application of the Due Process Clause, the
Shutes in Carnival Cruise are in essentially the same position as the
two local defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen. Both sets of par-
ties were swept into contact with distant states through their in-
volvement with interstate commerce and by virtue of the actions of
others. The principal de facto differences between their positions
with respect to the distant forum is that, unlike the defendants in
Volkswagen, the Shutes were not engaged in any commercial enter-
prise and received no profit from the transaction at issue. The
Shutes were brought into contact with Florida solely by-and solely
in the interest of-Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. They neither derived
any benefit from Florida nor developed any "affiliating circum-
stances" with the state. Further, even if one assumes that the
Shutes derived an economic benefit in the form of a reduced fare
because Florida was the contractual forum, the Court's decisions
establish that such an assumed benefit would not be sufficient to
subject them to jurisdiction in Florida. The benefit accrued to
them, not in Florida, but in Washington, their state of residence. 164
163. Id. Shutts dealt with the problem of nonresident and known class members in
a class action suit brought in a Kansas state court. It ruled that states must give such
absent plaintiffs "minimal procedural due process protection" that included notice, an
opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to opt out of the suit, and (following Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-45 (1940)) class representatives who would adequately represent
their interests. Id. at 811-12.
164. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Court
rejected plaintiffs' contention that jurisdiction over the local companies was proper in
Oklahoma because they derived economic benefits from the fact that the automobile
manufacturer encouraged interstate travel by operating "service centers throughout the
country," id. at 298, and that the opportunities for interstate travel enhanced the value
of the automobiles they sold. The Court ruled that whatever economic benefit the two
local companies might derive from such factors accrued to them in New York, not in
Oklahoma. Id. at 298-99; accord Kulko v. California, 436 U.S. 84, 94-98 (1978).
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Carnival Cruise implicitly responds to this analysis, of course,
by relying on the fact that the Shutes entered into an agreement in
which they "consented" to Florida as the exclusive forum. Under
the Court's due process decisions, however, that response seems in-
sufficient. First, the Shutes' consent was neither knowing nor in-
formed, and Carnival Cruise does not attempt to assert the
contrary. To rely on such "consent" in dealing with consumer form
contracts is to embrace a fiction, not to provide a reason. 65 More-
over, reliance on such uninformed and unknowing "consent" is in-
consistent with the Court's traditional analysis under the Due
Process Clause. There, the Court has repeatedly abjured arid for-
malities and stressed the need for a specific, factually detailed, and
"realistic" examination of "minimum contacts."' 66 It has consist-
165. The Court has, of course, relied on the fiction of "implied" consent in the past.
See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927). Reliance on implied consent,
however, only focuses attention on the underlying policy considerations at issue.
In fact, Carnival Cruise does not seem seriously to advance the idea of "consent" as
the basis of its decision. It seems, rather, to rest on three factors: that forum-selection
clauses are reasonable, that corporate form contracts are necessary for economic effi-
ciency, and that the Shutes bought cruise tickets with forum-selection clauses.
166. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1985); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cul-
len, 318 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1943).
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105
(1990), might be taken to support the validity of the "consent" in Carnival Cruise. The
Burnham plurality reasoned that a "minimum contacts" analysis was not appropriate
when the asserted basis for personal jurisdiction was the "presence" of the nonresident
defendant in the forum state. "Presence," the plurality maintained, was a "traditional"
basis for asserting jurisdiction that remained valid independent of any "minimum con-
tacts" analysis. Since "consent" is also a "traditional" basis for asserting jurisdiction,
one could argue that it, too, remains valid regardless of a "minimum contacts" analysis.
This argument, however, seems unpersuasive. Burnham differs drastically from
Carnival Cruise in the extent to which the asserted jurisdictional basis was real, know-
ing, and informed. In Burnham the nonresident defendant went to the forum state
knowingly and intentionally, and he was actually physically in the state when he was
served with process. In Carnival Cruise the "consent" was uninformed and unknowing.
The Shutes were apparently aware of neither the existence nor the significance of the
forum-selection clause. Thus, while the "presence" in Burnham was real and undenia-
ble, the "consent" in Carnival Cruise is fictitious and unreasonable.
In addition, of course, the plurality opinion in Burnham does not represent a ma-
jority view. Six Justices expressed various disagreements or reservations with it. See id.
at 2119 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2120
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Moreover, the reasoning of
the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), seems inconsistent with the plural-
ity's approach.
The Court has dealt with related but distinguishable issues in several other cases.
See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174 (1972); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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ently stressed that "isolated" or "attenuated" contacts are insuffi-
cient to establish jurisdiction. 67  Realistically considered, the
"consent" at issue in Carnival Cruise is nothing if not "attenu-
ated." 168 Indeed, as Judge Posner observed in Donovan, the forum-
selection clause in Carnival Cruise "plainly is neither intended nor
likely to be read" by the consumer.1 69
Second, ruling in an analogous situation in Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz,' 70 the Court announced a fundamental rule of con-
struction that seems fairly applicable here: When a contractual rela-
tionship is advanced as the basis for asserting jurisdiction over a
nonresident, the mere fact that a contract exists is not, by itself,
dispositive.17  The controlling issue is not the formal existence of a
contractual relationship between the parties but rather the nature of
the "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,
along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course
of dealing." 1 72 On the facts of Burger King the Court found the
relationship sufficient to allow long-arm jurisdiction in Florida over
a nonresident defendant from Michigan who had entered into an
agreement with Burger King, a Florida corporation headquartered
in Miami. The Court found a sufficient relationship for a number of
weighty reasons going to the substance of the commercial relation-
ship at issue: The nonresident defendant had entered into the con-
tract knowingly; he had accepted a closely-supervised, twenty-year-
long franchise relationship that required close supervision by and
consultations with the company's Miami office; and he had entered
167. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) ("Such regular
monthly sales of thousands of magazines cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
characterized as random, isolated or fortuitous"); World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
299 ("In our view, whatever marginal revenues petitioners may receive by virtue of the
fact that their products are capable of use in Oklahoma is far too attenuated a contact to
justify that state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them.").
168. As the Court stated in World-Wide Volkswagen, the "foreseeability" that is
critical to due process analysis is "not the mere likelihood" that contacts will arise with
the forum state but rather the existence of such substantive contacts that the person
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297. The is-
sue, in other words, is not determined by the mere fact that a forum-selection clause
makes a forum legally "foreseeable." The question, rather, is whether the use of a fo-
rum made legally foreseeable by such "consent" should be regarded as reasonable. For
the reasons adduced in this article, such use-however "foreseeable" it might be on the
basis of the formal "consent"-remains unreasonable.
169. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 327, 377 (7th Cir. 1990).
For a thoughtful analysis, see Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver,
28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981).
170. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
171. Id. at 478.
172. Id. at 479.
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the relationship for business purposes and received various commer-
cial advantages from establishing the relationship. Moreover, the
course of negotiations and subsequent dealings brought the nonresi-
dent into continuous contacts with the Miami office on major issues
relating to the operation of the franchise, and the contract docu-
ments tied the parties' relationship to Florida through a choice-of-
law clause and other provisions.'
73
In Carnival Cruise, of course, the Shutes' relationship with the
company was not long-term; it was not continuing; and it was not
commercial. Indeed, there were no "prior negotiations" and no
"course of dealing" at all. The simple transaction between the par-
ties in Carnival Cruise constituted, at most, only an "isolated occur-
rence" and an "attenuated" contact between the Shutes and the
contractual forum state. On the basis of the Court's reasoning in
Burger King, then, the contractual "consent" on which Carnival
Cruise relies is a fiction unrelated to any meaningful negotiations or
course of dealing between the parties. Under Burger King that con-
sent would not be sufficient to give Florida jurisdiction over the
Shutes, and in Carnival Cruise it should not be sufficient to compel
the Shutes to bring their action in that state.
Indeed, the reasoning in Burger King makes it clear that en-
forcement of the forum-selection clause in Carnival Cruise is incon-
sistent with the Court's use of the Due Process Clause to balance
geographical hardships and thereby ensure "the fair and orderly ad-
ministration of the laws."' 174 In Burger King the Court specifically
addressed the contention that jurisdiction should be denied because
a contractual arrangement that allowed large companies to compel
small businesses to litigate away from home could become abusive.
It also addressed the added contention that such contractual ar-
rangements could allow companies to impose forum choices on con-
sumers who would then be particularly vulnerable if consigned by
contract to distant and inconvenient forums. Announcing that it
recognized and "share[d]" those "broader concerns,"' 75 Burger
King nevertheless found them inapplicable on the facts. It did so
for sound reasons that distinguish the case sharply from Carnival
Cruise. The nonresident defendant and his partner, the Burger
King Court explained, "'were and are experienced and sophisti-
cated businessmen.' "176 The nonresident defendant was, in fact, a
173. Id. at 479-81.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 485.
176. Id. at 484 (quoting the findings of the district court).
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professional accountant and a senior partner in a Detroit account-
ing firm who "reach[ed] out" to Burger King in Florida and entered
into the franchise agreement not merely to invest in a commercial
enterprise but also to obtain tax-deferral advantages.1 77 He was
represented by counsel throughout his dealings with the company;
he negotiated over the terms of his franchise agreement for five
months; he succeeded in securing from the company "a modest re-
duction in rent and other concessions"; 1 78 and he agreed to
purchase $165,000 worth of restaurant equipment and to make pay-
ments in excess of one million dollars over the twenty-year period.
The agreement in Burger King, thus, was a bargained commercial
transaction between "experienced and sophisticated" parties.
79
Not surprisingly, Burger King cites The Bremen repeatedly in
support of its ruling. 18 0 Clearly, the underlying and "realistic" situ-
ations in the two cases are similar. Equally clearly, the situations in
both contrast sharply with the situation in Carnival Cruise. The
constitutional policy that informed the Court's views in Burger
King, like the similar policy that inspired The Bremen, calls for a
different result in Carnival Cruise.'8'
The Court's reasoning in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
where it held that the Due Process Clause protects nonresident
plaintiffs, confirms that conclusion.' 82 When the issue is whether a
plaintiff has consented to jurisdiction in a forum where she is a non-
resident, the Court explained in Shutts, the "essential question" is
177. Id. at 466, 479.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 466, 484-85.
180. Id. at 472 n.14, 478, 486.
181. It is worth noting that the position taken by the four Justices in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi would seem to strengthen the argument that the
enforcement of the forum-selection clause in Carnival Cruise was inconsistent with gen-
eral federal forum control policy under the Due Process Clause. In Asahi those four
Justices would have protected the defendant even though its contacts with the forum
developed as an integral part of its business operations, it contributed knowingly to the
stream of commerce, and it profited regularly and substantially from its participation in
the stream. The Shutes, of course, developed their contact with Florida only as an ad
hoc incident of their desire to take a vacation; they were apparently unaware of the
existence or import of the forum-selection provision; and they derived no commercial
gain from either the contractual forum state or from the transaction as a whole.
182. The Court in Shutts stated that nonresident plaintiffs were entitled to "minimal
procedural due process protection." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
811-12 (1985). The argument here is that, for the reasons developed in the text, the
Due Process Clause should provide a substantial protection against forum-selection
clauses in consumer form contracts and that, applied to the different factual situation
presented in Carnival Cruise, the Court's own reasoning in Shutts supports that
conclusion.
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"how stringent the requirement for a showing of consent will
be."' 83 When the basis of jurisdiction is consent the necessary in-
quiry is not a mere mechanical search for evidence of something
that might formally constitute consent. Rather, the proper inquiry
is contextual and practical, and different situations require the use
of more or less "stringent" standards to determine whether any par-
ticular alleged consent is constitutionally sufficient. Further, Shutts
also makes it clear that a court pursuing that inquiry should con-
sider the nature of the nonresident's legal interests, the extent to
which she made a knowing and informed decision, and the likeli-
hood that finding "consent" to jurisdiction will facilitate the nonres-
ident's efforts to seek an appropriate remedy. In conducting its
inquiry in Shutts the Court upheld the constitutional sufficiency of
"opt out" consent by nonresident plaintiffs in a class action. It did
so on the ground that the "opt out" procedure would ensure an
effective judicial forum for class members who were unlikely to
bring separate actions while, at the same time, providing a meaning-
ful opportunity to make a knowing and informed withdrawal to
those likely to prefer their own independent suits.18 4 That analysis
is consistent with the reasoning in Burger King and The Bremen,
but foreign to the approach in Carnival Cruise.
For more than a century the Court has used the Due Process
Clause to control forum use involving nonresident parties. Al-
lowing the states great latitude in providing their citizens with con-
venient forums and protecting nonresidents who have not developed
183. Id. at 812.
184. The Court based its reasoning on the nature of the nonresident class members
and on evidence in the record. With respect to class members, the Court considered
two typological groups: first, those who had small claims or who were "unfamiliar with
the law," and, second, those whose claims were "sufficiently large or important" that
they would wish to litigate them on their own. The Court reasoned that those in the
first group were unlikely to bring suit on their own and that requiring them to "affirma-
tively request inclusion would probably impede prosecution" of their claims. Id. at
812-13. An "opt out" consent was constitutionally sufficient with respect to those in
the first group, then, because it promised most effectively to ensure that their claims
would actually be heard in a proper forum. The Court reasoned that those in the sec-
ond group would "likely have retained an attorney or have thought about filing suit."
Id. at 813. An "opt out" consent was constitutionally sufficient for those in the second
group, then, because they would most likely be "fully capable" of making a knowing
and informed decision about exercising their right to withdraw from the suit. Id. at
812.
With respect to the record, the Court cited and relied on evidence showing that
class members understood the "opt out" procedure and used it in a meaningful way.
Some 3400 class members (approximately 12% of those who received notice) had, in
fact, chosen to opt out of the suit. On that record, the Court concluded, it was clear
that the "opt out" consent was "by no means pro forma." Id. at 813.
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contacts with other states, the Court has sought within the limits of
fairness to place the burdens of geography on the parties who are
most able to bear it. That policy best serves the ultimate mandate
of due process because it provides the parties a relatively equal op-
portunity to seek the judgment of the law and to have their rights
determined, not by their comparative social and economic re-
sources, but by the substantive merits of their underlying legal
claims. Carnival Cruise conflicts with that policy.
B. The Quest for General Federal Forum Control: The Origins of
Section 1404 and the Federal Law of Forum Non Conveniens
Within the limits set by the due process clause, both Congress
and the Supreme Court have repeatedly sought to minimize the bur-
dens that geography imposes on litigation. 1 a5 While they dealt only
sporadically with the burdens of distance throughout the nineteenth
century and into the first decades of the twentieth, the new century
brought drastic changes in American society that led both to re-
think their approaches to the problems that geography presented to
the legal system.' 86 In the years after 1910, tort and contract litiga-
tion became increasingly volatile and dynamic. Though the great
majority of individual plaintiffs continued to sue near their homes,
sizeable numbers began, for the first time, to bring their suits in out-
of-state forums that offered them special tactical advantages.
18 7
The changes that the twentieth century wrought guaranteed
that multiplying numbers of plaintiffs would attempt to exploit the
advantages of interstate litigation tactics. With the advent of pro-
gressivism, the general political climate changed profoundly, gener-
ating a strong sympathy for individuals who were injured by
corporations and a new admiration for those who fought back. The
political rhetoric of progressivism etched the image of injured work-
ers and consumers as corporate victims, and it exhorted them to use
every legal weapon at hand to force the corporations to do justice.
185. The pages of the United States Reports and of the United States Statutes at
Large are full of such efforts. The Court took geographical burdens into account, for
example, in Parsons v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 73 (1963); Power Mfg.
Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 492 (1927); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S.
505, 513 (1900). Similarly, Congress sought to minimize those burdens, for example, in
cases brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 6, 36 Stat.
291, 291 (1910) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)), and in cases involving
workmen's compensation awards. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat.
415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1988)).
186. Terry S. Kogan, Geography and Due Process: The Social Meaning of Adjudica-
tive Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (1991).
187. See PURCELL, supra note 77, at 177-78.
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The Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA")I 88-which offered
new opportunities and incentives for interstate forum shopping in
its special provisions granting claimants a wide choice of venues and
an absolute prohibition on removal-89-was a major accomplish-
ment of progressivism, and it seemed only proper that its intended
beneficiaries take full advantage of the rights it conferred.
Improvements in interstate transportation and communica-
tions were essential to the process, as was the ability of growing
numbers of Americans in the early years of the twentieth century to
put them to use. Ethnic and immigrant aid societies, settlement
houses, and labor unions grew in significance and sophistication,
and increasingly they provided wider social contacts for workers
and their families, spread information about the legal system, and
guided those with potential claims to legal specialists who would
represent them. 190 After 1910, for example, the railroad brother-
hoods expanded their efforts to help members and their families
when injury or death forced them to seek compensation. They rec-
ognized that the problem with obtaining such compensation was
two-fold: Their members needed protection against railroad claim
agents on the one side and against dishonest "ambulance chasers"
on the other. 191 The brotherhoods began to assist injured workers
or their families in attempting to settle claims, and they began more
actively to identify personal injury attorneys who were both able
and honest and who were willing to give "assurances against
overcharging."
92
The personal injury bar, too, which had been developing since
the late nineteenth century, began producing imaginative interstate
entrepreneurs. In the years after 1910, successful urban tort spe-
cialists developed reputations and contacts that brought them out-
188. 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)).
189. Congress amended the FELA two years after its passage to add a special venue
provision allowing plaintiffs to bring suit under the act in any federal judicial district
where the claim arose or where a defendant railroad resided or did business. See S.
REP. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1910); H.R. REP. No. 513, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1910).
190. For the developing relations between the settlement movement and workers,
see ALLEN F. DAVIS, SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1890-1914 (2d ed. 1967).
191. Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation: Hearings Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 20,487, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 196, 197-98 (1913)
(statement of T.J. Hoskins, member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers).
192. Limitation of Venue in Certain Actions Brought Under the Employers' Liability
Act: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1947) (statement of A.E. Lyon, Executive Secretary,
Railway Labor Executives Association).
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of-state business, and some attorneys and firms began to solicit dis-
tant clients actively and methodically. 193 By the beginning of the
twenties "ambulance chasing," especially in serious tort cases where
damage claims ranged from $10,000 to $50,000 or more, had be-
come the newest form of interstate commerce.
While several states seemed particularly attractive forums,
Minnesota was among the most widely used. The state offered
favorable substantive and procedural law, juries notorious for their
generosity, and an exceptionally enterprising plaintiffs' bar that ac-
tively solicited cases from Indiana to the Pacific Ocean. A partial
count of cases docketed in the state's courts in February 1923, for
example, identified more than a thousand personal injury actions
brought by nonresident plaintiffs against foreign railroad corpora-
tions that did not even operate lines within the state. 1 94 "It is more
or less an open secret," noted the Minnesota Law Review in 1929,
"that a plaintiff who has a cause of action against a railway com-
pany, no matter where he resides, may find it to his advantage to try
the case in Minnesota."
195
The railroads, the principal victims of such interstate forum
shopping, protested vigorously against the burden of distance that
the suits cast upon them. In a 1924 action the Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Railway Co. submitted an affidavit challenging what it
regarded as abusive litigation tactics. It stated that in the prior four
years nonresident plaintiffs had brought numerous freight-related,
personal injury, and wrongful death actions against it in Minnesota
on causes of action that arose outside the state. The use of forums
distant from the place of injury had forced it in some cases to trans-
port its witnesses for more than a thousand miles to the trial site.
Protesting the altered balance of power that interstate forum shop-
ping effected in the process of out-of-court negotiation, the rail-
road's affidavit affirmed that
a considerable number of such imported actions against the de-
fendant have been settled, and that in the settlement thereof the
defendant has been induced to pay sums larger than would be
193. See the interesting and sometimes elusive testimony of E. Burk Finnerty, a New
Jersey attorney, who acknowledged representing clients from a number of states, and
the unflattering portrayal of interstate solicitation by D. Lindley Sloan, a Maryland
attorney. Id. at 39, 97 (Sloan statement beginning at 39; Finnerty statement beginning
at 97).
194. Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 316 n.2 (1923).
195. Note, Action Against Foreign Carrier for Cause Arising Outside of State as Bur-
den upon Interstate Commerce, 13 MINN. L. REV. 485, 485 (1929).
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otherwise warranted, on account of the difficulties of defending
such actions under the circumstances above set forth.
196
The railroad's affidavit also suggested the extent to which geograph-
ical burdens on a defendant might contribute to a plaintiff's claim
and to its settlement value. The 191 personal injury actions brought
against it by those residing in Minnesota at the time of injury or
filing sought an average of less than $16,000 each; the 224 personal
injury suits brought by out-of-state residents sought damages that
averaged in excess of $40,000 each.
197
The economic value of the FELA's broad venue rights was so
substantial and well-recognized, in fact, that the railroads began lit-
erally to attempt to buy the rights from potential claimants. They
did so through varieties of what the railroad brotherhoods called
the "Rock Island release," a contract in which an injured worker
agreed to try to negotiate a settlement of his claim in exchange for a
monetary payment. The key was that the agreements provided
that, in the event negotiations failed and the worker decided to
bring suit, he could file his action in only one or two specified fo-
rums. The devices proved of considerable use, especially when rail-
road claim agents were able to speak to workers before the latter
had consulted an attorney and learned the practical importance of
their special venue rights. The courts split on the enforceability of
such agreements for two decades until the Supreme Court held
them unlawful in 1949.198
Although as late as 1948 a spokesman for the Illinois Central
Railroad still regarded Minnesota as "the most outrageous exam-
ple" of an importing state, 199 New York, California, Missouri, and
Illinois also served as similar centers. A survey conducted by the
196. Weinard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 298 F. 977, 983 (D. Minn. 1924).
197. Id. at 982. A sample of 133 cases brought against another railroad in Minne-
sota during 1927 and 1928 on out-of-state causes of action sought an average of almost
$31,000 each. Note, Discretion to Dismiss Actions Between Non-Residents on Causes of
Action Arising Outside the State, 15 MINN. L. REV. 83, 94 n.44 (1930).
198. Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949). Prior to Boyd such
agreements were upheld in, e.g., Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903, 905 (W.D.
Mo. 1945). Such agreements were voided in, e.g., Sherman v. Pere Marquette R.R. Co.,
62 F. Supp. 590, 593 (N.D. Ill. 1945). For general background on such agreements, see
Limitation of Venue in Certain Actions Brought Under the Employers' Liability Act:
Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1639,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1947) (statement of Warren H. Atherton, Esq., member of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen).
199. Limitation of Venue in Certain Actions Brought Under the Employers' Liability
Act: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.
1567 and H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 20 (1948) (statement of John W. Freels,
attorney for the Illinois Central Railroad Co.).
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railroads for the years 1942 to 1946 showed that those four states,
together with Minnesota, accounted for 2319 suits that the railroads
classified as imported; 92.3 percent of the cases they identified. 2°°
By World War II, the importing was concentrated in five cities:
New York, Chicago, Oakland, St. Louis, and Minneapolis-St. Paul.
Each was a rail center; each was home to one of the seasoned per-
sonal injury firms that worked closely with the railroad brother-
hoods; and each provided the kind of jurors and size of verdicts that
personal injury victims and their attorneys avidly sought.20
The railroads, insurance companies, and other businesses
fought the interstate forum shopping tactic persistently and
broadly. In addition to using the Rock Island release, they organ-
ized campaigns and associations to fight ambulance chasing and
200. Limitation of Venue in Certain Actions Brought Under the Employers' Liability
Act: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1947) (statement of John W. Freels, attorney for
the Illinois Central Railroad Co., representing the law committee of the Association of
American Railroads).
201. Id. at 29. The supporters and defenders of interstate forum shopping traded
numerous charges and countercharges. The former offered a number of reasons for the
emergence of the five major cities as importing centers (the plaintiffs' attorneys were
experts; the cities were headquarters for many railroads; the railroads brought large
number of their seriously injured workers to the hospitals in those cities; medical ex-
perts were more readily available; it was necessary to avoid many localities where the
railroads were a dominant force). The latter denied those claims and explained the
development on the basis of the unlawful and unethical practices that they alleged were
common (organized solicitation; champerty and maintenance; misleading and deceiving
clients; and unethical cooperation with the brotherhoods' legal aid department). See
supra notes 199-200; H.R. REP. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (Part 1, Majority
Report; Part 2 Minority Report; Part 3 Minority Views of Mr. Feighan).
By the thirties and forties representatives of the railroads and the brotherhoods
agreed on two points. Large verdicts generally came in large cities, and interstate forum
shopping was costly to the railroads. See Limitation of Venue in Certain Actions
Brought Under the Employers' Liability Act: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1567 and H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 37,
85, 169-70 (1948) (statements of John W. Freels, attorney for the Illinois Cent. R.R.;
Floyd E. Thompson, Esq.; Samuel D. Jackson, representing the Indiana State Bar Asso-
ciation); Limitation of Venue in Certain Actions Brought Under the Employers' Liability
Act: Hearings on H.R. 1639 Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 101-02, 109 (1947), (statements of the
Hon. John Jennings, Jr., U.S. Rep. from Tenn.; E. Burke Finnerty, a New Jersey attor-
ney; Jonas A. McBride, Vice President and National Legislative Representative, Broth-
erhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen). In the past 18 years, explained a
representative of the Railroad Trainmen in 1948, "the average amount paid to victims
of railroad negligence in settlement out of court has substantially increased and the
average amount of the verdicts recovered has risen." Limitation of Venue in Certain
Actions Brought Under the Employers' Liability Act: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1567 and H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
215, 232 (1948) (statement of Warren H. Atherton, Esq., representing the Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen).
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other unethical practices, sought to improve the "character" of the
bar by raising educational and admission standards, persuaded the
American Bar Association to sponsor helpful law reform proposals,
and urged legislatures throughout the nation to pass restrictive leg-
islation. As litigants, they engaged in their own preemptive counter
forum shopping, sought injunctions in plaintiffs' home states that
would prevent them from prosecuting their out-of-state actions, and
urged courts across the nation to dismiss actions brought in "re-
mote" and "inconvenient" forums.20 2
Their efforts met with mixed success. A few state legislatures
passed statutes designed to prevent citizens from suing out of state
or to make interstate solicitation unlawful, and some courts began
haltingly to shape doctrines that would allow them to dismiss suits
brought in "burdensome" or "vexatious" forums. Although prior
to 1910 the doctrine of forum non conveniens was largely unknown
to American courts outside of admiralty, in the years after World
War I a few state courts began to discuss the doctrine and give it
effect. 20 3 The federal courts, however, refused to recognize the doc-
trine. To make matters worse, for the railroads at least, in actions
brought under the FELA-the primary arena of systematic inter-
state forum shopping-the federal courts held that they had no dis-
cretion to refuse to hear cases over which Congress had specifically
given them jurisdiction.
2°4
Beginning in the twenties, however, a variety of considerations
made the federal courts increasingly concerned with the problems
of interstate forum shopping. In some instances federal judges were
probably influenced by their resentment at plaintiffs' calculated ef-
forts to manipulate jurisdiction, the unethical and unlawful tactics
that some personal injury attorneys utilized, or even a general ideo-
logical sympathy with national business. In any event, the use of
geography to impose heavy burdens on defendants seemed obvi-
ously unfair, even when a remote venue was unquestionably proper
202. See PURCELL, supra note 77, at 187-90.
203. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,
29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929); Roger S. Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of
Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. REV. 41 (1930); Roger S. Foster, Place
of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1930); Granger Hansell, The Proper
Forum for Suits Against Foreign Corporations, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 12 (1927); Com-
ment, Progress in Interstate Adjustment of the Place of Trial of Civil Actions, 45 YALE
L.J. 1100, 1235 (1936).
204. Cf Southern Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F.2d 1019, 1020 (6th Cir. 1932); Schendel
v. McGee, 300 F. 273, 278 (8th Cir. 1924); Comment, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Causes of Action Based on the Federal Employers' Liability Acts, 39 YALE L.J.
388 (1930).
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under the controlling statutes. Further, under the pressure of a rap-
idly expanding caseload that resulted in large part from the advent
of Prohibition, the federal courts were increasingly forced to con-
front the problems of docket control and case management. As
judges, lawyers, scholars, and government officials sought methods
of dealing with the growing caseload, interstate forum shopping ac-
tions stood out ever more sharply as examples of particularly unrea-
sonable forum use. Finally, as the legal profession came
increasingly to think of the state and federal courts not simply as
the separate judicial arms of independent sovereigns but as interre-
lated parts of a national judicial system, the propriety of establish-
ing rational and comprehensive rules of forum choice seemed ever
more obvious and necessary.
For almost three decades the Supreme Court experimented
with a variety of doctrines to give the federal courts more direct
control over parties' forum choices. It tried out the Commerce
Clause,20 5 the Full Faith and Credit Clause,20 6 the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 20 7 the Equal Protection Clause, 20 8 the Due Pro-
cess Clause, 20 9 and the federal judicial code.2 0 Further, the Court
explored the possibilities inherent in such discretionary techniques
as dismissals without prejudice, 21 I abstention, 21 2 and forum non
conveniens.
21 3
In the twenties, for example, the Court tried out the commerce
clause and held that a suit brought in a "remote" forum could im-
pose such inconvenience on a corporation's business operations that
it constituted a burden on interstate commerce. 21 4 The Court
sought in particular to counter FELA plaintiffs who were not only
methodically exploiting their broad venue options under the statute,
but who had also begun to take up residence in distant forum states
as a method of eluding the Court's tightening strictures on out-of-
state forum use. To meet the latter ploy, the Court refused to rely
205. Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
206. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
207. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
208. Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923).
209. E.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Mis-
souri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533 (1922).
210. Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653 (1923).
211. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
212. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
213. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
214. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Davis v.
Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923); see also, Michigan Cent. R.R. Co.
v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929).
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on the fact that a plaintiff was a "bona fide" resident of the forum if
the cause of action had accrued prior to the time plaintiff took up
his new residence. The Court's residence rule under the commerce
clause venue doctrine avoided the result that obtained under the
analogous rule in diversity actions that accepted a party's change of
residence after a cause of action arose but prior to suit as altering
the party's citizenship. 215 The commerce clause venue doctrine and
its special residence rule made it clear that the Court regarded inter-
state forum shopping-though expressly authorized by statute-as
sufficiently unfair to justify the creation and application of new and
more stringent rules to control the power of parties over forum
choice.
Gradually, however, the Court abandoned its commerce clause
doctrine and most of its other efforts to use the Constitution as a
routine method of forum control. The constitutional clauses were
too broad and cumbersome for such relatively individualized and
pragmatic decisionmaking. Finally, in 1947, the Court accepted the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in actions at law in the federal
courts as a practical, discretionary, and overtly case-by-case ap-
proach to forum control.216 As a result the national judiciary ob-
tained the express authority to control forum choice by dismissing
actions which seemed, in the court's judgment, to be brought in
"inconvenient" forums. The new doctrine authorized the national
courts to base their judgments on an evaluation of all the relevant
practical factors that affected the litigants and the court in each in-
dividual case, and to determine whether the chosen forum was fair
and convenient.
Although Congress left the growing problem of interstate fo-
rum shopping to the courts for some thirty-five years, it finally ad-
dressed the issue the following year when it enacted a
comprehensive new judicial code. The Revised Judicial Code of
1948 added an innovative new Section 1404 that adapted theforum
non conveniens idea to the structure of an integrated federal judicial
215. The Court refused to draw on the established rule in diversity actions that a
change of residence prior to suit though after the cause of action had arisen was suffi-
cient to change a party's citizenship. Compare Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (refusing to weigh
FELA plaintiff's residence in the forum state taken up after the cause of action arose
though prior to suit) and Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (same) with Williamson v. Osenton, 232
U.S. 619 (1914) (applying established rule in diversity action).
216. Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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system. 217 The new provision authorized the national courts to
transfer cases to any other appropriate federal judicial district upon
a showing that such a change of venue would serve the "conven-
ience of the parties and witnesses" and be in "the interest of jus-
tice."' 218 The official Reviser's notes stated simply that the new
provision "was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum,
even though the venue is proper.
'219
The statement of "legislative purpose" that accompanied Sec-
tion 1404 was concise if elliptical. Submitted by a panel of experts
who produced the code,220 the Reviser's notes and the new provi-
sion reflected a combination of forces. The growing pressures of
interstate forum shopping on the courts, decades of lobbying by
railroads determined to restrict the FELA's venue provision, the
pleas of bar associations seeking to restrict unethical practices and
to stop the loss of lucrative local business to big-city tort specialists,
and the rationalizing drive of law professors and legal reformers
joined to convince both Congress and most of the profession that
some such change was necessary. The Reviser's notes distilled
those varied elements to their essence and identified the fundamen-
tal congressional intent behind the new Section 1404 when it cited
but a single case as its only "example of the need of such a
provision." 2
21
The case, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kepner,222 decided
in 1941, involved a typical instance of interstate forum shopping
under the FELA. Plaintiff, an Ohio citizen injured in Ohio,
brought suit in a New York federal court where venue was proper
under the FELA. The railroad responded by filing suit in a local
Ohio equity court seeking to enjoin plaintiff from prosecuting the
217. The code was enacted on June 25, 1948. See Judiciary and Judicial Procedure,
ch. 87, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988)). For con-
gressional reports on the proposed new Section 1404, see H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., app., at
127-28 (1946).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988).
219. The Reviser's notes are printed in H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
app., at 132 (1947).
220. The Chief Reviser stated that there was "no purpose on the part of the Revision
staff to effect any change in existing law," and he acknowledged only that certain incon-
sistencies and ambiguities "not correctable by mere codification" had required "a few
such changes." William W. Barron, The Judicial Code: 1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439,
441 (1948). For a brief history of the revision and a description of the participants, see
H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7 (1946).
221. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 132 (1947) (reviser's notes).
222. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
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New York action. The railroad pointed out that both federal and
state courts were available to hear the action in Ohio, that the New
York court was seven hundred miles from plaintiff's residence, and
that a trial in New York would force the railroad to transport some
twenty-five Ohio witnesses to New York at an extra cost of $4,000.
The Ohio courts denied the injunction, and the railroad appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. "The real contention of peti-
tioner," the Court explained, "is that, despite the admitted [proper]
venue [in New York], respondent is acting in a vexatious and ineq-
uitable manner" since "a convenient and suitable forum is [avail-
able] at respondent's doorstep. '223 Affirming the Ohio courts, the
Supreme Court held that the states could not deny plaintiff an ex-
press statutory venue right regardless of the extent to which that
right subjected the railroad to "harassing incidents of litigation. '224
Splitting the New Deal Court, Kepner 225 and a follow-up case
decided the next year 226 deprived the railroads of their most power-
ful legal weapon against interstate forum shopping. The decisions
spurred the railroads' intensified drive in the late forties to persuade
Congress to amend the FELA. Indeed, passage of the Revised Judi-
cial Code with its new Section 1404 helped sidetrack a railroad-
sponsored amendment restricting venue rights under the FELA
that had passed the House the previous year.
227
Given the rise of interstate forum shopping and the history of
litigation under the FELA, the citation to Kepner in the Reviser's
notes points directly to the two particular types of abuse that the
new provision was intended to remedy. First, Section 1404 was in-
tended to counter the use of forums that were unrelated to either
the plaintiff's residence or the cause of action: The Reviser's notes
identified the salient factors in Kepner that made the venue practi-
cally undesirable, even though legally proper: The action "was pros-
223. Id. at 51.
224. Id. at 54.
225. Justice Reed wrote for the Court. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Chief Justice
Stone and Justice Roberts, dissented.
226. The following year, in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1942), a
more badly split Court applied the same bar to injunctions sought against FELA suits
filed in state courts. Justice Reed wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy. Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Chief Justice Stone and
Justices Roberts and Byrnes. Justice Jackson concurred in the plurality's result in a
separate opinion. Jackson expressed sympathy for the dissenters' wish that the courts
had greater control over forum choice, and he explained clearly why the ostensibly
abstract issue of desirable forum use involved substantial and practical questions of liti-
gation advantage.
227. 93 CONG. REC. 9193-94 (1947).
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ecuted under the Federal Employer's Liability Act in New York,
although the accident occurred and the employee resided in
Ohio. '228 Second, and more broadly, Section 1404 was intended to
limit the methodical exploitation of the burdens of geography by
organized classes of litigants. It was aimed directly and purposely
at actions under the FELA where the organized and systematic use
of geography as a litigation weapon had become both widespread
and notorious.
Events immediately following passage of the Revised Code
confirmed the intended purpose of the new provision. The Chief
Reviser, William W. Barron, highlighting the section as a "very im-
portant change" in federal law, noted that "there have been already
determined efforts to limit the power of transfer. ' 229 On the theory
that Section 1404 conflicted with the broad venue provisions of the
FELA, plaintiffs argued that the new section applied only to actions
brought pursuant to the general federal venue statute, not to those
brought under statutes that contained their own special venue pro-
visions. They pressed their position so aggressively, and the
Supreme Court was so eager to rule on their contention, that the
Justices decided the issue on a petition for mandamus and prohibi-
tion barely seven months after Congress enacted the new code. In
Ex parte Collett 230 and a companion case,23t which both presented
standard examples of interstate forum shopping under the FELA,
the Court rejected "special venue provision" arguments and held
that Section 1404 applied to any civil action. More revealing, the
Court devoted the bulk of its opinion, ten full pages, to a detailed
legislative history of the provision in order to refute petitioner's
contention that the revisers had concealed it in the massive new
code, "obscured" its relation to the FELA, and induced Congress to
enact it in ignorance and by mistake. The Court gathered the evi-
dence relevant to the provision's legislative history and showed that
individual members of the Revision committee, the official Reviser's
notes printed with the Code, reports of the Senate and House Com-
mittees, and general legal periodicals had all repeatedly stressed the
significance of Section 1404 and stated explicitly that it would apply
228. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 132 (1947).
229. Barron, supra note 220, at 442.
230. 337 U.S. 55 (1949).
231. Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. R.R. Co., 337 U.S. 75 (1949). The Court similarly
decided that Section 1404 applied to actions brought under the federal antitrust laws
which also contained their own special venue provisions. See United States v. National
City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
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to actions under statutes with special venue provisions, most partic-
ularly the FELA.232
The legislative history of Section 1404 and the Reviser's notes
establish that the purpose of the provision was not simply to allow
the federal courts to transfer individual cases in the interests of
some generalized and socially abstract goal of judicial economy.
The provision had a more specific and more fundamental purpose, a
purpose that was rooted in the same policies and values that
animated the Court in developing its Commerce Clause venue doc-
trine, its doctrine of forum non conveniens, and its construction of
the Due Process Clause relating to personal jurisdiction. The intent
was to ensure "the fair and orderly administration of the laws" 2
33 -
to serve, in the statute's language, "the interest of justice"-by lim-
iting the ability of parties to exploit geography as a litigation
weapon. It sought, in particular, to restrict those who selected fo-
rums with little or no substantial connection to either the parties or
the claim, and to block organized classes of litigants who attempted
systematically to use the weapon of geography. Accordingly, the
House report on the new code made it clear that Section 1404 re-
quired the federal courts to consider the "interest of justice" factor
separately and independently from the "convenience" factor. "The
new subsection," it explained carefully, "requires the court to deter-
mine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties
and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do
SO."234
Although Section 1404 created a number of doctrinal problems
for the federal courts, the Supreme Court has construed it in light of
232. Collett, 337 U.S. at 61-71. The Court again noted in 1964 that abuse of the
venue provisions of the FELA "was the subject of special concern" when Congress
enacted Section 1404. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964).
233. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
234. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 132 (1947) (emphasis ad-
ded).
In this regard, it is important to note the substantial difference between the legisla-
tive purpose behind Section 1404 and that behind a superficially similar provision en-
acted two decades later. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988). The latter section provides for the
consolidation for purposes of pretrial proceedings of factually related actions brought in
different federal judicial districts. In practice, the section is frequently used in conjunc-
tion with Section 1404.
In adopting Section 1407, Congress made it clear that the provision was intended
to serve the goal of judicial economy and administrative convenience. The interests of
the parties, while relevant, are distinctly secondary. Indeed, Section 1407 authorizes
consolidations in federal judicial districts where the parties are not otherwise subject to
personal jurisdiction and where original venue would be improper. In construing Sec-
tion 1407 the courts have made the goal of judicial economy their dominant considera-
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its mandate that transfers must serve "the interest of justice. '' 235
With that requirement in mind, the Court has evaluated motions
under Section 1404 with close attention to the practical significance
that its decisions will have both on the specific parties before it as
well as on litigation practice in general. It has sought, in particular,
to prevent litigants from utilizing sophisticated tactics that would
allow them to turn the statute itself into an instrument of forum
shopping or unfair jurisdictional manipulation.236 "The Section ex-
ists to eliminate inconvenience," the Court stated in 1990, "We
think it not the purpose of the section to protect a party's ability to
use inconvenience as a shield to discourage or hinder litigation
otherwise proper.
'237
Thus, when plaintiffs began systematically using interstate fo-
rum shopping tactics, Congress and the Court both found it neces-
sary to respond. The Court was particularly inventive and
persistent in its efforts, in part no doubt because forum choice and
"the fair and orderly administration of the laws" seemed inherently
a special concern of the judiciary. 238 Ultimately, however, both de-
cided that the law had to control the weapon of geography and pre-
vent its methodical exploitation by organized classes of litigants.
tion. See, e.g., Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (1991).
In contrast, the purpose of. Section 1404 is quite different. Though judicial econ-
omy may be a relevant factor, in Section 1404 Congress expressly made the interests of
the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice in the individual case the controlling
factors.
235. "Section 1404(a) reflects an increased desire to have federal civil suits tried in
the federal system at the place called for in the particular case by considerations of
convenience and justice." Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616. Stressing the need to ensure
that transfers under Section 1404 served the interest of justice and did not "prejudice"
plaintiffs, Van Dusen held that transferee courts were obliged to apply the state law that
transferor courts would have applied had there been no transfer. Id. at 639.
236. See, e.g., Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 623-24; Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-
585, 364 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1960); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960).
237. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 525 (1990). Ferens holds that the Van
Dusen rule-that the law the transferor court would have applied must be applied by
the transferee court-controls even when the plaintiff has clearly engaged in interstate
forum shopping and is also the moving party on the transfer motion. That decision
seems highly questionable since it will likely encourage the use of unfair and manipula-
tive tactical devices by sophisticated plaintiffs. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented in Ferens largely on that ground. Id. at
533-40.
238. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
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IV. WHY CARNIVAL CRUISE?
The examination in Part II of the business context in which
forum-selection clauses operate and the survey in Part III of the
evolution of federal forum-control policy suggest that there is far
more wrong with Carnival Cruise than its unpersuasive reasoning,
its dubious construction of The Bremen, and its rewriting of a fed-
eral statute in the name of "plain meaning." Carnival Cruise is an
unsatisfactory decision because it magnifies rather than minimizes
the impact on the nation's judicial system of the arbitrary and ineq-
uitable burdens of geography. The decision is unsatisfactory be-
cause it facilitates rather than counters a tactical device that enables
an organized class of litigants to exploit those burdens methodically
and systematically. It is unsatisfactory because it ignores the sensi-
ble and just public policy, which both Congress and the Court have
sought to implement, of minimizing the impact of geography on the
judicial system "in the interest of justice" and of "the fair and or-
derly administration of the laws."' 239 It is unsatisfactory, finally, be-
cause it imposes the burdens of geography on the weaker and more
vulnerable party and thereby increases the likelihood that disputes
will be resolved on the basis of the relative social resources of the
adversaries rather than the substantive merits of their legal claims.
A. Understanding Carnival Cruise: Venue and Public Policy
Given the way that forum-selection clauses disadvantage indi-
vidual claimants and the recurring efforts of both Congress and the
Court to limit the impact of geography in federal litigation, the de-
cision in Carnival Cruise seems arresting. Though its reasoning is
unpersuasive, its determination to uphold forum-selection clauses in
consumer form contracts is quite clear. It seems important, then, to
attempt to identify more carefully the values and policies that un-
dergird the decision.
The opinion's express references to the conservation of litiga-
tion resources and the creation of economic benefits 240 surely isolate
two fundamental policy goals that helped guide the Court to its de-
cision. Indeed, it seems probable that the Court's desire to conserve
judicial and litigant resources and to implement certain ideas of eco-
nomic efficiency and wealth-maximization are primary determi-
nants of the reasoning and result in Carnival Cruise. With respect
239. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
240. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991).
[Vol. 40:423
GEOGRAPHY AS A LITIGATION WEAPON
to both goals, however, Carnival Cruise seems dubious in theory
and unfairly biased in practice.
With respect to the first goal, two serious problems challenge
Carnival Cruise's assumption that forum-selection clauses will re-
duce the burdens of litigation by eliminating the need for litigants to
make, and the courts to decide, preliminary pretrial motions con-
cerning jurisdiction and venue.241 The first problem is that Carnival
Cruise might actually increase the federal caseload. The decision
promises to compound the impact of Ricoh and magnify the incen-
tives for defendants to remove state court actions to the federal
courts. Even more, the two decisions will presumably encourage a
growing number of industries to insert forum-selection clauses in
their consumer form contracts. Such clauses will likely appear far
more frequently in cases involving consumer disputes, and they will
appear even more commonly in federal question and diversity cases
as well as in admiralty suits. It seems probable, then, that Carnival
Cruise will multiply removals and transfer motions in the federal
courts. In addition, since removed cases remain in the federal sys-
tem after transfer, the decision could also increase the overall fed-
eral trial docket. Finally, in the event that the Court's
"fundamental fairness" scrutiny proves to establish any meaningful
limit on the use of forum-selection clauses, 242 the opportunity it
would offer to void such clauses would encourage consumers to
challenge them on the specific facts of their cases. More pretrial
motions, raising a wide range of relatively complicated and individ-
ualized factual questions, could easily result.
The second problem with Carnival Cruise's goal of conserving
litigation resources by minimizing pretrial motions is both more se-
rious and more certain. Simply put, if the decision does succeed in
cutting the burden of litigation, it will do so inequitably with respect
to the parties and, with respect to the judiciary, for a reason materi-
ally different from the one the Court advances. For the parties,
241. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 38-41. The current Court's
efforts to use procedural devices to cut the federal caseload threaten to become legen-
dary, however questionable they might seem. From the same term in which the Court
decided Carnival Cruise, see International Primate Protection League v. Administrators
of Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991) (adding that the statute authorizing re-
moval of state suits by federal officers does not permit removal by federal agencies);
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991) (holding that federal
appellate courts must review de nova district courts' determinations of state-law issues
on the ground, inter alia, that the result would foster "economy of judicial
administration").
242. See supra text accompanying notes 45-56.
1992]
UCLA LAW REVIEW
Carnival Cruise will prove inequitable because the decision does
not, as the Court seems to imply, simply reduce litigation burdens
in some general and mutually shared way. Rather, it substantively
redistributes those burdens, lifting them from companies that do in-
terstate and international business and imposing them on relatively
vulnerable and uninformed consumers. For the judiciary, Carnival
Cruise will not reduce the burdens of litigation so much by cutting
pretrial motions relating to jurisdiction and venue as by discourag-
ing claimants from filing suit or from litigating the suits that are
filed and transferred to distant contractual forums. The primary
result of Carnival Cruise, in other words, will most likely be to elim-
inate suits, not motions, and to deny forums, not make them merely
predictable. 2
43
The likely results of Carnival Cruise raise troubling questions
about the extent to which the Court is willing to transform its legiti-
mate desire to control the federal docket into a judicial master pol-
icy that threatens to undermine other and more fundamental goals
of the nation's legal system. Encouraging settlements may be both
wise and necessary, but doing so in ways that substantially alter the
litigation balance between the parties--especially when the de facto
result is to further handicap the weaker party-seems inconsistent
with "the fair and orderly administration of the laws."' 244 Indeed, it
is troubling that the Court, which in recent years has repeatedly
shaped legal rules to encourage out-of-court settlements, would in
Carnival Cruise consider only the impact that its decision would
have on formal pretrial motions and ignore its likely impact on the
out-of-court settlement process. If the federal docket is to be con-
trolled, as it should be, there are surely better and fairer ways to do
it.245
With respect to the decision's second goal, enhancing eco-
nomic efficiency and maximizing wealth, Carnival Cruise raises a
number of serious problems. 246 The first is that the decision accepts
and sanctions a massive market failure. The companies' ability to
impose forum-selection clauses on consumers arises from two eco-
nomic factors. One is that it would be irrational for consumers to
absorb the costs of identifying and evaluating such technical con-
243. Even if "fundamental fairness" scrutiny proves to have some substance, its nar-
rowness and the burdens of proof it carries with it will dissuade some claimants from
trying to invoke it.
244. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
245. See, e.g., the works cited infra note 293.
246. For a general discussion of Carnival Cruise focusing on its law and economics
underpinning, see Goldman, supra note 1.
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tractual provisions.247 Consumers are unable, on their own, to rec-
ognize and understand the full significance of the numerous
technical provisions that companies insert in their form contracts.
Because consumers must continually enter into such agreements as
a normal and unavoidable part of their daily lives and because each
individual consumer bears only a slight risk that he or she will be
affected by such provisions in any particular agreement he or she
enters into, spending time and money to obtain full information is
not a rational investment. The other economic factor is that trans-
action costs prevent consumers from joining together to collect the
requisite information, evaluate their options, and bargain for effi-
cient contractual terms. Economic rationality, then, leads consum-
ers to remain both uninformed and disaggregated. The market
failure arises from the fact that economic rationality leads the com-
panies in the opposite direction. Because the companies deal with
millions of consumers they have the economic incentives to gain
whatever information seems useful, and they know that over the
aggregate of their consumer sales they will derive substantial bene-
fits from various advantageous and arcane contractual provisions
that they incorporate, even though such provisions will become use-
ful in only a small percentage of their total transactions. Hence,
given rational economic behavior by both consumers and compa-
nies, the incentive structure prevents the parties from reaching
terms that are, in the aggregate, economically efficient.
The resulting inefficiencies appear on two levels. At the level
of accident prevention, companies are almost certainly the least
247. There is a large literature dealing with the economic rationality of not incurring
information costs when the costs would exceed the probable benefits of the information.
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1474 (1989) ("For many shareholders, the cost of reading and understanding each
proposal in the proxy materials will exceed the likely economic effect of any given pro-
posal. For such shareholders, it is rational not to read any proposals."). Richard A.
Posner states the point more broadly. The "economist's basic analytical tool," he
writes, "is the assumption that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions."
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 1 (1981). With respect to forum-
selection clauses, of course, it is rational maximizing behavior that leads the companies
to learn about and use such clauses and leads consumers, conversely, to overlook or
ignore them. See also POSNER, supra note 56, at 81-84; Goldman, supra note 1, at
716-17; Michael T. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Eco-
nomics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 596-608 (1990).
Of course, the "rationality" assumption that marks the work of most law and eco-
nomics scholars is itself unrealistic and subject therefore to criticism-as is Carnival
Cruise-on that ground. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human
Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 23 (1989).
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costly implementers of efficient safety precautions. Forum-selection
clauses-which enable companies to exploit geography to avoid or
minimize the liabilities they would otherwise incur-reduce the
companies' incentives to implement the efficient level of safety pre-
cautions. The result is an increased number of negligent injuries, a
result that is inconsistent with the wealth-maximization goal.248 At
the level of claim disputing, the companies, not their customers, are
certainly the least costly litigators. Their economies of scale, litiga-
tion learning curves, and other similar institutional advantages en-
able them to conduct numerous litigations scattered throughout the
various places they do business far more efficiently than the corre-
sponding plaintiffs would be able to conduct the same litigations
concentrated at varying but significant distances from their homes.
Once again, forum-selection clauses-assuming that the same uni-
verse of claims would still be brought to court-increase total costs
and defeat the wealth-maximization goal. In terms of the Court's
economic goals, then, it would almost certainly be more efficient for
the companies-the least-costly accident avoiders as well as the
least-costly litigators-to bear the burden of distance. 249 Carnival
Cruise thus does not serve its economic goal because forum-selec-
248. It is generally efficient and desirable for the law to impose liability on the least
costly accident avoider. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 126; Harold Demsetz, When
Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972); Hylton, supra note 129;
Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence, 6 JL. ECON. &
ORG. 433 (1990). Since the forum-selection clause is a procedural device that serves in
practice to prevent the rules of substantive law from properly and fully applying to
disputes which they are supposed to control (whether that legal control would come
through a final legal judgment or a "rational" settlement based on the parties' evalua-
tion of the merits of a claim), it is a device that allows the advantaged party to avoid
paying the full price that the law would otherwise require. Hence, to the extent that
substantive tort law properly identifies the least costly accident avoider, forum-selection
clauses prevent it from controlling cases and hence frustrate its purpose.
249. This theoretical point assumes that the same set of claims would be litigated
whether forum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts are enforceable or not.
Although the Court seems to adopt this assumption, it is almost certainly false. See
infra text accompanying notes 251-253.
If Carnival Cruise drives a substantial number of claims from the judicial system,
then concededly it will eliminate substantial litigation transaction costs. Holding aside
the wealth-destroying effects that arise from the disincentives that Carnival Cruise cre-
ates for companies to invest in efficient levels of accident prevention, the "litigation
efficiencies" that result will be redistributive (i.e., assuming that wealth will be in-
creased, the companies will gain the benefit while claimants receive less than they other-
wise would have). Since some individuals will be worse off (claimants driven from the
judicial system), the result will not be "Pareto efficient." Since claimants will not be
fully compensated, the result will at best be only "Kaldor-Hicks efficient" (i.e., the
saved transaction costs would in theory allow the claimants to be fully compensated
while at the same time increasing the wealth of the companies). This increased "effi-
ciency" will have been purchased at the cost of depriving many claimants of meaningful
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tion clauses in consumer form contracts are likely to be wealth-de-
stroying, not wealth-maximizing.
250
The analysis, however, must be carried further. Although Car-
nival Cruise seems to assume that the same universe of claims will
still be brought to court, that assumption is certainly false. The
companies save money with forum-selection clauses not, for the
most part, because it is more "efficient" 2 51 for them to defend the
identical universe of suits in the same forum, but because forum-
selection clauses discourage suits and pressure claimants to accept
relatively unfavorable out-of-court settlements.25
2 Thus, because
forum-selection clauses decrease the number of suits brought to
court, they decrease the litigation costs of the companies and of
access to a judicial forum and of severely reducing or eliminating whatever compensa-
tion the law would otherwise have allowed them.
At this point, the Court's assumption that consumers will benefit from lower prices
becomes relevant. That assumption cancels, in theory, the possibility of economically
redistributive results. As the text notes, it is an assumption.
For the aggregate result of forum-selection clauses to be wealth-maximizing, the
total "costs" to individuals and society of uncompensated injuries-multiplied due to
the lack of incentives to invest in an efficient level of safety prevention-must be less
than the gain in the companies' wealth. It seems highly doubtful that this result would
obtain. In any event, there is no proof that it does.
250. Goldman, supra note 1, at 721-30.
251. It might be relatively more efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, see supra note
76, because that standard allows for externalities. Under Kaldor-Hicks, it does not
make any difference how many individuals would take losses or how serious their losses
would be as long as those who gain from them somehow gain "more" than the others
lost.
The extent to which the Kaldor-Hicks standard allows externalities is vastly mag-
nified in the area of tort law because there is no accurate or objective method of quanti-
fying the total real-world losses incurred by tort victims and the society as a whole.
Even limiting losses to those for which claimants are compensated, the discrepancies
between amounts of compensation received shows that the legal system provides no
"objective" measure of such loss. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 116, tbl. 3, at
336-37. More broadly, uncompensated losses-though theoretically accounted for by
the Kaldor-Hicks standard-may in practice be easily ignored or minimized. Thus,
highly inefficient arrangements may appear to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient for the simple
reason that a substantial part of the relevant costs are externalized, unquantified, and
ignored.
The inability to identify and quantify total real-world losses leads to two specific
conclusions with respect to the practical utility of the Kaldor-Hicks standard in tort
analysis. One is that Kaldor-Hicks analysis fails to distinguish between efficient ar-
rangements and inefficient arrangements that allow for nonquantifiable (or nonquanti-
fled) externalities. The other is that, in this context at least, the Kaldor-Hicks analysis
lacks substantive content. To say that forum-selection clauses promote Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency would, as a practical matter, be meaningless.
252. See Hylton, supra note 129; see also supra text accompanying notes 118-126;
infra text accompanying notes 269-276.
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those consumers who settle quickly, 253 and they might also reduce
the docket burdens of the courts as well.
That result, however, does not support the further and critical
assumption on which Carnival Cruise implicitly relies: that forum-
selection clauses will also decrease aggregate litigation and related
social costs. First, under the rule of Carnival Cruise, aggregate liti-
gation costs could increase. Even if large numbers of consumers are
driven from the judicial system, the increase in litigation costs im-
posed on those claimants who remain-multiplied as they will be by
efforts to overturn the clauses on "fundamental fairness" grounds,
by the burdens of litigating in distant forums, and by their relative
inefficiency in carrying those burdens-might equal or exceed the
savings that accrue to the companies, the courts, and the claimants
who settle quickly. Second, and regardless of whether aggregate lit-
igation costs increase or decrease, total social costs could well in-
crease. Driving large numbers of claimants into unfavorable out-of-
court settlements will increase the number of individuals who re-
ceive inadequate compensation and, further, increase the amounts
by which their compensation is inadequate. The costs of such in-
creasingly widespread and more seriously inadequate compensa-
tion-fewer and less successful rehabilitations, more seriously
damaged family relationships and structures, lowered aggregate so-
cial and economic productivity, reduced faith in the nation's legal
institutions, and added burdens of care directly and indirectly im-
posed on governments, private institutions, and the public at
large-will likely outweigh whatever "savings" otherwise result.
Contrary to the Court's assumption, then, forum-selection
clauses-expanding the areas in which inefficient social arrange-
ments may flourish-seem likely to be wealth-destroying rather
than wealth-maximizing.
In addition, the wealth-maximizing assumptions that Carnival
Cruise seems to adopt also raise other fundamental problems. 254
253. Although forum-selection clauses will reduce the settlement costs of compa-
nies, that reduction will not reduce the aggregate costs of injuries. Rather, a decrease in
settlement payments will simply mean that those who suffer losses will bear higher per-
centages of the costs of those losses.
254. There is a large body of literature criticizing the legitimacy and coherence of
the wealth-maximization goal. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND
THE LAW 95-132 (1988); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237-66
(1985); Jules L. Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations
of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649 (1984). Other critics have focused on
the artificial and narrow concept of "efficiency" that underlies wealth-maximization
theory. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto Carrying Coase Further,
100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991). The wealth-maximization goal is restated and defended in
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Apparently embracing the economic views of Judge Posner,25" Car-
nival Cruise's wealth-maximizing rationale assumes that a modem
mass economy requires nearly universal use of standard clauses and
form contracts in order to eliminate what would otherwise be exces-
sive transaction costs. 256 Its theory replaces the market pressures of
individual bargaining with the market pressures of economic com-
petition between companies, and it assumes that the latter will gen-
erally force companies to pass on to consumers the savings that
result from the reduced transaction costs that form contracts al-
low. 237 Those competitive pressures, then, are the forces that pur-
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 76; Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited,
2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985).
255. See supra notes 56, 69, 72; infra notes 257-259. In two passages in his opinion
in Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990) from which
Carnival Cruise Lines quoted in its reply brief before the Court, Pet'r's Reply Br., at
9-10, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Briefs file), Judge Posner sets forth his wealth-maximizing rationale for the use of con-
sumer forum contracts:
Ours is not a bazaar economy in which the terms of every transaction, or
even of most transactions, are individually dickered; even where they are,
standard clauses are commonly incorporated in the final contract, with-
out separate negotiation of each of them. Form contracts, and standard
clauses in individually negotiated contracts, enable enormous savings in
transaction costs ....
... We may assume, since the market in surety bonds is a competi-
tive one, that the cost savings that accrue to [the insurance company]
from contractual terms that facilitate the enforcement of one of its bonds
will be passed on, in part anyway, to the purchaser of those bonds-the
enterprise in which the defendants invested-in the form of a lower
premium.
Donovan, 916 F.2d at 377-378. Judge Posner makes the same point in his book. Pos-
NER, supra note 56, at 68-69.
256. Both the original defendant, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., and the industry
group, the International Committee of Passenger Lines, seemed to adopt the same the-
ory. In its brief, Carnival Cruise Lines stated: "Like many consumer contracts, passen-
ger tickets are rarely, if ever, 'freely bargained for,' nor would it be practical for carriers
to engage in such negotiations with every consumer." Pet'r's Br., at 109, Carnival
Cruise, I I I S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). The
industry group made the same point: "This Amicus does not dispute the underlying
assumption that a passenger rarely engages in actual bargaining for a particular forum
clause in the ticket contract. Indeed, present day [sic] travel and commercial reality
render such bargaining impractical, if not impossible." Br. of the Int'l Comm. of Pas-
senger Lines as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Pet'r, at 120, Carnival Cruise, I I I S. Ct.
1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
257. See Carnival Cruise, I I I S. Ct. at 1527. "Common sense dictates that a ticket
of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation,
and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity with the
cruise line." Id. Judge Posner has stated similar views in POSNER, supra note 56, at
84-88.
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portedly increase efficiency, maximize wealth, and benefit
everyone.
25 8
The assumption about competition raises several substantial
problems. First, it requires that courts decide whether a particular
industry is economically competitive as well as what such a crite-
rion means in the context of evaluating consumer form contracts. 25 9
The difficulty of answering such questions raises the danger that
courts might be induced to rely on arbitrary or formal, and from an
enforcement point of view self-defeating, assumptions. They might,
for example, be led to assume that the mere existence of two or
more firms in an industry establishes the fact of competition.
26
0
The Court's assumption, in other words, could lead to the almost
automatic conclusion that competition exists and to a resulting ten-
dency simply to accept as valid whatever form contracts an industry
offers.
Second, the Court's assumption overlooks the fact that indus-
tries can be competitive in some ways, such as pricing or puffing,
but not in others. Because some contractual provisons may serve to
enhance the profitability of all competing firms and nevertheless re-
main beyond the understanding of consumers, those provisions
would tend to become uniform throughout an industry. In such a
258. This conclusion constitutes a classic example of the ideological function of
wealth-maximization theory. It bypasses and "transcends" the analysis of the unfair
and economically redistributive consequences of legal rules in any given time and place
or in any particular case or group of cases by shifting the level of analysis to an ostensi-
bly "comprehensive" theoretical level. At that level, of course, it invokes the Kaldor-
Hicks standard, ignores nonquantified or nonquantifiable externalities, and thus pur-
ports to justify economically redistributive rules as objectively "wealth-maximizing"
and "efficient."
259. Judge Posner elaborated his reasoning elsewhere as follows:
If one seller offers unattractive terms to a purchaser, a competing seller,
desiring to obtain the sale for himself, will offer more attractive terms.
The process should continue until the terms are optimal from the pur-
chaser's standpoint. Thus, the purchaser who is offered a printed con-
tract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis does have a real choice: he can refuse to
sign, knowing that if better terms are possible another seller will offer
them to him. All of the firms in the industry may find it economical to
use standard contracts and to refuse to negotiate with purchasers. But
what is important is not whether there is haggling in every transaction
but whether competition forces sellers to incorporate in their standard
contracts terms that maximize the purchaser's benefits from transacting.
POSNER, supra note 56, at 85.
260. If they did not make such a simplifying assumption, of course, the courts would
have to engage in a relatively sophisticated economic analysis of the industry that would
place substantial evidentiary burdens on the parties and transform relatively simple con-
tract or tort actions into something akin to antitrust suits. It seems highly doubtful that
the courts would follow such a course.
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case, consumers would find themselves at the same contractual dis-
advantage regardless of which of the industry's competitors they
chose to deal with and regardless of whether the industry was, in
some other respect, competitive. 26' Forum-selection clauses seem,
quite understandably, to be just such a provision. As the brief for
the International Committee of Passenger Lines noted, "the use of
forum selection clauses in passenger ticket contracts" in the indus-
try "is a universal practice. '262
Third, the Court's assumption overlooks the fact that even in
"competitive" industries companies may develop institutional
methods of reducing or deflecting the press of competition. With
respect to the cruise industry, for example, one such method is the
cultivation of travel agents. A common and sometimes critical
source of information and advice for consumers, travel agents gen-
erally work on a commission basis and often receive special bonuses
or "overrides" from carriers to whom they steer agreed-upon
amounts of business. The senior vice president for sales and mar-
keting of Carnival Cruise Lines, in fact, recently defended the over-
ride system, and a survey conducted by Tour & Travel News
identified Carnival Cruise as one of the four companies with the
highest number of such special arrangements with travel agen-
cies. 263 Such relationships between carriers and travel agents, espe-
cially when not fully disclosed to customers, create a variety of risks
to both individual consumers and the market as a whole, and com-
petition provides relatively little protection against them.
Finally, the Court's assumption is highly dubious for the basic
reason that savings resulting from the use of forum-selection clauses
may well not be passed on to customers. 264 It seems highly prob-
261. Goldman, supra note 1, at 718-19; cf POSNER, supra note 56, at 80-84.
262. Br. of the Int'l Comm. of Passenger Lines as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 61, Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-
1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
263. Betsy Wade, Cruises: Do Travel Agents Steer Clients Straight? N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 1992, at E3.
264. The Court's wealth-maximization assumption is also dubious for another rea-
son. It is based on an unstated-and certainly unsupported-judgment of policy. The
Court assumes that the value of the hoped-for reduced fares to all customers, which
would likely amount to at most a few dollars apiece, is greater than the value of more
substantial recoveries to those relatively few individual passengers who are injured by
the company or its employees. That judgment might conflict with the choice that at
least many passengers would make if they knew of and understood the significance of
forum-selection clauses. The Shutes' brief on appeal, for example, called the Court's
attention to a California case that refused to enforce a forum-selection clause in another
one of Carnival Cruise's tickets. The California court stated that only one of 288 pas-
sengers claimed to have known of the forum-selection clause. Resp't's Br., at 156, Car-
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able, in fact, that some or all of such savings will be funneled to the
companies and their shareholders. 265 Indeed, in Northwestern Na-
tional Insurance Co. v. Donovan, Judge Posner himself noted specifi-
cally that even "competitive" industries might pass on their savings
to customers only "in part. '266 Carnival Cruise ignores the likeli-
hood that its decision would cause such a patterned redistribution
of wealth.
Regardless of the extent to which competition exists, therefore,
the Court's assumption does not justify the judicial practice of gen-
erally accepting whatever provisions the companies in an industry
put in their form contracts. The fact that specific provisions happen
to appear in the contracts, after all, is the result of nothing necessar-
ily other than consumer ignorance and the common interests of the
companies. The rational economic need for mass bureaucratized
form contracts does not determine the proper substantive terms that
such contracts should include. The law regularly and, in economic
theory, properly seeks to force companies to take account of exter-
nalities.267 Because a principal defacto function of forum-selection
clauses is to create externalities, 268 economic theory suggests that
the courts should subject them to close scrutiny.
Unlike a free-market theory based on rational bargaining be-
tween equals, the Court's theory of corporate-managed form con-
tracts requires a far higher level of scrutiny than the minimalist
standards of "reasonableness" and "fundamental fairness" that
Carnival Cruise adopts. That an industry finds a certain contrac-
tual provision useful demonstrates that it serves some practical pur-
pose and is therefore "rational." Actual and legally demonstrable
"fraud" is presumably involved in ordinary consumer transactions
relatively rarely. Absent the sound check provided by the require-
ment of knowing consent obtained from knowledgeable bargainers,
however, mere compliance with such minimal standards can hardly
nival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file)
(citing Carnival Cruise Lines v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1990)). The
Court's unstated policy judgment surely conflicts, too, with the fundamental idea that
the legal system exists to compensate tort victims for their injuries.
265. Assuming that not all of the customers will be shareholders, the result would
be economically redistributive, essentially taking money from injured customers and
transferring it to shareholders.
266. 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990).
267. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 126, at 144-50; WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW
AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 11-22 (2d ed. 1988).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 117-126.
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constitute an adequate basis for accepting the provision as either
desirable for the society as a whole or fair to its individual members.
Some forty years ago, Judge Learned Hand exemplified such
heightened and realistic scrutiny when he gave judicial recognition
to the fact that ordinary persons cannot be expected to read, under-
stand, and adequately evaluate the significance of forum-selection
clauses. Judge Hand's remarks are particularly trenchant in con-
nection with Carnival Cruise because his concurring opinion in
Krenger v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 269 is often cited by those who
advocate the reasonableness rule that the Supreme Court subse-
quently adopted in The Bremen and purported to apply in Carnival
Cruise. At a time when forum-selection clauses were still generally
unenforceable in American courts, Judge Hand stated the advanced
view that such clauses were no longer barred by any "absolute ta-
boo" but rather were "invalid only when unreasonable. ' 270 In The
Bremen, the Supreme Court used Judge Hand's dictum in support
of the reasonableness rule it set forth.271 Given the remarks in his
opinion and the fact that those who support the enforceability of
"reasonable" forum-selection clauses frequently cite them, it is illu-
minating to note that in Krenger Judge Hand ruled that the con-
tract at issue-a "Rock Island release" in an FELA action-was
unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. It is even more illumi-
nating to note that he refused to base his ruling on the protective
provisions of the FELA.272 Instead, Judge Hand rested on the fact
that the railroad held an unfair advantage over the worker in induc-
ing him to sign the agreement:
Moreover, [the claimant] is at a much greater disadvantage in
estimating the effect of the contract upon his rights, than when
he settles the claim. He is likely to suppose that one court is like
another; and certainly he cannot be deemed to be acquainted
with those differences between them which may in fact vitally
affect his recovery. 273
269. 174 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J., concurring), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866
(1949).
270. Id. at 561.
271. The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1972) ("As Judge
Hand noted in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949), even at
that date there was in fact no 'absolute taboo' against such clauses").
272. Judge Charles E. Clark, the author of the majority opinion, also agreed that the
contract was invalid, but he rested on the restrictive provisions of the FELA. Krenger,
174 F.2d at 559. When the Supreme Court invalidated the "Rock Island release" in
Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949), it did so on the basis that such
agreements contravened the provisions of the FELA.
273. Krenger, 174 F.2d at 561 (Hand, J., concurring).
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Since ordinary claimants could not evaluate the significance of such
forum-limitation clauses, Judge Hand concluded that he "would
hold such contracts unenforceable unless the [defendant] shows that
the employee was fully advised of their effect upon his rights. 27
4
On the petition for rehearing, he suggested that such agreements
should be enforced only if the claimant had given his consent after
consulting with "someone who adequately informed him of the ef-
fect of the contract upon his rights. '275 Judge Hand was even more
specific: "Certainly that person must be someone not in the defend-
ant's employ;" he declared, "and, indeed, I am inclined to say that
he must be a lawyer, though I should not wish to make that an
inflexible condition."
276
In Krenger, Judge Hand had "something of Mephistopheles"
about him.277 He recognized the true nature of the dispute before
him and understood its relation to the formal rules of the law. He
responded by setting forth an approach designed to protect substan-
tive legal rights and claims from the arts of procedural cleverness
used against the uninformed in the interests of the powerful. In
sharp contrast, Carnival Cruise-in theory purporting merely to ap-
ply the same reasonableness test that Judge Hand bequeathed to
The Bremen -sets forth a rule that diminishes or precludes the very
kinds of substantive rights and claims that Judge Hand sought to
protect.
Granting the need for corporate-managed form contracts,
then, the economic assumptions behind Carnival Cruise still seem
inadequate. Insofar as they promise increased economic efficiency,
they do so doubtfully and only at serious costs that may well be
wealth-destroying rather than wealth-maximizing. As implemented
in Carnival Cruise, they do not seem likely to protect the legitimate
interests of consumers, society, or the judicial process itself. The
economic assumptions behind the decision are also inadequate be-
cause they fail to square the Court's acceptance of the need for form
contracts with the minimalist level of scrutiny it sees as appropriate
for such agreements. 278
274. Id.
275. Id. at 562 (Hand, J., denying reh'g).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Judge Posner would certainly disagree with the above. Among the relevant
responses he would presumably make would be that other "social costs," however real
and bad they might be, would most likely be less than the costs of government interven-
tion and more rigorous judicial scrutiny. He states, for example:
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Beyond the two express goals of conserving litigation resources
and maximizing wealth, Carnival Cruise also might be thought to
reflect the Court's growing commitment to "consensual adjudica-
tory procedure," the idea that parties should be free to determine by
private agreement where and how their disputes are to be re-
solved. 279 "Consensual adjudicatory procedure" is an enticing
idea-free individuals rationally selecting the location, procedural
style, and controlling law which seem to them most suited to satis-
factorily resolve their disputes. The idea suggests the political ideal
of free choice and individual self-determination. It evokes hopes for
minimizing preliminary motion practice by eliminating disputes
over forum choice, thereby conserving judicial resources. 280 It im-
plies the all-encompassing rationality of market economics, promis-
ing increased social efficiency from the free actions of individuals
rationally seeking their own self-interest.
Carnival Cruise, however, neither serves nor adopts that ideal.
Rather than allowing freely negotiating parties to protect their in-
terests by selecting mutually satisfying procedural provisions, it al-
lows stronger parties to force inequitable procedures onto weaker
ones. More to the point, Carnival Cruise expressly rejects any
meaningful theory of consensual adjudicatory procedure. As it re-
jects the need for free bargaining in favor of corporate-managed
contracts, so it rejects the need for knowing consent in favor of cor-
porate-required adjudicatory procedure. Indeed, the reason Carni-
val Cruise does not expressly invoke the idea of consensual
In the wealth-maximization approach the only basis for interference with
economic and personal liberty is such a serious failure of the market to
operate that the wealth of society can be increased by public coercion,
which is itself costly. Although economists differ as to when markets fail
to operate effectively and how costly it is to rectify those failures, at least
these are empirical rather than value questions. Some libertarians worry
that the economist will exploit the measurement problems inherent in the
use of a hypothetical-market criterion to impose all sorts of duties on
people in the name of efficiency. But to repeat, imposing duties is appro-
priate in the economic view only in the exceptional case where market
transaction costs are prohibitive.
POSNER, supra note 247, at 80. Here, assuming the adoption of rules along the lines
suggested in Part V, and for the economic reasons given in Part IV, the costs of judicial
intervention seem likely to be less than the costs that will result from the rule adopted in
Carnival Cruise.
279. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 2.
280. The evocation on this level appeals to an ideal. On a nonideal level, sometimes
unmentioned, "consensual adjudicatory procedure" offers a significant likelihood of ac-
tually reducing caseloads when it is taken to countenance agreements that require the
use of nonjudicial forums, impose restrictive time limitations or notice provisions, or
contain other similar limitations on forum choice that bar or effectively discourage suit.
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adjudicatory procedure is, presumably, the Court's awareness that
its reasoning contradicts the most basic assumptions that underlie
and confer legitimacy on that idea.
B. Understanding Carnival Cruise: Venue and Social Values
To the extent that Carnival Cruise seeks to conserve litigation
resources and maximize wealth, it seems ill-conceived and probably
dysfunctional. That conclusion, together with the incessantly re-
sult-oriented nature of the opinion's reasoning, suggests ultimately
the presence of additional-if perhaps unrecognized and only par-
tially conscious-informing social values and goals. That inference
receives further support and sharper focus from the decision's other
characteristics: Its effort to give corporations the broadest possible
leeway in structuring their relationships with their customers, its
willingness to cast potentially massive risks on uninformed consum-
ers, its refusal to consider openly the de facto impact of forum-selec-
tion clauses on the claims-disputing process, and its determination
to transform judicial scrutiny of consumer form contracts into a
one-eyed judicial glance. The presence of other values is also sug-
gested by the fundamental inconsistency that undergirds the
Court's reasoning: Carnival Cruise accepts the critical importance
of transaction costs in justifying the imposition on consumers of
corporate-managed form contracts that contain forum-selection
clauses, but it refuses to consider the equally critical role such trans-
action costs play in the claims-disputing process where forum-selec-
tion clauses have their impact. If transaction costs are relevant to
the Court's analysis on the first point, they are surely relevant on
the second. 28
1
Ultimately, Carnival Cruise may perhaps be fully understood
only by recognizing its congruence with two additional, unarticu-
lated, and somewhat inchoate goals, one institutional and primarily
pragmatic, and the other moral and essentially didactic. The first is
the goal of protecting American business institutions in the face of
perceived national economic decline and the rigors of sharpening
foreign competition. The second is the goal of disciplining litigation
behavior in the face of perceived national moral decline and a
docket crisis attributed to a rush of "undeserving" plaintiffs into the
courts.
281. See Hylton, supra note 129, at 119-31. The situations cannot be distinguished
on the ground of ex ante analysis. See supra note 76.
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Those two additional goals are highly controversial and polit-
ical, implicating a broad range of assumptions about the nature of
American society and our current social and economic problems.
282
The two goals are also, of course, consistent with the efforts of the
Reagan and Bush administrations to restructure the American legal
system. Charles Fried, who served as Solicitor General from 1985
to 1989, captured the social attitudes that underpin both goals when
he outlined the "legal philosophy" that he envisioned "at the heart
of the Reagan Revolution. ' 283 Central to that philosophy was a
challenge to the destructive "left-liberal" orthodoxy "that the pros-
perous had not earned their prosperity and that the poor were the
victims of everyone else."1284 When the courts adopted that ortho-
doxy, 285 the result was social and economic disaster. "Egged on by
aggressive litigators, the legal professoriate, and the liberal press,"
Fried explained, "the courts had become a principal engine for re-
distributing wealth and shackling the energies and enterprise of the
productive sector. '286 The goal of the Reagan Revolution was to
reform the legal system in order to prevent it from "distorting the
system of opportunity and reward for merit on which the morale of
a free-enterprise system depends.1 28 7 The Reagan message, in
short, was that judicial reform was essential because the courts were
handicapping "meritorious" entrepreneurs and workers while fun-
nelling undeserved wealth to the economically, and morally, non-
meritorious. 2
88
More recently, under the Bush administration, the President's
Council on Competitiveness issued its Agenda for Civil Justice Re-
282. Vice President Dan Quayle, for example, has repeatedly declared that the na-
tion's civil justice system overburdens American corporations and places them at a
"competitive disadvantage" in the world market, and his comments have just as repeat-
edly drawn criticism. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Administration Calls for Wide Legal Re-
forms, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al.
283. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-
A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 14-16 (1991).
284. Id. at 15.
285. "[T]he left-liberal orthodoxies embraced the premise that the federal judiciary
should be the engine for realizing their values," Fried wrote. Id. at 16. To a large
extent, he continued, the courts agreed to accept that task. "In many respects the
courts themselves had become major bureaucratic actors, enthusiastically, self-con-
sciously enlisting in the movement to substitute the judgments and values of the non-
productive sector of society-lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, politicians-for the self-de-
termination of the entrepreneurs and workers who create wealth." Id. at 17.
286. Id. at 17.
287. Id. at 17-18.
288. That message, in turn, was a corollary of the administration's banner theme
that the courts were disrupting American society in general and that government "inter-
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form in America, a compilation of fifty law-reform proposals aimed
overtly at assisting American business by restricting tort suits.
"Unrestrained litigation," it proclaims on its first page, "necessarily
exacts a terrible toll on the U.S. economy. '289 The Agenda sup-
ports that allegation by noting, among other things, that "47 per-
cent of U.S. manufacturers have withdrawn products from the
market. ' 290 The use of such a "fact"-meaningless at best-sug-
gests the extent to which political and ideological commitments
ference" of any kind in social and economic areas was usually, if not always, fruitless
and destructive.
Among lawyers and judges, Robert H. Bork has been one of the most prominent
voices drawing out these lines of argument. Announcing that "antitrust is a subcat-
egory of ideology," for example, he attacked what he saw as "a movement away from
the ideal of liberty and reward according to merit toward an ideal of equality of out-
come and reward according to status." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
408, 419 (1978). He subsequently developed his thinking further in ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
Charles Murray, a scholar whose work was termed the "bible" of the Reagan ad-
ministration, advanced similar views in his study of welfare policy. "The unwillingness
to acknowledge moral inequality," Murray wrote, "was a hallmark of Great Society
social programs and persisted throughout the 1970s." CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 183 (1984). Those programs failed because they
denied the fundamental truth that practical merit exists. "Some people are better than
others. They deserve more of society's rewards, of which money is only one small part.
A principal function of social policy is to make sure they have the opportunity to reap
those rewards." Id. at 233-34.
David Stockman, President Reagan's Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, captured much of the same attitude when he explained that the "real Reagan
supply-side program would embody a solid and sweeping anti-free lunch plan, based on
unprecedented retrenchment of federal entitlement, subsidy, and cheap credit pro-
grams." DAVID STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS 72 (1986). The "central idea
of the Reagan Revolution," Stockman continued, was to establish a "minimalist govern-
ment" whose "vision of the good society rested on the strength and productive potential
of free men in free markets." Id. at 8.
This is not the place to evaluate these ideas and attitudes either in theory or in
practice. Suffice it to say two things. First, while rewarding merit is, as a general mat-
ter, an unexceptionable and desirable goal, relying on implicit assumptions about the
merits of litigants to shape procedural and jurisdictional rules is dubious and dangerous.
The very purpose of the legal process is, after all, to determine properly the substantive
merits of disputes, not to find indirect or covert methods of prejudging them. Second, a
political or legal philosophy that merges the economic and the moral, identifies wealth
with virtue, and minimizes or disregards the complex role that cultural and institutional
forces play in structuring social relationships may become an explosive, dangerous, and
destructive force when transformed into an aggressive political ideology. It can arm its
adherents (who assume, of course, that they are among the meritorious) with strength
and determination, and it can endow them with the presumed moral authority to deal
harshly and effectively with the claims of those whom they regard as fundamentally
"nonmeritorious."
289. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA 1 (1991) [hereinafter AGENDA].
290. Id. at 3.
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shaped the administration's approach to "Civil Justice Reform."' 291
Indeed, the report relies heavily on evidence that would seem, at a
minimum, gravely partisan. "In a survey of over 250 American
companies," the report announces, "more than three-quarters of the
executives said they believe that the United States will be increas-
ingly disadvantaged in world markets unless modifications are made
in the liability system. ' 292 In contrast, the Agenda cites no testi-
mony from labor unions, tort plaintiffs, consumer groups, or public
interest organizations. Neither does it discuss the analyses of econ-
omists and businesspersons who see factors other than excessive liti-
gation costs as the causes of the nation's current economic
problems. Nor, finally, does it discuss the analyses of the econo-
mists, sociologists, historians, and legal scholars who have ex-
amined changing litigation patterns and raised serious questions
about the nature, causes, and existence of the alleged "litigation
explosion.
'293
291. Another rough measure of the extent to which political and ideological con-
cerns animated the Agenda may be obtained by comparing its proposals, documenta-
tion, and analysis with those of the nearly contemporaneous (and also controversial)
Final Report (1990) of the congressionally sponsored Federal Courts Study Committee,
which, of course, was available for use by the authors of the Agenda. The first two parts
of the Final Report are reprinted in Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 22
CONN. L. REV. 733 (1990).
The ideological and partisan nature of the administration's efforts are perhaps no-
where more arrestingly illustrated than in one of Vice President Quayle's recent
speeches defending the Agenda's proposals. There, in adding up the harmful costs that
the litigation explosion has allegedly imposed on American business, he refers to the
sum of $300 billion, the purported total of all costs "indirectly" incurred as a result "of
efforts to avoid liability." Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559,
560 (1992).
292. AGENDA, supra note 289, at 3.
293. There is an immense and increasingly complex and sophisticated literature on
the relationship between the legal system and the economy as well as on the so-called
"litigation explosion." Considering the scope and quality of the literature, the premises
and assertions of the Agenda are, at the very most, unproven, oversimplified, and parti-
san.
There is, of course, little consensus on many of the most basic factual and theoreti-
cal issues, let alone on any solutions that might seem necessary. Further, the observa-
tions and prescriptions of many commentators seem not unrelated to their political and
social views. Some, for example, question the existence of a "litigation explosion," e.g.,
Galanter, supra note 40, while others regard it as threatening to destroy the entire fed-
eral judicial system, e.g., POSNER, supra note 40.
For a few of the most recent contributions to the discussion, see WAYNE V. MCIN-
TOSH, THE APPEAL OF CIVIL LAW: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LITIGA-
TION (1990); Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An
Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Polit-
ical System, 70 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1992); James A. Henderson, Jr., The Efficacy of
Organic Tort Reform, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 596 (1992) (reviewing W. KIP VICUSE,
REFORMING PRODUCT LIABILITY (1991)); Saks, supra note 78.
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While some of the Agenda's proposals seem reasonable, many
would unfairly burden plaintiffs and create heavy disincentives to
sue regardless of the underlying merits of a claim. Those function-
ally inhibiting proposals include a "pre-complaint notice" require-
ment, 294 wider use of summary judgment,295 restrictions on expert
witness testimony,296 and tight limitations on punitive damages.
297
Perhaps most notable, the inhibiting proposals include several that
would purposely increase the costs of litigation, directly handicap-
ping claimants who do not possess substantial financial resources
and tilting the litigation balance even further in favor of those who
do.
2 9 8
The Agenda's proposals, too, contain revealing curiosities. Fo-
cusing on the need for procedural reform, the Agenda includes a
somewhat surprising provision aimed at protecting trade secrets;
stressing the need to limit discovery, the Agenda includes three pro-
visions aimed at expanding discovery. 299 In spite of the superficial
incongruity, however, the three proposals are integral parts of the
administration's approach. The purpose of the Agenda, after all, is
not merely to simplify procedure or to develop more equitable rules
for resolving disputes. Instead, its overriding purpose-heralded on
its first page-is to reduce drastically the litigation and liability
costs of business by forcing up the litigation costs of plaintiffs and
thereby driving large numbers of them from the courts. All three of
the seemingly out-of-place proposals would contribute to that
broader political and social goal.
294. AGENDA, supra note 289, at 15-16.
295. Id. at 20.
296. Id. at 21-22.
297. Id. at 22-23.
298. See, e.g., id. at 17 (requiring payment to obtain certain "additional discovery"),
19 (losing party to pay costs and fees on discovery motions), 24-25 (losing party to pay
winner's attorneys' fees), 25 (restricting or abolishing statutes that allow only plaintiffs
to win attorneys' fees).
299. The proposals are:
1) that courts retain the authority "to preserve confidential and trade secret infor-
mation" and that legislatures "resist efforts to limit the ability of courts" to issue protec-
tive orders safeguarding such information, id. at 19;
2) that discovery rules permit "more comprehensive inquiries of proposed 'expert'
witnesses," id. at 21; and
3) that the rules allow "[a]dditional expert discovery such as depositions for expert
discovery." Id. at 22.
The first proposal would provide added protection for business, and the latter two
would allow defendant companies to increase plaintiff's costs and to enjoy additional
opportunities to discredit testimony that is often required and critical to plaintiff's
claim.
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The Agenda attempts to justify its proposals on the ground
that a relatively high percentage of lawsuits are abusive and "frivo-
lous."' 3°° In his letter of transmission accompanying the Agenda,
Vice President Dan Quayle stresses the widespread "abuse of the
legal system" and the need to eliminate "excessive, needless litiga-
tion."' 30 ' He urges the adoption of rules that would eliminate "a lot
of frivolous claims and specious defenses. ' 302 The Agenda an-
nounces that the legitimate costs of "meritorious lawsuits" account
for only "some" of the heavy burdens on the legal system.30
3
Although the Agenda makes no effort to provide any relevant
analysis, its political and rhetorical centerpiece is the claim that its
proposals would restrict or eliminate only those frivolous suits.
"[N]one of the proposals by the Council," the Vice President as-
serts, "is designed to close the courthouse doors to any meritorious
claim. ' ' 3°4 Quite the contrary, he contends. Their purpose is "to
open those doors" to persons seeking to vindicate rights "by clear-
ing court dockets to hear truly meritorious claims. ' 305
The Vice President's insistence that the Agenda would facili-
tate the course of meritorious suits only highlights the fundamental
questions: Why, and on what basis, does the administration think
that a significant percentage of lawsuits are "frivolous"; and, more
important, why and on what basis does it think that the Agenda's
proposals would restrict only the "frivolous" while assisting the
"truly meritorious"? The Vice President proffers no answer to the
former, and his only response to the latter is both formalistic and
disingenuous. "It bears emphasis that these reforms are procedural
in nature-directed at reforming the process of resolving disputes,"
he states. 30 6 "They are not intended to affect substantive rights. ' 307
The Agenda's approach is, of course, based on far more than
such a scarcely veiled tautology. Explicitly, and in the first in-
300. The report's general emphasis on "market discipline," id. at 9, implies this, as
do many of its other comments and recommendations. See, e.g., id. at 8, 21, 24, 25, 27.
Needless to say, under FED. R. Civ. P. 11, and the cases that construe it, existing
law already provides an appropriate sanction for lawsuits that are, in fact, "frivolous."
301. Dan Quayle, Memorandum for the President, reprinted in AGENDA, supra note
289, first unpaginated page.
302. Dan Quayle, Prepared Remarks of the Vice President at the Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Ass'n 4 (Aug. 13, 1991) (transcript available in the Office of the Vice
President).
303. AGENDA, supra note 289, at 3.
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stance, it rests on the sleek logic of abstract market theory. Its goal,
the Agenda announces, is to "impose market discipline on the litiga-
tion process. ' 308 Increases in the costs and risks of litigation, its
theory holds, would automatically turn economically marginal (i.e.,
frivolous) claims into economically irrational claims but would not
affect economically non-marginal (i.e., nonfrivolous) claims. As-
suming that claimants and their attorneys would act in an economi-
cally rational manner, the Agenda assumes that claimants would
drop the former while pursuing only the latter.
That market rationale, of course, is a priori and prescriptive,
and it ignores both the complexities of human motivation and be-
havior and the social realities of contemporary litigation and settle-
ment practices. 30 9 The rationale, however, seems persuasive to
those who share the deeply-rooted moral assumptions that under-
gird the Reagan-Bush ideology of merit. Indeed, at the Agenda's
emotional and intellectual core lies a fundamental politico-moral
premise: Legally nonmeritorious suits are brought by individuals
who are morally nonmeritorious. Who else, after all, would bring a
"frivolous" lawsuit? 310 Identifying nonmeritorious suits with the
308. AGENDA, supra note 289, at 9. The market image recurs in several places. See
id. at 21-22. As the Reagan administration insisted that its social policy was to main-
tain a minimum "safety net" for the truly deserving poor, so the AGENDA refers to the
need "to safeguard equal access to the courts." Id. at 9.
309. See, e.g., supra Part II.
310. A parallel and functionally-equivalent charge can be made explicitly, with
much greater political freedom, and without compromising campaign rhetoric: That
venal and unprincipled attorneys are responsible for the frivolous cases. AGENDA,
supra note 289, at 8-9. This charge has the advantage of being able to exploit popular
hostility toward lawyers and to obscure implications concerning both the role and fate
of claimants. For a general discussion, see Cross, supra note 293.
Attributing frivolous suits to the greed and irresponsibility of attorneys allows for
the development of a handy political demonology, but it does not provide a response to
the substantive problems that the administration's law reform effort raises. That failing
is understandable, of course, because the purpose of the anti-lawyer tactic is precisely to
shift the focus of discussion away from such substantive problems and onto an easily-
recognizable and unpopular scapegoat. The administration's demonology, for example,
does not begin to address such important questions as:
1. How are we to determine which suits are "frivolous" and which "nonfrivolous"
without knowledge of the relevant facts and applicable substantive law in each?
2. How are we to measure or otherwise evaluate the number of "frivolous" lawsuits
that are brought, their relative size and type, and the overall impact they have on the
judicial system?
3. How are we to measure or otherwise determine how various changes in the law
will affect "frivolous" and "nonfrivolous" suits respectively?
4. How are we to measure or otherwise determine the number of "nonfrivolous"
claims that are not brought to the courts because "technical" legal factors (i.e., formal
and procedural rules unrelated to the merits that operate in practice to unfairly handi-
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greed, folly, indolence, and corruption of morally culpable individu-
als, the Reagan-Bush ideology conceives of a "litigation explosion"
that results from a rapid increase in "frivolous" suits, and it under-
stands that rapid increase, in turn, as the result of a wide-ranging
and accelerating moral decline in American society as a whole.
Those implicit assumptions provide the theoretical links that
give the Agenda its ideological as well as its programmatic coher-
ence. On the level of social theory, the assumptions justify the belief
that a large part of the caseload is made up of frivolous suits and
also explain why such frivolous suits have proliferated so rapidly
during recent decades. On the level of economic theory, they justify
the use of market mechanisms to control access to the courts. Since
those who pursue nonmeritorious suits prove themselves to be ra-
tionally nonmeritorious, their behavior deserves to be sanctioned.
The increased costs and risks that the Agenda would place on them
would thus be merely rationally appropriate penalties for irrational
behavior. On the level of politico-legal theory, the assumptions res-
onate within the Reagan-Bush ideology of merit to suggest two fun-
damental reasons why the Agenda's proposals would restrict only
the frivolous while assisting the meritorious. First, they evoke the
pseudo-Darwinistic belief that "meritorious" individuals overcome
social hardships while "nonmeritorious" ones do not. Increased lit-
igation costs would not deter meritorious claims, therefore, because
the meritorious individuals who assert them possess (by definition)
the strength of character necessary to prevail over whatever obsta-
cles confront them. In contrast, increased costs would deter non-
meritorious claims because the nonmeritorious individuals who
cap those who lack sophistication and resources) block the access of deserving would-be
plaintiffs?
5. How are we to measure or otherwise determine the number of "nonfrivolous"
claims that are not brought to the courts because extra-legal social factors block the
access of deserving would-be plaintiffs?
6. How are we to remove those legal and nonlegal obstacles and increase the ability
of deserving would-be plaintiffs to bring legal actions and thereby obtain in practice the
remedies the law provides in theory?
7. How are we to alter or regulate the private bar to ensure that attorneys-not
innocent clients-are responsible for the abuses that the administration alleges they
cause?
8. How are we to alter or regulate the private bar to ensure that all deserving
would-be parties are able to obtain the services of a competent and honest attorney to
represent them?
The Reagan and Bush administrations also attribute the "litigation explosion" to
dangerous expansions of regulatory laws and individual legal rights. To the extent that
they attack and attempt to change such substantive laws and rights, they are trying
openly and directly to accomplish their goals.
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assert them lack (by definition) the strength of character necessary
to overcome such obstacles. Second, the moral assumptions behind
the Agenda also evoke the related belief that hard work and eco-
nomic success naturally bring their own just rewards. Those with
financial resources sufficient to guarantee access to the courts have
simply earned their right to a hearing. In contrast, those with few
resources have not earned such a right and may, therefore, legiti-
mately be screened from the courts. Thus, by alleging the existence
of large numbers of frivolous claimants and identifying them with
moral fault, the assumptions underlying the Reagan-Bush ideology
of merit justify the Agenda by transforming its proposed de facto
denial of court access into a just punishment for moral failure.
Those and other cognate attitudes have helped animate the ef-
forts of the Reagan and Bush administrations to restrict tort actions
(and other disfavored types of claims as well) for the declared pur-
pose of freeing American business from unwise competitive burdens
and safeguarding the wealth of the economically and morally meri-
torious. 31' The Reagan-Bush entrancement with the amorphous,
value-laden, and politically-charged concepts of markets and merit
has thus inspired a powerful use for the ideologically implicit con-
311. George Gilder, who chaired the Economic Roundtable at the Lehrman Insti-
tute and was one of the early publicists of Reaganomics, stressed the moral necessity of
allowing the meritorious to amass their wealth. "They deserve what they win."
GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 58 (1981). Moreover, Gilder declared, the
wealthy are also morally meritorious because they are inevitably self-sacrificing, giving
up their wealth in the service of progress. "It is the rich who by risking their wealth
ultimately lose it, and save the economy," he explained. Id. at 63. The wealthy as a
class are a natural elite, essential to society's welfare: "Material progress is ineluctably
elitist: it makes the rich richer and increases their numbers, exalting the few extraordi-
nary men who can produce wealth over the democratic masses who consume it." Id. at
259.
It is important to note that echoes of the indirect but fundamental equation of
merit and money also sound in the Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency and in the the-
ory of wealth maximization. In both, interpersonal value comparisons are supposedly
avoided by allowing buyers' varying abilities to pay for goods to establish what is de-
fined as "objective" value. In according equal weight to each monetary unit, Kaldor-
Hicks and wealth maximization commit the standard of objective value to the control of
those with the most money. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 254; Crespi, supra note 76.
Judge Posner has made the point clearly:
Another implication of the wealth-maximization approach, however,
is that people who lack sufficient earning power to support even a mini-
mum decent standard of living are entitled to no say in the allocation of
resources unless they are part of the utility function of someone who has
wealth.
POSNER, supra note 247, at 76. Judge Posner would, however, limit the consequences of
this view when the issue is access to the courts. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 10,
131-39.
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cept of the "non-meritorious." The latter concept, stretching out to
encompass and then to merge the presumed frivolous nature of
many lawsuits with the presumed moral nature of their instigators,
provides both a compelling inducement and a valid warrant for urg-
ing ostensibly rational rules to deprive large numbers of claimants
of access to the courts.
Given the fissures in its reasoning and the social results it
promises, Carnival Cruise seems fully explicable only in light of the
influence of some such informing political and social attitudes.
312
The Court's decision fits the Bush administration's Agenda. Both
embrace "market discipline" as the proper method of controlling
access to the judicial system. 313 Both advance rules that substan-
tially raise the costs and risks that claimants must incur if they wish
312. The theory of "liberty of contract" that flourished in the Court's decisions in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries presents a curious and ironic parallel to
its current theory of corporate-managed form contracts. The two theories are in some
ways quite different. The current theory rejects the idea that contract requires free
bargaining between equal and rational individuals, the fundamental idea on which the
earlier theory rested. Further, the current theory embraces the idea that contractual
principles must be molded to changing social and institutional conditions, an approach
that seemed suspect to most of those who spoke for the earlier theory. And yet, in spite
of the differences that separate the two theories, they do seem to accomplish the same
generic social result. Privileging a particular view of the bases of national economic
power and assuming the innocence of private social power, both have led the Court to
sanction the efforts of stronger parties to impose unfavorable contractual provisions on
weaker ones. See PURCELL, supra note 77, at 264-65.
Although the earlier Court usually ignored many of the de facto social conse-
quences of its liberty of contract decisions, on occasion it did acknowledge them.
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and
will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties
negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circum-
stances. This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between
employer and employee. Indeed a little reflection will show that wher-
ever the right of private property and the right of free contract co-exist,
each party when contracting is inevitably more or less influenced by the
question whether he has much property, or little, or none; for the con-
tract is made to the very end that each may gain something that he needs
or desires more urgently than that which he proposes to give in exchange.
And, since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature
of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of pri-
vate property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those
inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those
rights.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
313. Although Judge Posner has urged that some market pressures be used to limit
the number of suits filed, he has approached the problem with more care and also em-
phasized the need to limit such pressures in the broader interests of justice. See Pos-
NER, supra note 40, at 10-11, 131-39.
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to seek judicial relief. Both agree implicitly that it is legitimate to
protect business and the judiciary by compounding the likelihood
that those with few resources will be unable to pursue their claims.
And, finally, both promise the same result: To drive large numbers
of claimants from the courts.
From the most general perspective, then, Carnival Cruise
seems to stand as a defining ideological marker for the current
Supreme Court. Since the reasoning in the opinion is at best result-
oriented and the decision could easily have gone the other way, its
holding necessarily constitutes the majority's purposeful value
choice. The decision's expected social consequences, too, are appar-
ent and consistent with those of many of the Court's other recent
decisions. The current Court has tended to burden individual liti-
gants who seek relief against large private and governmental institu-
tions, and it has strengthened the ability of those institutions to
defeat such suits and to do so relatively easily and relatively early in
the litigation process.314 While there is broad public recognition
that the current Court's criminal law rulings are directed toward
314. Among recent examples are the following:
1. The Court engaged in the most vigorous type of judicial activism to defeat tort
actions against military contractors and protect the federal treasury by providing a spe-
cial defense (which Congress had repeatedly refused to enact) under the federal com-
mon law. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); see Michael D.
Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Products Liability Crisis:
Lessons from Boyle's Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 637 (1990);
Terrie Hanna, Note, The Government Contract Defense and the Impact of Boyle v.
United Technologies Corporation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 691 (1990).
2. The Court lowered the threshhold required to succeed on motions for summary
judgment, significantly improving defendants' chances of prevailing at an early stage of
a litigation. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme
Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudica-
tion Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988).
3. The Court restricted the doctrine of implied constitutional causes of action, re-
fusing to allow recovery against the federal government even on facts establishing the
most outrageous governmental abuse of its citizens. See United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669 (1987).
4. The Court loaded heavy new burdens on those who sought to enforce their
rights under the federal civil rights laws, particularly in protesting against employment
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such ends, 315 there seems to be somewhat less awareness that a simi-
lar pattern marks its civil law rulings as well. 316 Although the civil
and criminal law patterns are somewhat different, their similarities
nevertheless seem broad, fundamental, and hardly accidental. 317
Carnival Cruise confers on national corporations the power to
summon up the burdens of geography and cast them on their adver-
saries. It thereby institutionalizes a powerful litigation tactic and
discrimination. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
5. The Court made it more difficult for those challenging the constitutionality of
government actions to establish standing to sue. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
6. The Court allowed an Alabama county commission to alter its internal opera-
tions in a way that deprived elected black officials of the authority that had previously
been placed in their offices. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
7. The Court strengthened the ability of employers to force their employees to sign
employment contracts that deprive them of the right to bring legal actions against their
employers and compel them to submit their claims to arbitration. Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
8. The Court chose to proceed on its own and to limit federal habeas corpus juris-
diction severely, even though Congress has refused to limit that jurisdiction as Chief
Justice Rehnquist repeatedly requested. In effect, the Court rewrote the controlling
federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715
(1992); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
315. The Court's rulings restricting individual rights in the criminal law area are
numerous. For decisions from one recent Term, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct.
2680 (1991); Florida v. Bostick, I ll S. Ct. 2382 (1991); California v. Hodari D., 111 S.
Ct. 1547 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
316. The Court's decisions relating to the federal civil rights laws, for example,
helped prevent untold numbers of individuals from bringing or maintaining their claims
in court. The exceptionally burdensome proofs that the Court required in Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), for example, where it essentially over-
ruled its earlier landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
increased substantially the time, expense, and expertise necessary to establish a prima
facie case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241, 253, as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). The combination of
practical and legal obstacles forced many employment discrimination complainants to
abandon their hopes of obtaining judicial redress. "What happens," one specialist in the
field explained, "is that they end up not being able to enforce their rights." Steven A.
Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits over Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 1991, at A1, A17. That, of course, is precisely what will happen to some additional
number of plaintiffs who find themselves confronting forum-selection clauses in con-
sumer form contracts. Congress overruled Atonio and several other similar recent deci-
sions in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
317. Defending much of the Court's approach to changing the criminal law, a recent
newspaper editorial struck the concern that appears most fundamental and trouble-
some. "Even if the majority's motives in implementing an anti-crime agenda are the
best, the worry is that the court is too easily casting aside its historic role as the
staunchest, and often last, protector of the individual against state power." High
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reverses the long-standing efforts of both Congress and the Court to
minimize the impact that those burdens impose on "the fair and
orderly administration of the laws."' 318 Restricting the rights of or-
dinary Americans to obtain relief against established and powerful
institutions, Carnival Cruise enshrines the social and economic val-
ues of a corporatist-statist Court in a time of perceived economic
and moral decline. It reflects the Court's inchoate desire to
strengthen the nation's economic institutions by allowing American
business to operate freely and "efficiently" and its relative unwill-
ingness to provide meaningful remedies for those individuals who
fail, for whatever reason, to protect their own interests.
Court's Crime Offensive: In the End Who Will Be Hurt?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at
B4 (editorial).
Considering several recent decisions that affected minorities, Judge Stephen Rein-
hardt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expessed a similar concern about the
Court's attitudes. He noted that:
the Court clearly turned away from its historical role as the protector of
the civil rights of minorities-those who need its protection the most.
Instead, in a remarkable display of that dreaded quality-judicial activ-
ism-the Court perceived a need to rewrite our civil rights law and to
concentrate its efforts on preserving the privileged status of the white
majority.
Stephen Reinhardt, Civil Rights and the New Federal Judiciary: The Retreat from Fair-
ness, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (1991). Along the same line, Professor David
Chang concluded that the Court has been particularly "activist" in limiting "programs
that benefit traditional victims of racism" and that, in doing so, it has "ignored princi-
ples of federalism" and "ignored the impropriety of judicially-mandated resolutions of
political controversies based only on their personal values." David Chang, Discrimina-
tory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Con-
servative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 844 (1991).
Reviewing the Court's recent use of its powers of judicial review, Guido Calabresi,
Dean of Yale Law School, concluded more generally that the Justices have been "will-
ful" in failing to intervene in several areas, including situations where "the burden of
the rule [under review] falls on those who cannot protect themselves in legislatures."
The decisions of the current Court, he emphasizes, constitute "result-oriented judicial
activism." Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court 1990 Term-Forward: Antidiscrimina-
tion and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
HARV. L. REV. 80, 151 (1991).
The pattern seems clear. As Professor George Kannar commented recently:
The advent of the Reagan-Rehnquist Court presents an opportunity
for some corrective perestroika, as a broader set of constitutional scholars
now suddenly experience the same frustrations those concerned with
criminal procedure have been facing for almost twenty years-the frus-
trations of living with a Court pursuing a pre-determined course toward
Constitutional retrenchment.
George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297,
1344 (1990).
318. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
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V. REPLACING CARNIVAL CRUISE: SOME PROPOSED
ALTERATIONS IN THE LAW
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance
of an individual's right to bring suit in a forum near her home.
Even its restrictive commerce clause venue doctrine recognized that
plaintiff's residence in the forum state prior to the time of injury
weighed heavily in favor of her right to sue in the local courts. 319
When the Court abandoned the doctrine in the thirties, it again em-
phasized that in determining the propriety of forum choice the
plaintiff's place of residence, "even though not controlling, is a fact
of high significance." 320 When the Court finally adopted the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens in 1947, it again emphasized the same
point. "Where there are only two parties to a dispute," it declared,
"there is good reason why it should be tried in the plaintiff's home
forum if that has been his choice."'321
The same rule should apply, though often it does not, to mo-
tions under Section 1404. Because the provision allows judges to
transfer rather than dismiss actions, as is done under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, the federal courts have considered transfers
"less drastic" remedies and, accordingly, give plaintiff's choice of
forum somewhat less weight in considering a motion under the for-
mer than under the latter.322 As discussed earlier, 323 however, the
legislative history of Section 1404 suggests strongly that Congress
319. See State of Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & Mex. R.R. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S.
200, 207 (1924); Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 316-17
(1923).
320. International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511, 520 (1934).
321. Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524
(1947). In a companion case the Court explained that "unless the balance [of conven-
ience] is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
322. Under Section 1404 the federal courts hold that plaintiff's choice of forum
should be respected unless there are strong reasons why another forum would better
serve the interests of convenience and justice. Further, they also hold that the party
seeking transfer under Section 1404 carries the burden of making that showing. On the
theory that transfer under Section 1404 is a less drastic remedy than dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, the federal courts exercise broader discre-
tion under the former and give greater weight to general "economy" factors, including
the convenience of witnesses and of the judicial system itself. Accordingly, they give
relatively less weight to plaintiff's choice of forum in motions under Section 1404 than
they do under forum non conveniens. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 30-32
(1955). Compare Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (discussing
the proper weight to be accorded to plaintiff's choice of forum in a motion to dismiss on
the ground of forum non conveniens) with IA, pt. 2, JAMES W. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.345[5], at 4376 n.23, 4379 n.35 (2d ed. 1991).
323. See supra Part III(B).
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intended that in deciding transfer motions the courts continue to
give heavy weight-most likely the same weight accorded under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens-to plaintiff's choice of forum
when she chooses to sue in the courts of her home state or where
the claim arose. First, the legislative history shows that Congress
intended the provision as a device to deal with cases brought in
forums unconnected with either the plaintiff or the cause of action.
Second, the Reviser's notes state that the new provision "was
drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. ' ' 324 When Congress enacted Section 1404, it was surely
aware of the heavy weight that the Court had accorded to plaintiff's
choice of forum when it adopted theforum non conveniens doctrine
the preceding year. Those considerations of legislative history ar-
gue strongly that the courts should accord the same heavy weight to
plaintiff's choice of forum under Section 1404 as they do underfo-
rum non conveniens, and, more specifically, that they should un-
questionably do so when plaintiff files suit in her home state or in
the state where her claim arose. That conclusion is further
strengthened by the recognition that, in the context of real-world
claims-disputing practices, a transfer under Section 1404 is often no
"less drastic" a remedy than a dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds. 325 In both instances the result is frequently the same:
Plaintiff may still pursue her claim; if she does, she must litigate in a
forum that will impose greater costs and inconveniences on her; and
in either event she will be more likely to settle and more willing to
do so for relatively less money. To the extent that a transfer is the
functional equivalent of a dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds, the standard under the two should be the same.
326
The fundamental social policy that those rules and the legisla-
tive history of Section 1404 embody, and the particularly oppressive
324. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 132 (1947).
325. The situation could, of course, be quite different in some cases. If the statute of
limitations had run during the time between filing and decision on the venue question,
for example, then a forum non conveniens dismissal would be "drastic." More broadly,
too, transfer allows plaintiff to retain whatever advantages she may have sought from
the laws of the forum state. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). If plaintiff
was seeking special advantage from the forum state's laws, transfer would then be a
"less drastic" disposition than dismissal.
326. Forum non conveniens is not used in the federal courts when the action can
appropriately be transferred to another federal judicial district. It is used only when the
proper jurisdiction for an action is a foreign country. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981). The point in the text, of course, is only that in most cases there is little
or no de facto difference between transfer and dismissal in terms of the litigation future
of the dispute.
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burdens that geography imposes on ordinary litigants, suggest the
desirability of several related changes in the law. First, in the inter-
ests of both justice and convenience, and contrary to the holding in
Carnival Cruise, federal admiralty courts should not enforce forum-
selection clauses in consumer form contracts. 327
Second, The Bremen's reasonableness rule should be restricted
to commercial cases involving bargaining between relative equals.
While expanding the rule beyond the field of international trade
may be both desirable and consistent with the decision's rationale,
extending its rule to consumer form contracts is not.328
Third, for the same reasons and contrary to both Ricoh and
Carnival Cruise, the federal courts should not give weight to forum-
selection clauses in consumer form contracts in considering the
merits of transfer motions under Sections 1404.329 Section 1404
was not intended to deal with cases brought in a plaintiff's home
state or in the district where the claim arose. It was intended to
block systematic efforts to exploit the burdens of geography. Giv-
ing weight to forum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts
conflicts with the intent of Congress on both counts.
Fourth, in the interest of eliminating intrastate forum shopping
and promoting the equitable administration of justice, and contrary
to the Court's holding in Ricoh, the validity and enforceability of
forum-selection clauses should be controlled in federal diversity ac-
tions by the law of the appropriate state.330 Indeed, as we have
seen, relying on Section 1404 as a justification for giving weight to a
forum-selection clause in such cases is dubious in the extreme.
Finally, to the extent that the Court seeks to conserve judicial
and litigant resources by minimizing pretrial motions regarding
venue and jurisdiction, there are other and better ways to proceed.
Eliminating the uncertain but beguiling lure of a highly fact-specific
"fundamental fairness" scrutiny in favor of a broader and more eas-
ily applied general rule would be a substantial help. Perhaps the
easiest and most effective approach would simply be to construe the
327. Standard adhesion contract analysis justifies this result. See, e.g., Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173
(1983); Kirby, supra note 1, at 902-06.
328. For a thoughtful general defense of forum-selection clauses, see Leandra Leder-
man, Note, Viva Zapatal: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause En-
forcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422 (1991).
329. Ricoh involved a commercial agreement, not a consumer form contract.
330. The dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 33-41 (1988) states the appropriate considerations.
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"interest of justice" requirement in Section 1404331 to mean that in
cases involving consumer form contracts no transfer may be made if
plaintiff has filed suit in the district where the injury occurred.
332
This construction would dispense with the need for burdensome
"fundamental fairness" challenges and eliminate large numbers of
transfer motions, and it would also abolish the incentive defendants
now have to remove actions that are brought in states where the
local courts do not enforce forum-selection clauses.
CONCLUSION
The United States is currently enduring a period of relatively
intense self-doubt and introspection. Increasing numbers of people,
perhaps a large majority, seem to agree that major changes are nec-
essary, though few seem to agree on what the changes should be. In
Carnival Cruise the Court reveals its sympathy for those who advo-
cate a relatively untrammelled market approach to our national
problems. Whatever the merits of such an approach in economic
theory or commercial practice, it seems sadly out of place as an
ideal for the nation's system of civil justice. As a valuable commod-
ity, justice has always had a price. Seldom, if ever, however, have
we sought to push that price upwards as a matter of national policy
and to do so for the express purpose of driving Americans out of the
market for justice.
Forum-selection clauses create an egregious disproportional-
ity. 333 Highly technical, apparently inconsequential, and rarely no-
ticed or understood, they suddenly become-at a crucial and
perhaps devastating time for the individuals and families involved-
a substantial obstacle to suit and a powerful force pressing them to
abandon their claims or to discount them substantially. The law
should not sanction market failures that lead to such radical dispro-
331. This proposal does not apply to transfer motions made pursuant to § 1406
which allows such motions and transfers in actions brought in an improper venue.
332. Where plaintiff brought suit in her home state, the case would be transferred
only if "convenience" factors overcame the heavy presumption in favor of plaintiff's
choice that the Court discussed with respect to forum non conveniens in Koster v.
(American) Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). This would require a modification of current law.
See, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
333. The value consumers receive in exchange for accepting the forum-selection
clause is, in theory, a discount on the purchase price. On the level of individual savings,
even assuming consumers actually receive the theoretically full discount, the amount
each saves will be insignificant. In the event that the passenger needs to bring a suit, he
or she may be severely disadvantaged in the effort, and the severity of the disadvantage
may be wholly disproportionate to the minimal savings on the ticket.
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portionalities and compromise the essential integrity of the nation's
system of civil justice.334
334. In the preceding Term, in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990),
Justice Scalia called attention to the inherent unfairness of such disproportionate trade-
offs. There, he rejected the concurrence's argument that acceptance by a nonresident of
the protections and benefits of California's health, safety, and transportation systems
during a short visit to the state was a fair or reasonable basis on which to subject him to
personal jurisdiction in the California courts on a claim unrelated to that visit. "We
daresay," Justice Scalia declared emphatically in the plurality opinion, "a contractual
exchange swapping those benefits for that power would not survive the 'unconscionabil-
ity' provision of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 623.

